DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 289 018	CE 049 147

AUTHOR	Spitze, Hazel Taylor, Ed.
TITLE	Ethics in Today's World. Proceedings, Anniversary Conference, Illinois Teacher of Home Economics (30th, Champaign, Illinois, April 11-14, 1987).
INSTITUTION	Illinois Univ., Urbana. Div. of Home Economics Education.
PUB DATE	Apr 87
NOTE	82p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Illinois Teacher, 350 Education Bldg., University of Illinois, 1310 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820 ($6.00).
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021) -- Viewpoints (120)
EDRS PRICE	MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Conference Proceedings; *Ethical Instruction; *Ethics; *Home Economics; Individual Development; *Moral Values; Postsecondary Education; Secondary Education; *Values Education

ABSTRACT

Presentations and panel discussion papers are provided from a conference on ethics, specifically in regard to home economics education. Presentations include "Education for an Ethical Society: Transforming Moral Education, Insuring Domestic Tranquility" (Jane Martin); "Taking Our Ethical Responsibilities Seriously as Home Economists" (Margaret Arcus); "Ethics in Home Economics Curriculum" (Janet Laster); "Ethical Dilemmas in Serving Both Public and Private Spheres" (Virginia Moxley); "'Deep' versus 'Shallow' Ecology: The Search for an Environmental Ethic" (George Kieffer); "Science and Ethics" (Edith Baldwin); "Ethics, Home Economics, and Development Education" (Gladys Gary Vaughn); "Ethics in Today's World" (Margaret Herrmann); "Ethical Considerations in Development Education" (Sally Williams); "Asking the Right Questions: Analyzing Ethical Issues in the Human Services Professions" (Samuel Nickols, Sharon Nickols); "Teaching Values in Education" (Robert Berdahl); "Human Development and Ethics" (Dorothy Mitstifer); "Ethics and the Media" (James Carey); and "Hestian Ethics: An Ethics of Care and Connection" (Patricia Thompson). A list of questions and comments from the discussion group sessions and a list of resolutions proposed by the Listening Panel are also provided. (YLB)

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Copies of this publication are available for $6.00 from Illinois Teacher, 350 Education, University of Illinois, 1310 South Sixth St., Champaign, IL 61820.

PROCEEDINGS
XXXth ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE
ILLINOIS TEACHER OF HOME ECONOMICS

ETHICS IN TODAY'S WORLD

Hazel Taylor Spitze, Director and Editor
Division of Home Economics Education
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

April 11-14, 1987

Co-sponsors
- Kappa Omicron Phi
- Omicron Nu
- Phi Upsilon Omicron

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- The Miller Committee
- College of Education
- Dept. of Vocational and Technical Education

The objectives of this conference are to:

(1) encourage the profession of home economics to consider the issue of ethics in a broad sense
(2) establish working definitions of some of the concepts in the area of ethics
(3) identify areas of ethical problems for which Home Economics can help provide solutions
(4) stimulate thinking about the ethical aspects and implications of practice.

P R O G R A M

Ethics in Today's World
April 11-14-1987

Saturday - April 11, 1987

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HESTIAN ETHICS
Dr. Patricia Thompson, Associate Professor,
Division of Professional Studies,
Herbert Lehman College, CUNY 69

WELCOME

Welcome to the first session of the Third Conference in the last decade to be sponsored by the *Illinois Teacher of Home Economics*, a publication of the Home Economics Education Division of the Department of Vocational and Technical Education, University of Illinois, which has subscribers in every state, every Canadian province, every Australian state, and over 20 other foreign countries.

For this conference, which celebrates our 30th year, we have as co-sponsors the three honorary societies in Home Economics; Omicron Nu, Kappa Omicron Phi, and Phi Upsilon Omicron, each of whom is sponsoring a speaker on our program. Our theme this time is "Ethics in Today's World." We're pleased to have Millercomm sponsorship for our first speaker and to be able to open this session to the public. Welcome to all of you!

People have asked me "Why ethics?" We are reminded *every day* of why we need conferences on ethics. I read in the newspaper that some Wall Street officials are indicted for insider trading, some members of Congress and our Executive Branch of government are found guilty of unethical behavior, some of our military personnel are turning into spies for other countries, some parents are abusing their children, even killing them. I go to a meeting of the campus Senate Executive Committee and I find an item on the agenda about students cheating on tests and engaging in plagiarism. I read in a journal that some professors manufacture data so they can publish more articles. I turn on the TV and hear about leaders in the Praise the Lord group having their troubles and misusing gifts. Racism has reared its ugly head anew. Even children are committing crimes.

But there are always larger numbers in all these categories who have *not* done these things, and the very fact that some unethical behavior is now noticed and punished rather than being ignored or accepted, shows progress--no major wars lately, more civil rights, less sexism--and though we have far to go, I'm not giving up!

One man asked me, on hearing our theme, "Do you think there *are* any ethics in today's world?" I replied, "Yes, I have some. Don't you?" He smiled and admitted that he did. And I know you do, too.

So here we are!

For those of you who are interested in PDUs, that is, the professional development units the American Home Economics Association is granting to keep your new status of "Certified Home Economists" up to date, you must sign in at each session, including this one.

At the close of this session, all of you, whether registered for the conference or not, are invited to a reception for our speaker in the next room.

And now I'm happy to present to you our fairly new Dean of the College of Education, Nancy Cole, who has the distinction (although it's no distinction for the University of Illinois that this is so!) of being the first woman ever to be hired as an academic dean on this campus. She's a psychologist, a specialist in testing and held a position at ACT, a former administrator at the University of Pittsburgh, and she has creative ideas a mile a minute. We're proud of her!

She will introduce our speaker.

Hazel Taylor Spitze

EDUCATION FOR AN ETHICAL SOCIETY: TRANSFORMING MORAL EDUCATION, INSURING DOMESTIC TRANQUILLITY

Jane Roland Martin
Professor of Philosophy
University of Massachusetts - Boston

On this 200th anniversary of the writing of the Constitution, I want to begin my address by reading you the preamble to the United States Constitution:

> We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more Perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America.

As you may have guessed, it is the words "to insure domestic Tranquillity" that attract my attention; or rather, it is the fact that our founding fathers used these words in setting forth the ends the Constitution was to serve. I do not think enough has been made of this fact. Indeed, of the several ends listed in this preamble, domestic tranquillity surely qualifies as the least studied and discussed.

The Relativity of the Domestic

Scholars today agree that insurrection--specifically Shays' Rebellion--hastened the writing of our Constitution.[1] Frustrated by high taxes, high interest rates, declining farm prices, farm foreclosures, and the imprisonment of those who could not pay their debts, in the summer of 1786 Massachusetts farmers began protesting the actions of their legislature. By the fall and winter these protests had become armed confrontations, although with almost no bloodshed. By February 1787 Daniel Shays and his men were routed, but the fear of further rebellion haunted the men who were soon to frame the new constitution. The adoption by our founding fathers of the concept of a strong national government is at least in part due, then, to Shays and the debt-ridden farmers of Massachusetts. The inclusion in the preamble to the Constitution of the "domestic tranquillity clause" is no doubt to be accounted for in this way, too. As constitutional scholars like to remind us, however, the language of the framers outlives the immediate concerns of 1787.[2] Thus, it is incumbent on us to ask not simply what significance the phrase "domestic tranquillity" had when the Constitution was written but what it might have for us 200 years later.

Even for the founding fathers the domestic tranquillity clause must have had meaning beyond simply that of preventing rebellion, for the term "domestic" conveys a double message. Had they spoken of "civic" tranquillity, we might justifiably conclude that their interest was only in insuring governmental stability. Indicating on the one hand that internal as well as foreign disturbances can constitute threats to that stability, use of the term domestic also casts the new nation in a special light. If England had once been home to the colonists, they were now to consider the United States of America their home.

Surprisingly enough, the relativity of the domestic is seldom noticed today. By "relativity" I mean simply that what one takes to be the domestic sphere varies according to one's point of view. In the last fifteen to twenty years the concept of the domestic has played a central role in research on women. Implicitly adopting the perspective of a single society, this work consistently contrasts the domestic sphere or realm with the public, political or civic realm.[3] The current women's studies literature is by no means in agreement about the universality of the two-sphere distinction. The precise boundaries of each sphere, the content of the spheres in different cultures, the explanatory adequacy of the two-sphere analysis, the degree of freedom women have enjoyed within the domestic sphere are also matters of debate. On one point, however, there seems to be no dispute: this research locates the domestic within a culture or country. Thus, whereas the founding fathers, implicitly adopting an international perspective, viewed the United States itself as the domestic--for them, what scholars today call the public or civic realm was the domestic realm, this body of theory and research on women places a restricted construction on the domestic.

If the concept of the domestic plays a key role in recent scholarship on women, it has long been part of the theoretical framework of home economics. I believe that here too, however, the relativity of the domestic has gone unnoticed. Indeed, the very distinctiveness of the field of home economics has seemed to derive from the fact that it alone among the intellectual disciplines takes the private home as its central subject matter.

It is one thing to notice the relativity of the domestic, however, and quite another to show that the founding fathers' vision of the civic as a realm of the domestic has theoretical and practical significance for educators. Moreover, to say that from one standpoint the domestic and the public or civic are contrasting notions whereas from another, the public or civic is the domestic, is to say very little if the domestic is not given content. Here I will begin the task of filling in the notion of an expanded domestic "realm." At the same time I shall argue for the importance of taking seriously the founding fathers' concern with domestic tranquillity. I hope it will become clear as I proceed that even as we increase *our* own vision of the domestic to match that of the framers, we must enlarge *their* understanding of tranquillity to meet the realities of life in the United States in the late twentieth century.

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[1] Marian Starkey, A Little Rebellion (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955); Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United States (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); Allen Weinstein, "Massachusetts Uprising Affected the US Constitution," Boston Globe, February 2, 1987, p. 13.

[2] Paul Freund, "What They Said, What They Read," New York Times Book Review, March 15, 1987, pp. 3, 20-21.

[3] See, e.g., the essays in Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, ed. Woman, Culture & Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974).

Versions of the Domestic

Recent discussions of the domestic/public distinction point out that the nature and structure of the domestic varies across both cultures and time. Despite its variability, however, for us the term "domestic" in its primary sense pertains to the family or home or household. Thus, in urging that we explore the implications of an enlarged conception of the domestic, I am really asking us to think about the kind of home we want our nation to be and the kind of family we want its inhabitants to be. There is another related sense of the term to be reckoned with, however; one that commentators on the domestic tend to overlook. Think for a moment about domestic animals. They are not simply nice gentle beings that we happen to have invited to live in our homes or farmyards. They are tamed creatures whose fierceness has been trained or bred out of them.

Interestingly enough, the classic story of domestication is not about animals, however; it is about women. Shakespeare may not have used the term "domestic" in *The Taming of the Shrew*, but Petruchio's taming of Kate has all the marks of a domestication. Involving the images of roaring lions, an angry boar, and neighing steeds when in Act I he determines to marry Kate, in the last scene of the play Petruchio assures his friends, and his servant who had earlier likened Kate to a wildcat, that whereas he would wager twenty crowns on the obedience of his hawk or hound, he would venture twenty times as much on his wife's.

Renowned in Padua for her "scolding tongue" and "loud alarums," "Katharine the curst," as she is called, has the clear misfortune of possessing a sister who is everything she is not. As famous for her "beauteous modesty" as Kate is for her shrewishness, Bianca meets the description of an ideal woman that Petruchio ironically attaches to the unruly sister:

> I am a gentleman of Verona, sir,
> That, hearing of her beauty and her wit,
> Her affability and bashful modesty,
> Her wondrous qualities and mild behaviour,
> Am bold to show myself a forward guest
> Within your house, to make mine eye the witness
> Of that report which I so oft have heard.[4]

It is not only Kate's affability and mild behavior that Petruchio desires, however. To "curb her mad and headstrong humour" (p. 174) is but one of his objects. Even as he tells her, "When you are gentle, you shall have [a cup] too. And not till then" (p. 175). He uses the brainwasher's techniques of sleep and food deprivation to ensure that her beliefs and actions conform to his will. "I will be master of what is mine own," says Petruchio:

> She is my goods, my chattels; she is my house,
> My household stuff, my field, my barn,
> My horse, my ox, my ass, my any thing;
> (p. 171)

Shakespeare would have us realize that to domesticate an animal is to make it gentle *and* obedient. He would have us know, too, *that* although we consider the domestic to be women's realm, women like Bianca and like the tamed Kate are themselves domesticated animals. At the play's end, Kate says:

> Thy husband is thy lord, thy life, thy keeper,
> Thy head, thy sovereign; one that cares for thee,
> And for thy maintenance commits his body
> To painful labour both by sea and land,
> To watch the night in storms, the day in cold,
> Whilst thou liest warm at home, secure and safe;
> And craves no other tribute at thy hands
> But love, fair looks and true obedience;
> Too little payment for so great a debt.
> Such duty as the subject owes the prince
> Even such a woman oweth to her husband;
> And when she is froward, peevish, sullen sour,
> And not obedient to his honest will,
> What is she but a foul contending rebel
> And graceless traitor to her loving lord?
> I am ashamed that women are so simple
> To offer war where they should kneel for peace,
> Or seek for rule, supremacy and sway,
> When they are bound to serve, love and obey. (p. 181)

So you see, if in its primary sense, the term "domestic" pertains to the home and family, to domesticate has a dual meaning: to make gentle and to make obedient. These are not the same, for an individual can be gentle without being obedient or obedient but not gentle. In domesticating Kate, Petruchio makes her both gentle and obedient for his object is to transform her into that cultural artifact we call a woman.

Domesticating Society

What does Kate's taming bode? Petruchio is asked. "Peace it bodes, and love and quiet life, And awful rule and right supremacy; And, to be short, what not, that's sweet and happy?" (p. 181). In other words, it bodes domestic tranquillity. Whether Petruchio's supremacy in his private home will conduce to Kate's happiness as to his own we can never know. One thing is clear, however. Her subjection to his commands is not an aspect of their domestic tranquillity that one would want to see replicated in society at large. Conflicting with the most basic principle of democracy as well as with the ideal of sex equality, Kate's docile obedience to her husband's authority mimics the very political relationship the founding fathers were determined to avoid. Shays' Rebellion may have moved them to strengthen the Union but it did not undermine their faith in the very self-government Kate renounces in marriage. Indeed, upon hearing about Daniel Shays, one of their number, Thomas Jefferson, even allowed that "a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical."[5]

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[4] William Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, in Hardin Craig, ed. *The Complete Works of Shakespeare* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1951), p. 165. Henceforth page references will appear in parentheses in the text.

Fortunately, both history and contemporary experience reveal that the domestic tranquillity Petruchio foresaw for himself and Kate need not turn on "awful rule and right supremacy." Indeed, just as the British learned that awful rule and right supremancy contain the seeds of domestic intranquillity, studies of family violence indicating that the incidence of physical abuse in the private home is much higher where the husband presumes to be the head of the household than where both spouses view themselves as equal, are teaching us an analogous lesson.[6]

The ends of peace, love, and happiness both in the private and the public home surely require the gentling of characters like Kate--although not with Petruchio's training methods. But in humans, if not in roaring lions and angry boars, making gentle does not have to entail--and from both an ethical and a political standpoint ought not to entail--making obedient. Thus, in determining the implications of an expanded conception of the domestic, let us bracket Kate's subservience and Petruchio's corresponding mastery of her, but let us not lose sight of her new-found gentleness. In keeping this latter in focus we must, of course, be ever mindful that in history, as in Shakespeare's play, a woman's gentleness has been part and parcel of her subservient status; indeed, has been a factor contributing to her domination. Thus, although the two aspects of domestication as taming--making gentle and making obedient-- are analytically independent, in practice it may not be so easy to detach the one from the other. Nevertheless, if we value the peace, love, and happiness that Shakespeare attached to the private domestic realm, and if we believe that these goods should characterize the entire social realm as well, we had better try to accomplish just this.

I need scarcely remind this audience that the domestic tranquillity Petruchio anticipated in his life with Kate does not characterize American society in the late twentieth century. In our private homes wife beating is rife: one does not know whose statistics to believe but one volume I have read reports that two million women are beaten by their husbands each year while a Boston Globe article recently quoted an expert in the field as saying that 600,000 women in the United States are severely assaulted four or more times a year by their husbands.[7] The incidence of child abuse is also staggering: this same volume reports that two million children are victims of abuse annually.[8] In addition, man-girl incest is estimated to involve at lest one percent of all girls.[9]

The spaces of our public home are plagued by violence, too. Our schools play host to vandalism and assaults on teachers and students, our sports arenas to brutality and rioting, the streets of our cities to mugging, murder, gang terrorism, rape. The violence permeating our public home is not only physical. In her fascinating book Redesigning the American Dream, Dolores Hayden details the way billboards, bus placards, store windows, public art turn urban space into a "landscape filled with images of men as sexual aggressors and women as submissive sexual objects."[10] Her chilling account of this landscape as experienced by two women traveling to work in Los Angeles in June 1981 holds all too true, I fear, for urban dwellers in just about every American city today.

It must be emphasized that our public home has not always been an unsafe place in which to live. Violence in the sense of the physical or psychological violation of persons[11] has not always been the norm. Indeed, in 1786--the very moment when our founding fathers judged domestic tranquillity to be in jeopardy--a Boston newspaper was moved to write:

> In America mobs are noisy and stop courts--in Great Britain they are riotous and pull down houses. In England or Ireland a man is liable in the most peaceful times to be robbed at noon. In America any man is safe at midnight in the largest cities and surrounded with a Hampshire convention or a Worcester mob.[12]

How paradoxical! For us, the domestic tranquillity the founding fathers sought to preserve is relatively unproblematic. I do not mean to suggest that either the fear or the possibility of insurrection is entirely a thing of the past. Nonetheless, it seems safe to say that although the civic form of domestic intranquillity that worried our founding fathers is by no means extinct, another kind of domestic intranquillity--an anti-social form that seems to have been relatively unproblematic for them-- is by far the greater danger today. Tearing the social fabric as surely as rebellion unties civic bonds, domestic violence writ large violates the very rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that the United States Constitution is intended to protect.

Social reality demands, then, that we expand the founding fathers' understanding of domestic tranquillity and that we claim--or should I say

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[5] Starkey, op. cit., p. 4.

[6] Pamela Reynolds, "Violence at Home," Boston Globe, March 29, 1987, pp. A15, A17.

[7] John Langone, Violence (Boston: Little Brown, 1984), p. 124; Reynolds, op. cit.

[8] Langone, op. cit., p. 134.

[9] Wini Breines and Linda Gordon, "The New Scholarship on Family Violence," Signs, 8 (Spring, 1983), p. 521.

[10] Dolores Hayden, Redesigning the American Dream (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984, p. 221.

Newton Garver, "What Violence Is," in Jeffrie G. Murphy, ed., An Introduction to Moral and Social Philosophy (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 332-338.

[12] Starkey, op. cit., p. 63.

"reclaim"?--the civic or public realm as a domestic domain. It requires that all of us take on the task of erasing the domestic violence and intranquillity that in our society is now writ large and inscribing domestic tranquillity in its place.

There are many competing models of the private home but once again by limiting our discussion to our own culture, one can safely say that ideally we conceive of the home as not simply or even primarily a system of government and law. An arena for daily living, a space where children are reared, we take it to be an environment where people who are connected to one another in ways in which they are not connected to "outsiders" live out their lives. Now the nineteenth century promoted an image of the private home as a haven--a sanctuary to which one returned at the end of the day from an amoral, if not a positively immoral, outside world.[13] Needless to say, this model of the home applied only to men. It did not and could not capture the experience of the women whose job it was to create and maintain the home. Having no place to retreat from, this home could not be women's haven; working in it both day and night to make it a husband's or brother's or son's haven, it could scarcely be considered their place of rest. Still, if the vision of private home as haven was at best an illusion masking the realities of women's existence, we ought not to dismiss out of hand the sense of connection and intimacy, the safety and security, the peace and love that, like Petruchio, nineteenth century theorists and publicists attributed to the private home. These, after all, are precisely the qualities our public home so sorely lacks today.

Before we proceed to write large the qualities of the private home embodied in the home as haven model, however, at least one important argument against doing so must be addressed. If the private home is a major site of violence in the United States today, is it not the height of folly to project its qualities onto the whole realm? If we want to reduce the violence of the civic sphere, had we not better look anywhere for our model but to the private home? The enormous gap between the realities of private homes today and the model of home as haven should give us pause. We need not fear, however, that in writing large the qualities of an ideal private home, the civic realm will thereby be polluted by these realities for the larger society is already a sphere of violence. Indeed, we should be asking more than we do if its violent nature does not adversely affect the tranquillity of the private home. Rather than assume that the failings of the private home invalidate the project of domesticating society, we should perhaps expect the private home to be one of many social institutions reaping the benefits of a domesticated civic or public realm.

Domestic and Civic Education

I have no doubt that our Constitution could be appealed to more than it ever has been to insure the kind of domestic tranquillity writ large that I am discussing. But even if the courts were inclined to give due weight to the domestic tranquillity clause, we would be remiss to view one of the most important issues of our age as primarily a matter of law. A conception of the nation as home, of public space as a place of safety and security, of the relationship among citizens as one of harmony and shared goals rather than antagonistic claims: all this constitutes a reorientation of thought, feeling, and action. For this new perspective, and for the knowledge and skill that must accompany it, we must look not just to legislation but to education.

Unfortunately, when we do so the prospects seem dismal. It is not simply that our schools today do not conceptualize the nation as home. There is no place in education as we know it for the very qualities that constitute domestic tranquillity--the peace and love and gentleness at its core. Examine the recent national reports on education. You will find repeated demands for proficiency in the 3Rs, for clear, logical thinking and for higher standards of achievement in science, mathematics, history, literature, and the like. You will search in vain, however, for discussions of love of any kind.[14]

Why are there no calls for mastery of what in my research I have named the 3Cs of care, concern, and connection--qualities closely related to the peace, love, and gentleness of domestic tranquillity? Briefly put, except for home economics, education today constitutes preparation for performing society's productive processes, in which category I include political and cultural activities as well as economic ones. Preparation for carrying out the reproductive processes of society--a category I define broadly to include not simply conception and birth but the rearing of children to more or less maturity and associated activities such as tending the sick, taking care of family needs, and running a household--is all but ignored. Insofar as they are said to have value at all, the 3Cs--as well as peace, love, and gentleness--derive their significance from society's reproductive processes. Considered functional in relation to childrearing, family living, and the like, they are thought to be irrelevant if not actually dysfunctional in relation to the productive processes of society. They are seen, then, as irrelevant to education and are excluded form its domain along with the societal processes to which they are connected.

Given that the productive processes of society take place in what is considered to be the public or civic sphere of society and the reproductive processes in what is considered to be the domestic sphere, one implication of the fact that education is defined solely in relation to society's productive processes is that the function of the whole of education today is to prepare people for life in the public or civic realm. In a very real sense, then, all education is civic education. This is not generally recognized, of course. Indeed, many voices right now question our nation's very commitment to civic education. "Civic education" has both a broad and a narrow sense, however. Insofar as these critics are using the label to designate what used to be called citizenship education--or perhaps citizenship plus patriotic education plus that civics course we once took--their concern may be warranted. Their complaint that we do not have enough *civic* education should not lead us to suppose, however, that we now have too much *domestic* education. On the contrary, with the exception of home economics education--and perhaps only some parts of that--no education today directly prepares our young for life in the domestic realm. The general, liberal and vocational education we have today are *all* forms of civic education in the broadest sense of the term.

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[13] Hayden, op. cit., p. 68ff.

[14] This paragraph and the next are adapted from Jane Roland Martin, "Redefining the Educated Person: Rethinking the Significance of Gender," Educational Researcher, 15 (June/July, 1986).

Once one acknowledges that all education is broadly speaking civic, the anomalous status of home economics becomes apparent. Taking as its subject matter the private home and its associated reproductive processes, home economics studies phenomena whose existence is not even recognized by the conceptual categories that guide education. Teaching students to understand and value and learn to perform the very tasks and activities that education, as we have defined it, excludes from its purview, home economics has goals that by definition fall outside the realm of education.

But now consider the following. If all education is civic, and if we shift our perspective so as to perceive the civic as the domestic, then all education becomes domestic. Thus, one implication of the switch in our thinking about education that I am proposing--an implication this audience will appreciate--is that home economics is no longer an anomaly. When the domestic and the civic are sharply separated, as they now are, and the domestic is so devalued that preparation for it is not even considered to be one of education's functions, as it now is, home economics cannot fit comfortably into our conceptual categories. If, however, our founding fathers' insight into the relativity of the domestic is honored and the whole sphere is called home, our fundamental categories shift and the anomalous phenomenon becomes the expected. With domesticity writ large, education can no longer be defined solely in relation to society's productive processes. Whether its function is then best described as preparation for carrying on both kinds of processes or whether the distinction between the two kinds of societal processes itself becomes untenable I cannot at this point say. Clearly, however, as a subject whose material is the private home and its associated tasks, processes, knowledge, skill, and personal qualities, home economics will not only be easily accommodated by this new perspective; it will have much to contribute to it.

Notice, I have not said that when all education becomes domestic education, all teachers will be home economics teachers! To construe the civic as a realm of the domestic is *not* to equate the whole of education with *this* one field. Just as there is a broad and a narrower sense of civic education, so too there is a broad and a narrower sense of domestic education. When all education is seen as civic, civic education in the limited sense of citizenship or patriotic education or education about one's country's form of government becomes one among many elements of civic education broadly understood. Similarly, when the civic is seen as the domestic, domestic education in the limited sense of home economics becomes one among many elements of domestic education writ large. Granted, there are many versions or models of home economics education to be reckoned with. Still, whichever version one embraces, when domesticity is writ large, home economics as we know it is just one element of domestic education broadly understood, albeit it a very important one.

Education for Domestic Tranquillity

In other words, when our perception of the civic changes, so must our vision of education. Insofar as an expanded domestic realm promises to supplant an ethic of violence and violation with one of safety and security, peace and love, our new vision will reorient educational theory and practice in general and the theory and practice of moral education in particular. In making the insuring of domestic tranquillity one of the central functions of education, we claim for our young a very special quality and kind of moral instruction and training even as we claim for our society a very special kind and quality of moral life. Furthermore, because in a real sense all education is moral education--in that, whether intentionally or not, wherever teaching occurs norms are transmitted and patterns of conduct are acquired--this new vision does not simply infuse *formal* programs in moral education with goals and objectives derived from our interest in insuring domestic tranquillity. It requires that *all* aspects of our educational endeavor be made consistent with and reflective of this end.

Do you, by any chance, remember that Boston area high school English teacher who gained national attention a year or two ago by resigning her job rather than continue to meet the "irrelevant" demands being placed on her? I recall especially her complaint about having to pick up trash in the hallways and keep order in the lunchroom. If I were an English teacher, I would not particularly want to do those things either. And yet the conceptions of teaching and learning and of school itself that lay behind her protest are troubling. Moreover, the hidden and not so hidden moral lessons to be learned from littered hallways and also from teachers who, while seeking to establish tranquillity in their classrooms, want to responsibility for establishing it in a school's public places, clearly conflict with the project of educating for domestic tranquillity writ large.

So that there is no misunderstanding, let me make it clear that I do not advocate the establishment of "law and order" regimes in our schools: passes to leave the classroom, authoritarian vice-principals, up and down staircases. Teaching their own negative lessons, these measures keep at best a repressive peace. My point is, rather, that the domestic tranquillity required by the whole social sphere is not likely to be fostered by educational structures embodying the very practices we want to change. I do not say that our English teacher should actually have picked up the litter, at least not by herself. I regret very much, however, that she apparently did not see the presence of the litter as the occasion for moral education it surely was, an occasion out of which a sense of community and an appreciation of public space might have begun to develop. Of course one should not expect a single English teacher to take on her own shoulders the moral education that is every teacher's task. Yet one cannot help wishing that this highly educated person had at least realized that no one is "just" an English or science or math or home economics teacher; that as a teacher of X, Y, or Z, one is necessarily also a moral educator.

To write domestic tranquillity large requires that we recognize and rethink the domestic/public split wherever it occurs in education. Within schools it takes the form of a split between one's private classroom--sometimes called homeroom--and the larger school environment; within the child's environment outside the private home the school itself is seen as a home or haven in relation to the larger society. Testifying to the selfsame relativity of the domestic that I emphasized earlier, these unnoticed repetitions of the domestic/public dichotomy can actually be made to work to our advantage. For if from the perspective of the whole public or civic realm schools are already viewed as a child's home, it is but a small step to ask those who teach in and administer schools to regard them as domestic environments. A small step, I say, yet one with a multitude of implications for the way rules are instituted, relationships are perceived, and responsibilities are carried out.

Now we should not assume that when education is guided by the interest of domestic tranquillity only the informal aspects of moral education will be affected. The formal programs of moral education popular today tend to be reductionist. Morality is equated with decision making, decision making is then viewed as reasoning, and reasoning is conceived of as judging, with dilemmas or conflict situations assumed to be the proper objects of that activity. In light of the contemporary ideal of the educated person and the theory of liberal education that I wrote about in the last chapter of my book Reclaiming a Conversation,[15] this reductive sequence is to be expected. An enlarged conception of the domestic raises questions about its validity, however. Requiring us to reject the divorce of reason from feeling and emotion implicit in the judging model, the goal of domestic tranquillity mandates also a denial of the split between thought and action entailed by the equation of morality with a narrowly defined reasoning. In addition, it forces us to reconsider the central role these programs now assign to individual decision making and choice and to conflict.

That conflict looms large in programs of moral education is not surprising: disputes between opposing parties to controversies are what judging is all about.[16] It is not at all obvious, however, that conflict and controversy are what morality is all about. In daily living, moral dilemmas are the exception not the rule. I do not mean to say that we never confront them. Of course we do.[17] But moral life is not reducible to a series of dilemmas nor is it comprised mainly of them. Neither is the resolution of conflict the only, or even the most important, element of moral thought and action.

Interestingly enough, once insuring domestic tranquillity takes clear shape as a function of education, the aims of solving dilemmas and resolving controversies recede into the background. With the emergence in the foreground of the 3Cs of care, concern and connection and the fourth C of cooperation, individual decision making and choice recede, too. This is not to say that in an enlarged domestic realm, there is no room for differences of opinion. Nor is it to say that education for domestic tranquillity must or should include training in obedience. On the contrary, as Thomas Jefferson understood so well, domestic tranquillity is quite compatible with dissent in both speech and action. It is quite compatible with the expression of a wide range of viewpoints and "life-styles," to use an overworked phrase. It is to say, however, that an emphasis on education for domestic tranquillity transforms the entire landscape of moral education. And so it must, for this new emphasis requires that we shed many of our most fundamental assumptions about moral education.

Conclusion

Once the relativity of the domestic is acknowledged, numerous far reaching questions about moral education, indeed about all of education, emerge. Some of these I have brought forward here. In closing there is one more that I simply have time to mention.

For good reason, our founding fathers made the new nation the site of the domestic. Two hundred years later, we must reclaim their insight into the relativity of the domestic without accepting the domestic boundaries they took for granted. Today, if not in Daniel Shays' lifetime, a domestic/public split separating our homeland from other lands is as fraught with danger as was the fragmentation of states inherent in the Articles of Confederation the founding fathers saw fit to reject. In an age in which technology places not merely the nation, indeed not merely the human species but all life at risk, the earth itself must be seen for what it is--our home. Thus, the domestic tranquillity we seek in our private homes and need desperately to extend to our national home must ultimately be projected onto the whole planet and this largest projection will itself have to be reflected in the new moral education.

Now you may have been wondering how I could have gotten to almost the end of my address without having discussed the devaluation of the domestic. I am sure that everyone working in the field of home economics has at one time or another felt its weight. Given this negative assessment of the domestic, which is not limited to this culture, how can the project of expanding our conception of the domestic realm and enlarging our understanding of domestic tranquillity possibly gain support? Do not our cultural presuppositions demand the narrowest rather than the broadest definition possible of the boundaries of the domestic? And what about the by no means unrelated cross-cultural association of women and domesticity? If one set of late twentieth century social realities requires us to enlarge the scope of domestic tranquillity, does not this other set of realities make our endeavor an exercise in futility?

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[15] Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation: the Ideal of the Educated Woman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), Ch. 7.

[16] Although an emphasis on conflict is part of the judging model of moral reasoning, conflict is detachable from it. Thus, to reject the judging model is not necessarily to deny conflict the major role it now plays in moral education.

[17] For more on this point see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

The realities of a cultural value hierarchy that denigrates both women and the domestic make our task difficult and complex but certainly not futile. I remind you of what you already know not so that you will throw up your hands in despair but so that as educators we can together begin to develop ways to overcome this obstacle to insuring domestic tranquillity. I need scarcely tell you that the project I recommend will not be achieved overnight. However, women's studies programs have already developed curricular strategies for addressing the asymmetric cultural evaluation of the sexes and the evaluation of the domestic. And as you well know, there is a wealth of material, methods, and concepts developed over the years by home economics educators that treat this issue. Building on our existing resources, we must now try in concert to raise to consciousness the hidden curriculum of school and society in anti-domesticity and to explore the implications of positive alternative valuations of the domestic. At the same time, however, we must make every effort to view education for domestic tranquillity writ large as a constructive positive project, not simply a reactive negative one. This does not necessarily mean that the new moral education will require brand new school subjects. But just as Dolores Hayden has held urban public space up to scrutiny and has begun the task of redesigning it, we must examine and ultimately redesign old subjects, old methods of instruction, old forms of curricular organization, and old conceptions of school structures even as we also develop some new ones.

Lest any of us suppose, however, that the best insights into how to redesign education are to be found in the academy, I want to close with a statement written for a church publication and reprinted in a Boston area independent school news bulletin. Robert Fulgham says:

> Most of what I really need to know about how to live, and what to do, and how to be, I learned in kindergarten. Wisdom was not at the top of the graduate school mountain, but there in the sandbox at nursery school.
>
> These are the things I learned: Share everything. Play fair. Don't hit people. Put things back where you found them. Clean up your own mess. Don't take things that aren't yours. Say you're sorry when you hurt somebody. Wash your hands before you eat. Flush. Warm cookies and cold milk are good for you. Live a balanced life. Learn some, and think some, and draw every afternoon. When you go out into the world, watch for traffic, hold hands, and stick together. Be aware of wonder. Remember the little seed in the plastic cup. The roots go down and the plant comes up and nobody really knows how or why, but we are all like that.
>
> Goldfish and hamsters and white mice and even the little seed in the plastic cup--they all die. So do we.
>
> And then remember the book about Dick and Jane and the first word you learned, the biggest word of all: LOOK.
>
> Everything you need to know is there somewhere. The golden rule, and love, and basic sanitation. Ecology, and politics, and sane living.
>
> Think of what a better world it would be if we all--the whole world--had cookies and milk about 3 o'clock every afternoon, and then lay down with our blankets for a nap. Or if we had a basic policy in our nation and other nations to always put things back where we found them and clean up our own messes. And it is still true, no matter how old you are, when you go out into the world, it is best to hold hands and stick together.[18]

As the scholars tell us, the domestic realm belongs to children as well as to women. But then, we should not really be surprised that some of the best ideas about domestic education writ large are already being practiced where young children are being taught.

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[18] "From the Director's Desk," Shady Hill News, Fall-Winter, 1986-1987, p. 2.

ETHICS IN HOME ECONOMICS: TAKING IT SERIOUSLY

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In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in and concern for ethics. Questions have been raised about the rightness or wrongness of the actions of individuals in government, in the health care and education systems, and in business and industry, as well as about the behaviors of individuals in their private lives. Attention is increasingly directed to the ethical aspects of scientific and technological developments, and disciplines and professions have begun to examine the ethical aspects of their work more systematically. Given this rather general climate of concern for ethics, it is not surprising that home economics is also experiencing renewed interest in ethics.

As you may recall, questions of ethics entered into early home economics deliberations in two ways (Arcus, 1984). First, there was the general emphasis placed on improving home and family living as the mission of the field. Hunt, for example, noted that "To improve is a value position, that is implying some valued end, and as such it has ethical implications for Home Economics practice" (Hunt, 1907, p. 10).

As well, many specific references were made to ethics and morality during the 1899-1908 Lake Placid Conferences. Ellen H. Richards noted the need to incorporate into education "those ethical and practical principles which may check wrong and foster right tendencies" (Vincenti, 1981, p. 309). Alice Chown (1901, p. 7) asserted that "whatever tends to elevate the home, tends to deepen the development of the moral nature of the child and citizen." My personal favorite comes from Adelaide Hoodless who stated that "It is character we need to build and not cooks" (1905, p. 68).

However, as Vincenti (1981) has pointed out, ethics as an explicit normative concern disappeared from the Home Economics literature after these Lake Placid Conferences and did not reappear until after World War II. Since that time, of course, considerable attention has been given to the study of all Home Economics matters including that of ethics. A number of scholarly and professional papers have been published (e.g., Arcus, 1984; Brown & Paolucci, 1978); attention has been given to the development of a code of ethics for the field (e.g., Arcus, 1986); and meetings and conferences such as this one on home economics and ethics have been held.

These kinds of actions and activities have been necessary in the evolution of the ethical dimension of our field, but I do not believe that they have been sufficient. If we wish to demonstrate both scholarly and ethical integrity in our field, there are several additional tasks to which we must give considered attention if we are to take ethics in Home Economics as a serious development in our field. My purpose here is to explore several of these tasks with you: becoming clear about the nature (or definition) of the field of ethics; using ethical concepts with greater rigor; understanding the role of principles in ethical behavior; and examining the theoretical perspectives which lie behind ethical judgments and actions.

The Nature of Ethics as a Field of Study

First of all, if we are to be serious about ethics in Home Economics, we must be clear about the nature of ethics as a field of study. Unless we are clear both about what ethics entails and what it excludes, our thoughts and our actions concerning ethics may be confused and misguided.

One place to begin, of course, is with definitions of the field. John Ladd (1978, p. 400) defines ethics as "the philosophical inquiry into the principles of morality, of right and wrong conduct, of virtue and vice, and of good and evil as they relate to conduct." William Frankena (1973, p. 4) identifies it as a branch of philosophy and states that "it is moral philosophy or philosophical thinking about morality, moral problems, and moral judgments." Such definitions may be accurate but they may not seem very helpful, particularly to the uninitiated. Thus, it may be useful to examine more closely three key elements of these definitions.

1. As these definitions imply, the terms "ethics" and "morality" generally refer to the same thing, with the term ethics coming from the Greek and that of moral coming from the Latin. Although the terms do not have the same emotional impact for most individuals, their commonality must be acknowledged if they are to be understood and used appropriately. While some ethical and moral theorists have made some distinctions in the use of these terms, these distinctions are not consistent ones. For most purposes in Home Economics, it is appropriate to use the terms synonymously.

   However, an important ambiguity about these terms needs to be clarified. Both ethics and morality have two opposites. One opposite is that of "nonmoral" or "nonethical" and serves to categorize things which do not belong to the ethical and moral domain. The second opposite--"immoral" or "unethical"--serves to evaluate those things which lie within this domain. In being serious about ethics, it is important not only that we become clear about what belongs within this domain but also that we restrict the application of ethical concepts and principles only to those things. This is particularly important for a field such as Home Economics which has a strong value component, some of which lies within the ethical domain and some of which is value-related but nonethical.
2. What, then, *is* the domain of ethics and morality? As our definitions tell us, it is concerned with human conduct and character and it refers to "...those acts which it makes sense to describe as right or wrong, good or bad. They are acts that have, or are likely to have, helpful or harmful effects on the lives of others. They

are covered by the rules of right conduct, such as 'We ought to tell the truth' or 'We ought to keep our promises'." (Schulte and Teal, 1975, p. 228).

The field of ethics is concerned with three major questions related to human conduct and character: What is good (or bad) for human beings? What constitutes right (or wrong) conduct? and How ought we to live and to treat others? Our systems of ethics and morality should help us to answer these three questions and should serve as a means for adjudicating conflicts of interests between or among persons. As Coombs has stated, "Moral judgments, or judgments from the moral point of view are judgments based on consideration of how other people are to be treated, how their interests are to weigh against one's own. The point of making a moral judgment is to adjudicate a conflict of interests, typically human interests. Were our interests never in conflict there would be no occasion for making moral judgments or having moral principles" (Coombs, 1975, p. 9).

3. Our definitions also tell us that ethics and morality are philosophical inquiry into questions about human conduct and character. This kind of inquiry differs in important ways from empirical inquiry. Clearly one can study moral and ethical phenomena in empirical ways--describing patterns of conduct which occur in given groups or societies, identifying the moral beliefs of certain individuals, and so on. In contrast, moral philosophy is prescriptive or value inquiry into moral phenomena, seeking not to describe what occurs, but to determine which actions or ideals are better and for what reasons. This kind of thinking focuses on justification rather than explanation and requires the development of appropriate skills in reasoning.

To clarify further the nature of this field, it may also be helpful to explore the role of ethics and morality in society. Ethics and morality are established patterns of social interaction, developed through time by communities to meet their needs for the regulation of social conduct and the maintenance of practices considered to be socially important. In this sense, ethics is an instrument of society as a whole for the guidance of its members, and it places demands on people to act in accord with these established practices.

Because ethics and morality have this societal dimension, they are often confused with other social institutions and practices which also help to regulate and maintain social conduct. When asked what one ought to do, for example, some people may refer to whatever is customary or established practice, i.e., one ought to do it because it has always been done this way, or because most people do it this way. Or they may refer to formalized codes or rules as found in law or in religion, i.e., one ought not to do a thing because it is against the law or because the church forbids it.

Being customary or the law or a religious edict, however, does not make a thing morally right. There are many examples of customs and laws and edicts which are unjust or harmful. Discrimination may be customary, but that does not mean that it is morally right. The concept of "unjust laws" indicates that legal and ethical are not synonymous and that some laws may be unethical or immoral. Some religions may require the sacrifice of unwilling victims or may persecute those who do not accept their tenets. Are these actions right just because they have some religious force behind them?

Ethics and morality are concerned, not with what customs, laws, or edicts are but with what they ought to be. Ethics provides the standards or criteria by which we might judge these other social practices. In ethics, one does not ask how we treat others, that is, what are our practices, but how ought we to treat them. Are our customs, laws, and religious practices good and just? Please note that I am not saying that law, custom, and religion are unethical. Rather, I am saying that they are different from ethics and morality.

This may have seemed to be a rather lengthy overview of the nature of the field of ethics, but it has also been a cursory review of some of its major elements. But we cannot take ethics seriously in our profession unless we know what that field is about and what its integration into our own will demand of us.

Ethical Concepts

Let me turn now to a second task in taking ethics seriously, i.e., using ethical concepts with greater rigor. Many of the major concepts of ethics are familiar ones: rights, responsibility, freedom, respect, goodness, justice, value, reason. These and other ethical concepts are used regularly in Home Economics, although they are not always used in ethical contexts. This is not surprising since most of these concepts also have nonethical uses.

The dual uses of ethical terms can sometimes lead to ambiguity and confusion. "Value", for example, is an ethical term, but ethical values are only one kind of value. There are other kinds of value (economic value, aesthetic value, prudential value) which do not lie within the moral domain (Association for Values Education and Research, 1978). "Good" is an ethical term which may refer to moral good, because it meets moral criteria, or to nonmoral good, because it is effective, efficient, or attractive (Frankena, 1973). These two uses are distinguished by the grounds or the reasons for which a judgment is being made; that is, the kind of reason given indicates the kind of good or value intended. If actions are good because they are effective (i.e., for a nonmoral reason), then these actions are nonmoral ones. If they are good because they promote justice (a moral reason), then they are moral actions. Making and using these distinctions contributes not only to better understanding of these concepts but also to better communication about ethical issues.

Clarity in the use of concepts is more than distinguishing between the moral and nonmoral uses of terms, however. It also involves making concepts as explicit as possible in order that they may more adequately serve as indicators of the moral domain and as guides to ethical conduct. Let me illustrate this with two rather detailed examples.

One moral concept used widely in Home Economics is that of "respect for persons". This concept appears in many of our curriculum guides and is generally held to be an important guiding principle in our interactions with others. But what does it mean to show "respect for others" (i.e., how should one act toward others)?

Jason Joh (1975) believes that many who hold "respect for persons" as a moral imperative misunderstand it as a moral concept. His clarification of this concept demonstrates that different kinds of behavior may be required to show "respect for persons" in different interaction contexts. He focuses on two kinds of verbal interaction situations: casual or social conversations, and serious or educational conversations.

Joh uses the example of a teacher who has worked hard with a student from a ghetto area and who has been successful in keeping this student in school and improving his attitudes toward school and work. The student appreciates the support of this teacher and demonstrates this by giving to the teacher an expensive tie. All is well until the teacher discovers that the tie is stolen. Although he appreciates the good intentions of the student, he cannot approve of stealing.

The teacher's internal dialogue goes something like this. "Should I try to convince John that stealing is wrong even if his intention s good?...I should. But what if John is offended by my entering into dialogue with him on stealing? He has already said that it's no big deal." Then, the teacher recalls what he has heard: stealing is not such a bad thing to certain subcultural socio-economic groups. Mr. Smith now decides not to say or do anything to John about his admitted act of stealing, for he is worried that showing his disapproval might jeopardize the rapport that he has painstakingly cultivated. Mr. Smith does not want to see John feel hurt. His inner dialogue continues. "Furthermore, why should I impose my middle-class values on John? Who am I to say to John that his act of stealing is wrong? Let him discover it for himself. I should allow him to discover it. Not allowing him the freedom to choose for himself is authoritarian, anti-humanistic, not treating a student as an individual, a person, and not respecting his individuality, his human dignity...I must respect him as a person." (Joh, 1975, p. 274). In this example, has Mr. Smith indeed shown respect for John as a person?

According to Joh, showing respect for persons implies having a general disposition to act properly towards others with all relevant moral concepts, principles, and rules carefully observed--fairness, maximizing freedom, considering interests, and so on. However, respect for persons takes on more specific meanings in the context of specific kinds of interactions.

In casual conversation situations, respect for persons means taking a general moral attitude toward another, with the central concern to recognize and accept the person as a distinctive experiencing individual (one who has desires, interests, beliefs, feelings). Respect for persons in this context means to accept beliefs as personal (i.e., coming from the person). It does not mean that one either assents to the beliefs or approves of the validity of that person's reasoning. Lack of respect would include such behaviors as not listening, deliberately not being attentive, interrupting, or dominating.

In serious discussion situations, however, the central concern is for the truth or the reasonableness of the beliefs held by an individual. Respect for persons in this context means something quite different; it is the quality of the idea rather than the person who holds it that matters. Respect for persons includes not only the general moral attitudes mentioned previously but also the principles of rational thinking (e.g., listening critically, assessing beliefs on some impersonal standard, and correcting and criticizing inadequacies in reasoning). Lack of respect for persons in these serious discussion situations would mean refusing to get into serious dialogue (thus excluding others from the rational and moral community, disregarding relevant principles of morality, deceiving or manipulating, or catering to emotions in order not to hurt feelings.

As Joh concludes (p. 277), "Respect for persons as a moral principle in serious discussion situations is not simply a vague moral sentiment often expressed by such cliches as "being humanistic", "being democratic", or "treating children as individuals or equals"... The principle of respect for persons provides more definite, though still general, procedural principles in these situations. One shows respect for others as persons by doing certain things rather than others for rational and moral reasons, not by echoing cliches or repeating slogans."

A second important concept in Home Economics is that of "quality of life". Although this concept is commonly used in our profession, little attention has been given to a disciplined and systematic investigation of its meaning. In the absence of such investigation, our use of the concept is often imprecise and at times may be little more than slogans or emotional appeals to action.

There have been several attempts to clarify the meaning of the term quality of life through conceptual analyses (Baier, 1974; Bedau, 1974; McCall, 1975; Rescher, 1972). These analyses have addressed such questions as: Does quality of life pertain to societies as a whole, or is it something characteristic of individuals and extended to societies by some process of summation? Is it measured by collecting subjective reports of individual satisfaction/dissatisfaction, or by making objective counts of social indicators such as numbers of schools or levels of nutritional status? Is quality of life the same for all individuals everywhere, or does it differ from person to person and from country to country? Until we have answers to questions such as these, we will be unable to measure the concept with any confidence and to determine whether or not quality of life has improved.

The social indicators movement has been instrumental in attempting to define and measure the quality of life. Two key studies of this movement, Social Indicators of Well-Being (Andrews and Withey, 1976) and The Quality of American Life (Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers, 1976) were carried out in the early 1970's at the University of Michigan. In these studies, it was taken for granted that individuals had the basic essentials of life (adequate food, housing, and other material goods) and it was assumed that in order to determine the quality of life, it was necessary to go directly to the individual for expressions of satisfaction on life experience domains such as health, marriage, family life, and jobs. Thus, these studies defined quality of life in individual and subjective terms, with individual perceptions aggregated to indicate the quality of life for the group or society as a whole.

The findings of the two studies were similar, with responses tending to cluster rather heavily (and somewhat improbably) toward the positive end of the scale. Regardless of the conditions in which people lived, most reported that they were reasonably well satisfied. In the Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers study, for example, respondents from poor neighborhoods expressed almost as much overall satisfaction as did those from high-income neighborhoods, and even those who were described as "trapped in more or less bleak conditions" still reported general life satisfaction.

These studies are important studies and have been widely cited to indicate that, overall, the quality of life in the United States is quite high. The definition of quality of life in individual and subjective terms, as used in these studies, is appealing to many and indeed is reflected in much of the Home Economics/Human Ecology literature. Although this definition is *reflected* in the literature, however, it is *not clear* that it has been critically *selected* by the field.

Several important questions have been raised about this interpretation of quality of life and have challenged the notion that quality of life can be adequately defined by reference to individual perceptions of satisfaction or well-being. Wilcox (1981) characterizes these concerns as "dissatisfaction with satisfaction". For example, concerns have been expressed about the positivity bias found in these studies. There may be several reasons why most people report general overall life satisfaction: self-deception, a lack of knowledge of alternatives, a low level of expectation, or the ability to adapt to changed circumstances. Given these diverse possibilities, what do reports of individual satisfaction indicate? Are those "trapped in bleak conditions" expressing satisfaction because they have a high quality of life or because they have the capacity to adapt to changed circumstances? Self-reports of satisfaction may tell us more about individual expectations and capacities than it does about quality of life.

There are other problems with the use of individual satisfaction as the indicator of quality of life. Satisfaction/dissatisfaction are relatively unstable and transitional states and are easily influenced by rising or falling expectations or even by unreasonable expectations (those based on social inequities or injustices). Thus, one's reported level of satisfaction often depends upon when one was asked and upon what else was going on in one's life at the time, or upon what one believes, rightly or wrongly, that one is entitled to. Given these different influences and the potential fluctuation in satisfaction, how much confidence can be placed in the subjective perceptions of individuals?

But if quality of life is not the same thing as individual perceptions of satisfaction or well-being, then what is it? While as yet there is no clear consensus on a definition of quality of life, agreement on key elements of the concept is emerging (Baier, 1974; McCall, 1975, Rescher, 1972).

"Quality" in quality of life implies some kind of life-enhancement; that is, life is somehow better than it was before or than it is in some other place. This life-enhancement has two dimensions: the aristic dimension and the hedonic dimension (Rescher, 1972). The aristic dimension--merit in or excellence of life--refers to meeting the basic needs common to all human beings and is determined objectively. The hedonic dimension--individual life happiness--is determined subjectively and reflects individual wants and preferences, those things an individual perceives as necessary for his or her own life-enhancement but not seen as necessary for all. The distinction between these two dimensions is more precise than, but similar to, the distinction between needs and wants. Needs are common to all and best determined objectively, while wants are idiosyncratic, varying both within and among individuals. Conceptual analysis of the concept of quality of life indicates that only the dimension of merit or excellence is relevant to the quality of life. It is not that the hedonic component is unimportant or uninteresting, but that individual wants and preferences are too idiosyncratic, transitory, and possibly unrealistic to serve as the goal for professional service or social policy.

"Life" in quality of life refers not to individual lives but to "life in a given region". More precisely, it means "the conditions for life throughout a given region as provided by the systems of that region" (Baier, 1974; McCall, 1975). These systems are the political, social, and economic structures which provide for meeting the needs of those who inhabit a given region. The region may be specified in various ways (a village, a city, a country), but whatever the region specified, quality of life refers to *all* who inhabit that region.

The intent in appraising or evaluating life in a given region is to determine the capacity of the physical and social environment to provide and maintain conditions which make the lives of *all* living within the region as good as possible (Baier, 1974). Attention is directed to the total environmental system, to the ways in which this system facilitates the attainment of needs, and to negative feedback which indicates how life throughout the region can be improved. Not only does this imply how good or bad *any* person's life can be in that region, but, on a more practical level, it also suggests to individuals the kind of help they can expect from the environment in their own efforts to lead an optimal life.

According to this conceptual analysis, quality of life is not determined by asking people how satisfied they are but by determining to what extent basic needs are met for all within a given region. The greater the percentage of people in a given region for whom basic needs are satisfied, the higher the quality of life in that region.

Rescher (1972, p. 66) notes certain benign consequences which follow from this conceptualization: "It is then feasible to put aside the vast plethora of individual differences and diversity and focus upon the smaller and more orderly set of needs...that are commonly recognized within the society and enjoy something of a universal status...Our attention is directed not at the...microscopic level of the characteristics of this or that individual life but at the...macroscopic level of the climate of life in general."

This conceptualization also facilitates the measurement of the quality of life. As noted earlier, when measurement is made in terms of individual wants (satisfactions), quality of life tends to seek a kind of equilibrium. When quality of life measurement is made in terms of basic needs, however, it is possible to make comparisons over time and across groups. Assuming that a standard for meeting basic needs can be established (and it can, although not without some difficulty), monitoring the percentage of those who meet the standard within a given region provides a clearer picture of how well the region is doing in providing quality of life.

While it would be instructive to review some of the other critical ethical concepts which we use regularly in Home Economics, I hope that these two detailed examples have been sufficient to make my point: ethical concepts have rather more precise meanings than we in Home Economics have acknowledged and used. Becoming more clear about these concepts would not only facilitate our use of them but would help to bring some much-needed ethical and intellectual rigor and integrity to our field.

Ethical Principles

It is one of the common assumptions in moral philosophy that principles play a central role in ethics and morality (Boyd, 1979). Since this is the case, we must give some attention to these principles as we examine the role of ethics in Home Economics. It is not possible to explore this aspect of ethics in depth at this time, but a few comments may be helpful.

Moral principles are of importance because they are a part of the reasoning process (they logically link factual claims and value judgments) and because the morality of any act is justified on the basis of these principles. They serve to focus our deliberations about ethical issues on the elements of good and evil or right and wrong which might exist in these issues. The value of life principle, for example--a principle found in nearly all ethical systems--focuses attention on the preservation and protection of human life. This principle does not tell one what to do (i.e., what action to take) but indicates what perspective to take (i.e., what kind of evidence to take into account). Thus, a key feature of ethical and moral principles is that they provide guidance for action but they do not close off discussion or debate about what one should do.

There are, of course, many different ethical principles, all of which provide guidance for moral action: justice, equality, paternalism, liberty, beneficence, and so on. Like ethical concepts, these principles have rather precise meanings, but rather than focus on these meanings here I want to illustrate two important characteristics of ethical principles.

The first of these characteristics is that ethical principles do not operate in isolation. Take, for example, the principle of beneficence. This principle basically means the prevention of harm and the production of good. When this principle has been applied, emphasis has generally been placed on the prevention of harm, as seen in ethical codes which govern research with human subjects or in attempts to assess in advance the possible negative consequences of new technologies. The positive side of this principle, the production of good, is more demanding, since it requires the conferring of some benefits and since any attempt to confer benefits has at least some risk of causing harm. The intent of the principle of beneficence is to help ensure that the benefits outweigh the harms.

But the principle of beneficence, by itself, does not say anything about the distribution of harms and benefits. To this principle, then, we must add the principle of justice, since this helps to ensure that the benefits and the harms are allocated fairly among the various groups affected. According to the principle of justice, it is not acceptable for the more powerful groups in society to reap most of the benefits and for the less powerful to bear most of the harm. Linking the principles of beneficence and of justice reminds us that it is not enough to ask whether the benefits outweigh the harms, but also to ask who benefits and who is harmed.

Another important characteristic of ethical principles is that many of our principles, to which we are deeply committed, may come into conflict. In bioethical issues such as euthanasia, for example, questions such as "Should humans have the right to seek their own death?" and "Should others be allowed to assist them?" are difficult because they represent a clash between two important moral principles, the prohibition against the taking of life, and the demand for mercy in the face of intolerable suffering. When important value principles come into conflict, to act on one principle requires that one violate another equally valued principle. How does one resolve these conflicts of ethical principles? Answers to that kind of question are not easy, but serious attention to ethics in Home Economics will require that we spend some time, not only identifying those ethical principles which are central to our field, but also in establishing priorities for these principles when they come into conflict as they inevitably will.

The Theoretical Bases of Ethics

As in other fields, there are many complex and diverse theories of ethics, each a systematic account of the way in which to view the ethical life and to determine what is good, what is right, and what ought to be done. Because any theory has implications for practice, it is important that Home Economics give some attention to these diverse theories. This, then, is the final aspect of ethics which I wish to discuss, its theoretical bases.

There are two general streams of ethical theories: deontological and teleological. Each of these gives some guidance for human conduct, but they do so in different ways. Briefly, deontological theories are those which maintain that there is something intrinsic or inherent in moral acts, that is, these acts have certain features which make them right or good or obligatory. There are several different versions of these deontological theories, but one example may help to illustrate this major stream of ethical thought. The Categorical Imperative theory of Immanuel Kant requires that one act on universal laws, regardless of the consequences of doing so. According to this theory, moral imperatives are unconditional and inescapable, absolute, and supreme. That is, there are no exceptions, they are binding whatever the consequences, and they override all other laws with which they come into conflict. Lest this sound too restrictive, Kant's theory stresses the so-called liberal values of autonomy such as freedom and respect for individual rights.

Teleological theories (the second major stream of ethical thought) differ from deontological theories in that certain acts are to be performed or preferred, not because they are intrinsically or inherently good, but because they are right or wrong by virtue of their consequences. Something is good or right if there is a greater balance of good over evil than in any available alternative. One familiar teleological theory is that of utilitarianism. This theory stresses the consequences of an action rather than its motives, and states that an action is right insofar as it produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

The distinction between defining an action as inherently right or good, or as right because of the goodness of its consequences, is an important one since the decisions and policies implemented on the basis of these theories may be substantially different (Reamer, 1982). A deontologist might argue that it is best to maintain an elderly person in the home as long as possible simply because that is the right thing to do (i.e., it is inherently right). A teleologist, on the other hand, might justify placing that same elderly person in some institution on the grounds that in the long run, this is less of a burden for the family--a desirable consequence. Which of these decisions is the better one, and which should we, as professionals, recommend? In professions where confidentiality of information is a feature of the client-professional relationship, is it inherently wrong to breach such confidentiality, or can such a breach be justified by potentially desirable consequences? Because as professionals, we take actions to educate and assist families and we help to establish policies which impinge on their lives, it is essential that we give some critical thought to the theoretical basis of our action and our recommendations.

In my view, some serious attention to the theories of ethics is particularly important in Home Economics because of the ethical stances we have generally taken in our field. Historically, when home economists have been faced with judgments and claims which lie in the ethical domain, we have often been resistant ("But that would be making a value judgment.") or we have been apologetic ("I know I shouldn't make a value judgment, but..."). The reasons given for this stance are usually that because the values of cultures and of individuals are different, it is, therefore, impossible or inappropriate for us as professionals to make judgments which reflect on others.

My review of ethical theories suggests that this stance taken by many home economists is most closely related to ethical theories of descriptive relativism, i.e., what is good, right, or obligatory is relative to something else. The two most common examples are cultural relativism (i.e., what is ethical depends upon the culture) and psychological relativism (i.e., what is moral depends upon individual psychology or personality). These theories tend to rest upon empirical facts which indicate that, indeed, cultures and individuals do differ from each other. The assumption is then made that, because there are these factual differences, matters of right and wrong also differ.

To examine that premise more closely raises some interesting and important questions for Home Economics. For example, many home economists would support and might even act upon some universal declaration of human rights. And yet an ethical theory which says that societies vary in standards and values would have to deny that there can be any universal code that can be accepted by all persons and applied to all societies. A universal code says that what is right is absolute or invariant. Descriptive relativism says that what is right varies from culture to culture and from individual to individual.

It may be that descriptive relativism is not really what we mean, and that, in fact, we are referring to normative relativism. These ethical theories go beyond the fact that people believe and act differently in order to take some stand on what is right, good, or obligatory. In particular, the psychological versions of normative relativism believe that everything of value may be good or bad for someone, and that what makes something good is the individual's own desires, preferences, or interests. Here, contemporary social problems such as euthanasia or abortion do not have general moral solutions, but are decided by each individual, depending upon his/her preferences or interests. There are many, of course, who would reject this stance, believing that some actions are wrong even if some people prefer them. If it is in my best interests to cheat someone, does that mean that it is right for me to cheat in that circumstance?

In which of these various theories do we believe and how can we resolve the apparent contradictions in our beliefs? It is not my purpose here to try to answer that question or to resolve the contradictions. Rather, I have raised the questions and provided some examples to illustrate that, if we mean to take ethics seriously, we must examine more carefully the ethical theories which lie behind our judgments and actions and ensure that these do, in fact, reflect the stance we as a profession have chosen to take. Such careful attention to theory is essential both for our ethical and our intellectual integrity.

Summary and Conclusions

As I noted in my introduction, although ethics was a part of Home Economics in the early years, it has received very little attention since that time. It is only in the relatively recent past that we have begun to address this element of the field more systematically. In my view, the work that we have done on ethics has been necessary but it has not been sufficient.

In this paper, I have identified four tasks which I believe are critical if we are to take ethics in Home Economics seriously. Let me review these tasks briefly and make some final comments concerning them.

First, we must know what the field of ethics is about, and recognize what its incorporation into our own, will require of us. When we talk of ethics, we are talking about human conduct and character, about matters of good, right, and obligation, and about resolving conflicts of interests among persons. Unless we are willing to make these concepts a more central focus of our field, we will not be taking ethics seriously.

Second, we must use ethical concepts with greater rigor. Since conceptual analysis is a strength of moral and ethical philosophy, giving attention to the philosophical dimension of Home Economics should necessarily bring with it a concern for greater conceptual rigor. It is relatively easy to use many of these concepts as buzz words, but without conceptual rigor we weaken both the practice and the integrity of our field.

Third, we must understand that the role of ethical principles is to provide guidance for human conduct and character. In Home Economics, this requires that we give more serious attention to identifying those ethical principles which are central to our field and to establishing some priorities among them. The first of these, identifying central principles, will be much easier than the second, establishing priorities. But we must begin to establish priorities of principles for the profession if we are to provide the kind of ethical guidance that is required, both for our members and the clientele we serve.

Finally, because theory has implications for practice, we must become clear about the theoretical bases for our ethical actions. Without such attention to theory, our actions and our recommendations are likely to be inconsistent and confused, or to be a matter of the personal preferences of individual home economists. Surely our field deserves better than that!

It seems to me that if we are to take ethics seriously, we must make some commitment to this as an integral part of the field and to begin to tackle some of the difficult tasks that I have identified. Without this commitment, ethics in Home Economics will not develop the roots it will need in order to survive and to make a difference. The question that we now face in Home Economics must be answered by all of us, individually and as a group: Just how serious are we about ethics in Home Economics?

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ETHICS IN HOME ECONOMICS CURRICULUM

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On March 5, 1987, ethics in home economics curriculum made the front page of The Columbus Dispatch, my morning newspaper. To my surprise and dismay, five home economics textbooks were banned from Alabama's public schools because they were unconstitutionally promoting "a religious belief system." These books, along with thirty-one history and social studies textbooks, were banned by a federal judge for "espousing secular humanism, which the plaintiff in the case define as an atheistic religion that makes man the center of the universe and advocates ethics and morals instead of absolute values.[1]

The textbook banning is raising the consciousness of home economists concerning ethics in home economics curriculum. We have questions about the meanings associated with ethics and values within the profession, society, and theology. We are wondering about the ethical values which are being espoused in home economics.

This consciousness raising is long overdue.

As I reflected on this situation, I was struck by its irony. Since values entered the home economics literature in the 1950s, home economics educators have increasingly tried to remain value neutral in order to avoid any controversy which might be associated with particular values or types of values. In the process, discussion of all types of values has been, for the most part, overtly avoided in home economics professional education and in general and vocational home economics programs. While trying to evade controversy by not explicitly teaching the meanings of value concepts, the home economics textbook authors involved in the court case had, in fact, landed in the middle of controversy by inadvertently and implicitly teaching, what the judge felt were religious values.

The irony of this court case dramatizes our inability to avoid ethics in home economics curriculum and the need to recognize how ethical values are reflected in home economics curriculum--without our even trying! This court case also dramatizes the fact that ethics can no longer be ignored in contemporary home economics curriculum development efforts. Ethics cannot be ignored as we develop recommended curricular materials to guide practitioners, written curriculum materials to guide classroom teaching, or supporting curricular materials such as textbooks and other media. Ethics certainly cannot be avoided in our taught curriculum.

I accepted the assignment to prepare this paper for a very selfish reason: I have been wanting an excuse to clarify the meanings of concepts involved in this issue, and examine home economics curriculum for ethical concepts. Consequently, this paper is the result of a review of the literature concerning three topics: 1) the nature of ethics as value knowledge, 2) ethical values in home economics philosophy, and 3) ethical values in home economics curriculum. Hopefully, this review will help us with our much needed professional dialogue and curriculum decision making.

Nature of Ethics as Value Knowledge

In curriculum development it is important to understand the nature of content and the various forms of knowledge comprising that content. B. Othanel Smith points out that "value knowledge is one type of knowledge which extends into and through all school subjects and into a neglected area of education--moral conduct"[2] As curriculum planners, we need to understand the nature of value knowledge. Values are conceptual criteria rather than feelings for rating objects or behavior along a continuum of worth. Values are the grounds, the reasons, or the bases for value judgments and action, not the judgments or conclusions.[3]

There are many types of values or reasons on which value judgments are made. (See Table 1) Some of these include aesthetic, health and safety, economic, environmental, legal, intellectual, religious, prudential, and moral.[4] Moral values are one type of value, the standards or criteria for proper conduct, the norm or rule for right action, particularly human social action. In the proper sense, "morals" often refer to sexual issues. However, universal moral issues include punishment, property, roles and concerns of affection, roles and concerns of authority, law, life, liberty, distributive justice, truth, as well as sex.

Essence of Ethics

The Dictionary of Philosophy refers to ethics as moral philosophy,

> that study or discipline which concerns itself with judgments of approval and disapproval, judgments of rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, virtue or vice, desirability or wisdom of actions, dispositions, ends, objects, or states of affairs.[4]

Consequently, ethics and morals are interchanged in everyday use.

The story of Louis Slotin, a nuclear physicist, dramatically illustrates the essence of ethics, the elements of morality. His story was first told by the scientist-philosopher Jacob Bronowski and later used by Richard H.

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[1] "Judge Bans 36 Textbooks in Alabama," and "Here are the Books in Alabama Ruling" The Columbus Dispatch, March 5, 1987, p. 1.

[2] B. Othanel Smith, "Curriculum Content," in Fundamental Curriculum Decisions, edited by Fenwick W. English (Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1983), p. 37.

[3] James Shaver and Willing Strong, Facing Value Decisions: Rationale Building for Teachers (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1976), p. 27

[4] Runes, D. D. Ed. Dictionary of philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co. p. 98.

Table 1

TYPES OF VALUES[5]
(Reasons or points of view from which value judgments can be made)

AESTHETIC	Concerned with appearance, beauty Positive value terms: pretty exquisite, elegant
ECONOMIC	Concerned with control, cost, efficiency Positive value terms: useful, efficient, inexpensive, functional, practical
ENVIRONMENTAL	Concerned with state of surroundings Positive value terms: clean, sanitary, non-polluting
HEALTH and SAFETY	Concerned with physical well-being of individuals Positive value terms: safety, health, wellness
INTELLECTUAL	Concerned with thought processes, such as reason Positive value terms: scientific, rational, true, valid, reliable, accurate, logical
LEGAL	Concerned with fulfilling the requirements of law Positive value terms: lawful, legitimate, civil
MORAL	Concerned with interests and well-being of other people Positive value terms: just, fair, ethical, right, beneficial, trustworthy, autonomous, dignified
PRUDENTIAL	Concerned with one's own interests Positive value terms: smart, wise, shrewd, clever
RELIGIOUS	Concerned with following religious doctrine Positive value terms: sinless, devout, godly, pious

Hersh and associates to introduce their appraisal of the Models of Moral Education.

> Slotin...worked in the laboratories at Los Alamos to help develop the atomic bomb. In 1946 he was conducting an experiment...that required assembling pieces of plutonium. He was nudging one piece toward another, by tiny movements, in order to ensure that their total mass would be large enough to make a chain reaction, and he was doing it, as experts are prone to do such things, with a screw driver. The screwdriver slipped, and the pieces of plutonium came a fraction too close together. Immediately, the instruments everyone was watching registered a great upsurge of neutrons, which was the sign that a chain reaction had begun. Radioactivity was filling the room.
>
> Slotin moved at once...He pulled the pieces of plutonium apart with his bare hands. This was virtually an act of suicide, for it exposed him to the largest dose of radioactivity. Then he calmly asked his seven co-workers to mark their precise positions at the time of the accident in order that the degree of exposure of each one could be fixed.
>
> Having done this, and having alerted the medical service, Slotin apologized to his companions and said what turned out to be exactly true: he would die and they would recover.[6]

Slotin's response to his dilemma was instantaneous--no time was available for reflective deliberation. As Hersh, Miller and Fielding point out, Slotin's response is the epitome of morality, of ethical choices. Ethical choices are required whenever the fundamental question is raised: "What, all things considered, ought to be done?" While most everyday choices do not involve life and death value choices, as in this situation, most do involve empathetic caring for others beyond self interest, reasoned judgment based on knowledge and interpersonal understanding, and courageous action.[7]

As this true story illustrates, the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual, and takes a universal point of view. To act ethically, home economics educators and family members, must "weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of action most likely to maximize the interests of those affected. Thus (we) must choose the course of action which has the best consequences, on balance, for all affected."[8]

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[5] Margaret E. Arcus, "Technology and the Need to Examine Our Moral and Ethical Judgments," Journal of Home Economics 74, 2 (1982): 37. Association for Values Education and Research, Teacher's Manual: The Elderly (Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1978); Francine Hultgren and Melodie Goosen-Conlon, What to Do Regarding the Parenthood Decision? (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University, 1981).

[6] Hersh, Richard H., Miller, John P., & Fielding, Glen D. (1980). Models of moral education: An appraisal. New York: Longman Inc., p. 1-2.

[7] Ibid.; James R. Rest, "Morality" in Paul H. Mussen, Ed., Handbook of Child Psychology, 4th Ed., John H. Flavell and Ellen M. Markman, Eds., Cognitive Development, Vol. III (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983): 556-629.

[8] Singer, Peter. (1979). Practical ethics. London: Cambridge University Press, p. 12.

Ethical Values in Home Economics Philosophy

What ethical values have been advocated in the home economics profession? Through the years, the aim of home economics has not been value neutral. According to Marjorie Brown's analysis, our history shows that our

> professed aim...has been value-oriented toward well-being or the improvement of conditions in the interest of the family and the individual...Initially the professed concern was for the character of persons created by home life in which 'character' meant the moral, intellectual, and motivational qualities developed and fostered.[9]

These and other moral or ethical values have been themes found in our philosophy since our inception. In an analysis of the explicit, written expression of the ideals, beliefs, and values in the home economics profession from 1840 to the present, Virginia Vincenti found that "at times, the philosophy reflected religious values, while at other times it reflected a secular view of ethics." The evidence of religion, particularly protestant Christianity, has decreased in the home economics philosophy over the years. In later years value judgments have been justified with humanistic rather than biblical axioms of earlier periods.[10] Table 2 outlines some of our values.

Table 2

ETHICAL VALUES IN HOME ECONOMICS

Enduring Values	- Well-being of family and individual - Improvement of conditions for family and individuals
1840	- Self-sacrifice for someone or something equally important or more important than self[11]
1900s	- Commitment, interdependence, and self-sacrifice of each family member for the other... - Common time together - Responsibilities...to create...conditions wherein each [family] member shall reach his or her highest physical, intellectual, and spiritual development[12]
1940s	- Civic, moral and economic responsibility to the individual home to the community and [to] instruct in the right care of human life in the home[13] - Individual and family well-being and general social welfare[14] - Mutual responsibility of members of group for successful personal and home life[15]
1950s	- Freeing Americans from the dominance of material things - Cross-cultural understanding and cooperation - Making good homes which are essential to a good society[16] - Happy, democratic, and cooperative family life[17] - Individual development, democratic family life, and social action affecting the well-being of homemakers' own and other families[18]

Ethical Values in Home Economics Curriculum

During the 1950s, an analysis of home economics teachers' manuals and guides indicated that the main goals and objectives of these curriculum guides included personal ethics as well as those characteristics that would help to create a happy, democratic and cooperative family life.[17] However, as Marjorie Brown recently observed,

> home economists have not talked of democracy, freedom, free or autonomous persons much in the past three decades. Perhaps we have substituted 'technological society' for a democratic society and technology for freeing the person...[18]

Even when home economics educators have professed ethical and moral values, "in practice [they] generally have not paid much attention to the professed political-moral aim or, where attention has been given, it lacked coherence and precision...."[19] During the last three decades, the ethical aims of home economics curriculum materials have been less clear, and often curriculum planners omitted a curriculum aim altogether.[20] A study of the values reflected in the aims for parent education curriculum guides showed that most are knowledge and skill-focused, with some concerned with the responsibilities of parents, e.g., caring for and helping children grow. Only one or two statements were society-focused.[21] Even when teachers espouse ethical aims verbally, written instructional objectives do not reflect those aims.[22]

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[9] Brown, M. M. (1985). Philosophical studies of Home Economics in the United States. Vol. II. Michigan State University, p. 921.

[10] Virginia Brambl Vincenti, "A history of the philosophy of home economics," (Ph.D. diss., The Pennsylvania State University, 1981) p. 12.

[11] Ibid., p. 241.

[12] Ibid., p. 118.

[13] Ibid., p. 157.

[14] Ivol Spafford, A functioning program of home economics(New York: John Wiley, 1940): 12.

[15] Ibid., p. 13.

[16] Vincenti, op. cit., 241-242.

[17] Dorothy Lee,"Discrepancies in the teaching of American culture," in George D. Spinkler, ed. Education and Anthropology. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955): 163-176.

[18] Brown, Philosophical studies, pp. 633-634.

[19] Ibid., p. 922

[20] Edna Page Anderson, "Goals for vocational home economics curriculum," in Janet F. Laster and Ruth E. Dohner, Vocational Home Economics Curriculum: State of the Field(Peoria, IL: Bennett & McKnight Publishing Company, 1986) pp. 32.

Many recent curriculum guides focus on preparing students for the occupations of homemaking and wage earning and appear to be most concerned about the values of efficiency, productivity, and economy. Some, however, such as Colorado's curriculum guide, also have as an ultimate goal "to improve the quality of individual and family life."[23]

There are several notable exceptions. Recent recommended and written curricula have aims reflecting ethical concerns. The aim of the Wisconsin Family Focus curriculum is for

> the development of students' capacities to become competent in (the) work of the family...The phrase work of the family refers to the actions taken by the family to develop and nurture critically conscious members who make rational and ethical judgments and take daily life actions consistent with those judgments.[24]

Similarly, the aim of the Ohio Practical Action Curriculum is to

> foster the development of a fully functioning family member/homemaker who takes action for the betterment of the family, workplace, society. A fully functioning individual is a person who makes reasoned judgments, is humanly caring, and acts responsibly for self and others.

Specific student outcomes for the Practical Action Curriculum identify several ethical values as curricular goals, and in the process, clarify the meaning of quality home and family life. The curriculum planners expect students to: (underlining added to identify ethical values)

> Value quality home and family life, including a personal philosophy of...
> - equitable role sharing of work and family responsibility,
> - network of supportive interdependent relationships, and, most important,
> - a concern for the well-being of self, family, and others...[and]
>
> Take reasoned action....[so as to]
> - manage resources to meet developmental needs of all family members throughout the career-family life cycle,
> - improve societal conditions to enhance the family....[25]

Three other recently developed curriculum guides also reflect concern for values, but with less obvious emphasis on ethical values. The goal of the Minnesota curriculum is to

> enable individuals and families to function within their own strengths (by helping) individuals and families develop their intellect and use rational, objective analysis of alternatives and ends.[26]

The aim of the Pennsylvania State University Value Reasoning Curriculum Project is to help students "reason about value issues, and use what is learned through critical thinking and acting on practical problems of families".[27] New York state's seventh and eighth grade curriculum guide "concentrates on the development of the reasoning skills needed to solve the practical perennial problems of daily living." This "reasoned action" approach is based on the belief that the ability to reason, to think critically and creatively, and to reflect on one's actions will empower students to act responsibly toward themselves, their families, their peers, and the larger society.[28]

Ethical Values as Subject Matter of Home Economics

What curriculum content needs to be taught if the aims of home economics curriculum are focused on helping students make increasingly critical, creative, and morally responsible decisions regarding the home and family, and solve perennial, practical problems of the family? To achieve these ends, Marjorie Brown recommends that

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[21] Ruth Thomas and Betty L. Cooke, "Valued ends in parent education," unpublished paper to be presented at the 1987 American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.

[22] Ruth Thomas, telephone conversation with author regarding unpublished study, March 31, 1987.

[23] Carolyn Brink, Phyllis Abt, and Dorothy Horrell, "Occupation of homemaking task analysis and competency-based design: Colorado Curriculum Project," in Laster and Dohner, op. cit., p. 194.

[24] Idelle Fauske, "Family Focus Home Economics Design," in Laster and Dohner, p. 268.

[25] Joanna Kister, "Practical Action Curriculum (PAC) Design: Ohio Curriculum Project," in Laster and Dohner, ibid., p. 306.

[26] Donna J. Schwartz, Joan Wilkosz, Joyce DeBoe, Audrey Grote, and Roslyn Torgerson, "Problem Posing Curriculum Model: Minnesota Curriculum Project," in Laster and Dohner, p. 280.

[27] Francine Hultgren, "Value Reasoning Design: The Pennsylvania State University Curriculum Project," in Laster and Dohner, p. 289.

[28] The University of the State of New York, Home and Career Skills (Albany, NY: Division of Occupational Education Programs, 1986), p. 1.

> basic concepts of valued ends (basic normative concepts) for each perennial problem...[need to be identified, along with] concepts regarding processes (modes of inquiry) involved in such decision-making and action,...[and]...concepts of the self, of interpersonal relations, and of modes of thinking [which are] to be built into the curriculum processes of learning.[29]

Considering this recommendation, what value concepts have been included in home economics curriculum in the past and today? Values as a curriculum concept entered the home economics literature in the 1950s.[30] Through the years, values have been viewed as central to the home economics discipline and service by some (Kotzin, Smart, Peterson, and Brown and Paolucci) and rejected by others (Creekmore, Martin, Lee and Dressel).[31]

For the most part, home economics educators have not advocated the inclusion of identifying value concepts of any type, including moral or ethical values, in written curriculum documents. This position is illustrated in the report from the 1967 national curriculum development project which set out "to define the cognitive content of home economics for high school students to progress...toward the competences that will serve them for effective personal, family, and community living."[32] Even though the report from this project, affectionately known as "the bird book," cites "values" as one of three interrelated concepts unifying the content of all home economics subject matter areas, the value concepts were not identified. Only generalizations *describing* values were included; for example:

> Some of the most influential and compelling values are held unconsciously...[and]

Values serve as guides for developing goals....[33] This omission reflects the dominant view of values as "non-cognitive, emotive, not subject to rational examination and validation, separate from the intellect, and relativistic or personalistic in nature." There are several possible reasons for this position. Besides viewing ethical values, like other values, as being attitudes formed by the individual by "thinking things through for himself" and by himself, with no cognitive basis, home economics educators also have been committed to a pluralistic society and fear indoctrinating students with the values selected. As our society has become more heterogeneous, home economists have been even more concerned that certain individuals' values or a certain group's values will be taught and not others."[34]

However, for some home economics educators, this so-called value-neutral, relativistic, subjective approach to ethical values in home economics has been equally untenable. Most notably has been the home economics philosopher, Marjorie Brown.[35] (In reality, many teachers espouse ethical values, without being aware, when they have students to "clean the food lab so it's ready for the next class.") However, teachers are also feeling uncomfortable with this so-called value-neutral position, as indicated by a concern expressed by a teacher evaluating curriculum to prevent adolescent pregnancy: "How can I teach the home economics objectives when I feel that the basis of the problem is moral standards rather than a lack of information?"[36]

Similarly, teachers and supervisors in Ohio's recent consumer-homemaking curriculum project were concerned with the self-centered decision making of their students, who seemingly had no concern for how their actions affect others. While cognizant that self-centered decision making is indicative of early stages of moral development, teachers were equally cognizant that they might not be providing learning experiences to help students move to higher levels of moral development. A sub-committee of the curriculum project task force decided to analyze and critique previous Ohio curricula for 1) the aim and values underlying the curriculum plans, and 2) the probable consequences of that value position if implemented. In the analysis, they imagined what the actual outcomes would be if the recommended state curricular materials were implemented and compared these potential outcomes with the aim or valued-ends of the curriculum. The analysis of the two guides showed that if teachers used the guides, they were probably encouraging self-centered behavior. The teachers discovered that as they attempted to avoid imposing their values on students, teachers were encouraging students to use prudential rather than moral standards. Students were told to decide what to do on the basis of "whatever *you* think best," a prudential value, rather than encouraging them to decide on the basis of critically examined moral value standards, e.g., what is best for the long term well-being of self *and* others, a moral value standard.[37]

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[29] Marjorie M. Brown, *A Conceptual Scheme and Decision-Rules for the Selection and Organization of Home Economics Curriculum Content* (Madison, WI: Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 1978), p. 33.

[30] Brown, *Philosophical Studies*, op. cit., p. 622.

[31] Ibid., p. 628-629.

[32] American Home Economics Association, *Concepts and Generalization: Their Place in High School Curriculum Development* (Washington, DC: AHEA, 1967), p. 16.

[33] Ibid., pp. 54-55.

[34] Brown, *Philosophical Studies*, op. cit., pp. 622-633.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Florida teachers' concerns regarding teenage pregnancy prevention in Betty L. Dixon, *Laying the Groundwork for an Interdisciplinary Effort Aimed at Prevention of Pregnancy among Middle School Students, Phase IV: Revised Curriculum* (Pensacola, FL: The University of West Florida, 1982), p. vi. Similar concerns were expressed by teachers in Beverly Ann Jensen, "The Impact of Programs on School Personnel's Attitudes Toward Pregnant Adolescents and School-Age Parents," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1986.

[37] Janet F. Laster, "Models and Model Building" in Laster and Dohner, op. cit., p. 157.

This analysis influenced curriculum planners specifically to include the desirable moral values in the curriculum aim, and to include tests which students could use to decide whether judgments are morally defensible, and to guide their own ethical judgments.[38] While the delineation of ethical concepts is limited in Ohio's curriculum guide, it is one example of curriculum planners trying to help students and teachers with the value knowledge needed in ethical decision making. If students are to use moral values as criteria for their judgments affecting other people, they must have an understanding of the meanings of alternative value concepts and the consequences of acting on those in families and their social milieu.

To my knowledge ethical values have not been systematically outlined in elementary, secondary, or adult home economics curriculum materials. However, the National Council on Family Relations has included "ethics" as one recommended content component for family life education. The key concepts for family life education programs over the lifespan are identified for children, adolescents, and adults. Table 3 shows the content as outlined in the guidelines.

Ethical Values in the Taught Curriculum

No studies have been conducted that directly assess what ethical values are actually being taught in home economics classrooms. However, the national census study of secondary vocational consumer and homemaking programs was designed to "identify what home economics concepts are being taught..." In the 1147 schools reporting topics taught, 1073 reported teaching the "roles and responsibilities of parents," and 656 reported "citizen's responsibility to community regarding housing." These were the only topics reported which reflected ethical dimensions. While "values and goals" was a family relations topic reported being taught in 1079 schools, and was a consumer education and management topic in 1064 schools, there is no way to know if ethical values are part of the topic.[39]

In an interview study with 24 Wisconsin home economics teachers, Joanne Moeller found that the teachers felt the public school and home economics definitely had a role to play in moral education, and expressed a desire to do something about it. Yet these teachers were very individualistic in their approach and practice. They varied in their beliefs about moral education. Four conceptual patterns emerged. The teachers saw moral education as: 1) teaching right from wrong using a rule such as the 10 commandments or the golden rule; 2) developing one's own moral code; 3) decision making in terms of effects of that behavior on others, self, and the environment; and 4) development from individual gratification to concern for others.

Table 3

ETHICS AS RECOMMENDED CONTENT FOR
FAMILY LIFE EDUCATION PROGRAMS

"Ethics" incorporates four major categories: 1) ethical principles as guides to human social conduct, 2) reciprocal nature of rights and responsibilities, 3) individual and social dimensions of ethics, and 4) acting ethically.

KEY CONCEPTS

Children
- Respect for all persons
- Rights of all persons
- Gaining new rights and responsibilities with age
- Consequences of actions for self and others
- Taking responsibility for actions

Adolescents

- Ethical principles as one kind of values
- Ethical values as guides to human social conduct
- Interrelationship of rights and responsibilities
- Self-responsibility and social responsibility
- Complexity and difficulty of ethical choices
- Ethical implications of social and technical change
- Developing a personal ethical code

Adult

- Ethical principles as one kind of values
- Ethical values as guides to human social conduct
- Acting in accordance with personal beliefs with consideration for others
- Interrelationship of rights and responsibilities
- Personal autonomy and social responsibility
- Establishing an ethical philosophy of life
- Complexity and difficulty of ethical choices and decisions
- Ethical implications of social and technological change
- Assisting in the formation of ethical concepts and behaviors in others[40]

NOTE: No attempt was made to make the language of the key concepts consistent: some (e.g., "ethical principles as one kind of values") suggest content to be learned while others (e.g., "acting in accordance with personal beliefs with consideration for others")[41] suggest attitudes to be fostered.

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[38] Ohio Department of Education, Home Economics Section, Ohio Consumer/Homemaking Curriculum Guide: Practical Action (Columbus, OH: Instructional Materials Laboratory, 1983), p. 44-45; scope and sequence charts.

[39] Ruth P. Hughes, The National Census Study of Secondary Vocational Consumer and Homemaking Programs (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc., 1980), p. iii.

[40] National Council on Family Relations, Standards and Criteria for the Certification of Family Life Educators, College/University Curriculum Guidelines, and Content Guidelines for Family Life Education: A Framework for Planning Programs Over the Life Span (St. Paul: National Council on Family Relations, 1984), p. 10

[41] Ibid., p. 7.

To achieve these aims, teachers used a variety of moral education approaches. The majority of the teachers followed primarily a character development or a moral analysis approach, rather than using values clarification, avoidance, or eclectic approaches. However, value clarification or the ethical relativity theory was identified by 71 percent of the teachers. Character development, involving setting a good example and making and enforcing rules, or indoctrination was used to teach right from wrong. Moral analysis, involving listening, discussing, and helping students make rational decisions, was used to teach decision making, and to foster moral development. Some of the teachers seemed to avoid using specific moral education teaching strategies, but influenced students indirectly through concern for student well-being. Teachers expressed difficulty in engaging in moral education due to their confusing moral with religious education, or due to their inability to clarify their own beliefs abut what they can and should do.[42]

An examination of recommended home economics curricular materials suggests that home economics curriculum planners have often limited their conscious deliberations and judgments to deciding what knowledge to teach and which objectives they should strive to achieve.[43] Like curriculum planners in other fields, we have neglected to examine and consciously make decisions about the values, including the ethical values, which will be used to make home economics curricular decisions.[44] Specifically, we have neglected to resolve four professional issues:

1. What core values should be articulated at the professional level to guide our practice as home economics curriculum planners?

2. What should be the aim or goal of the home economics curriculum?

3. What values knowledge should be included in in the subject matter of home economics?

4. How should ethics be included in the subject matter of home economics?

The Alabama textbook case has raised my consciousness to the need for conceptual and empirical research to help us in the dialogue that will be necessary to decide what is best to do about values in home economics. For example:

- What values are being taught through the textbooks we use?
- What values are being taught, directly or indirectly, through our home economics curriculum?
- Do we really espouse a "religious belief system" through our curriculum?
- Are private or group-specific meanings of value concepts and standards of conduct appropriate in our complex society?

You can think of many more concerns which need examination.

Home Economics Curriculum Work: An Ethical Endeavor

Home economics curriculum work, like curriculum development in other fields, is an ethical endeavor. Educators in all educational fields and educational levels must answer the fundamental ethical question regarding curriculum issues: "What all things considered, ought to be done?" "What should we teach?" "How should we teach?" "How should we relate to students?" These questions and other more specific curriculum questions, such as, "What foods should I use in my foods class?" or "What values should I teach in my program?" require decisions which ultimately will affect people, their relationships and long-term well-being. These curriculum decisions are, in the words of Scheffler, "responsible or justifiable acts with public significance.[45]

In their book, Moral Education, David Purpel and Kevin Ryan observe that ethical judgments and moral education

> permeate the very fabric of the teacher-student relationship...and... [come] with the territory" of the educator. The school [and its teachers and culture]... cannot help but be a force for growth or retardation--for good or evil-- in the moral life of the student.[46]

This is especially true in home economics education.[47] Ethics and moral education permeate the very fabric of home economics education: 1) as the aim or goal of the curriculum, 2) as part of the subject matter of home economics, in terms of both content and instructional processes used or not used and the learning processes facilitated, and 3) as standards guiding the practices of home economists as they plan and teach the curriculum. While ethics can be avoided in our recommended and written curricular materials, ethics cannot be avoided in our taught, supported, and learned home economics curriculum. They come with our territory.

Our consciousness is raised. What ought we to do about ethics in home economics curriculum?

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[42] Joanne Moeller, "Teachers' Implicit Theories on Moral Education: An Interview Study" (Ph.D. diss., The University of Minnesota, 1982), pp. 88-223

[43] American Home Economics Association, op. cit.; Laster and Dohner, op. cit.; Thomas, op. cit.

[44] Michael Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Brown, Philosophical Studies, op. cit.; William A. Reid, Thinking About Curriculum (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); Robert S. Zais, Curriculum: Principles and Foundations (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1976).

[45] I. Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 116.

[46] David Purpel and Kevin Ryan, Moral Education (Berkdley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1976), p. 9.

[47] Marjorie M. Brown, A Conceptual Scheme, op. cit.

ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN SERVING BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPHERES

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Immersing oneself in the study of ethics can be an immobilizing experience. One becomes acutely aware that every action is fraught with unintended as well as intended outcomes and even inaction has consequences. Decisions become ethical ones precisely because the outcomes affect the existing and future order of things. Furthermore, perspectives of what is ethical vary within a diverse society and over time for all societies because views of what life ought to be like and what values are most important vary within the society and change over time. Because there is almost always more than one perspective on any ethical issue, the ethical appropriateness of professional endeavors is often a matter of controversy.

Take the work of the early home economists, for example. Many of them viewed their roles as promoting the freedom of women--freedom to participate more fully in the public sphere and freedom to derive more satisfaction from their private lives. However, contemporary feminist authors (Sachs, 1983; Shapiro, 1986; Strasser, 1982) view the early home economists not as promoting women's freedom but as promoting women's domesticity, of promoting the home as women's "proper place." This contemporary understanding is not surprising--contemporary Americans live at a time when women's life options are wider than before, even if women's lives are not especially freer than before. The reality of 19th century America was that the alternative to hard work in the household was backbreaking labor on the farms and in the factories--work that was unlikely to enhance substantially one's life experience.

Over time, both the social structure and the profession of home economics have changed. As the knowledge base in home economics expanded, specializations evolved. Contemporary home economists are specialists working in a specialized public world in areas of endeavor that affect the private spheres of human satisfaction and experience (Hamilton, 1986, p. 9).

Throughout this paper, reference will be made to the public and private spheres of endeavor. Individuals live and work in two interconnected spheres--the public sphere of commerce, industry and institutions, and the private sphere of individual and family experience.

The historic separation of the private and public spheres of life and a social system based on economics as a centering concept "has resulted in a cultural valuing of public spheres of life and devaluing of the private spheres of life" (Hamilton, 1986, p. 9). When the public sphere endeavors are more highly valued than private sphere endeavors, people neglect their private obligations to perform their public ones. Brown (1987, p. 40) notes that when policies and practices in the public sphere fail to acknowledge the importance of private obligations, then the individual is unnecessarily diminished.

While private sphere experiences are significant to the life satisfaction of men, women, and especially children, responsibility for maintenance of the private sphere has largely been assumed by women, and issues related to enhancing the private sphere are considered women's issues. Perhaps this is why home economics is essentially a women's field.

It's hard to be politically powerful when you're in a women's field. Men, the gender whose thought and behavior predominates in the public sphere, have historically viewed women's concerns as less important than men's. Because the male viewpoint is pervasive in society, women, too, devalue the importance of the private sphere, of the intimate environment and of daily life experience.

This devaluation takes tangible form in agricultural experiment station research. Hamilton (1986, p. 9) illustrated it this way: "To talk about increasing beef production is public and serious business and deserves the attention of academic specialists. But to concern oneself with the preparation of beef for family consumption is somehow less serious, less scholarly, less important. Similarly, conflict between middlemen in the marketing distribution system for apparel manufacturers is a legitimate research concern, but to express research interest in how individuals want to dress is to talk to the private, the superficial, the feminine. That the former is dependent on the latter is apparently beside the point."

The fact that the public sphere can neither sustain nor reorganize itself without enabling private experiences is not widely acknowledged in American society. For home economists to exercise their ethical commitment to devote their public work in service provision, product development and education to enhancing the private sphere, they must also work to enhance the legitimacy of the private sphere as a matter of concern to public decision makers.

If one accepts that the centering concept for home economics is the enhancement of the private sphere, then one must ask the question: "How can this best be done?"

When one acts in behalf of "progress" and the "well-being" of a group, it's easy to be wrong. One rarely has one good choice. One rarely has complete information. Furthermore, it isn't possible to promote the well-being of everybody because actions have differential impacts.

A guide for the professional practice of home economists lies in understanding what makes actions right or wrong in a society. Behavior that supports the established norms of the society is generally considered to be ethical behavior. However, there are few behaviors that are supportive of everyone in a diverse society, so professional behavior is of necessity guided by a mix of values, politics, economics and law. Of the list, only values are ethical; politics, economics and law are practical considerations. While the practical is not to be overlooked, it is insufficient as a guiding principle for a profession or society attempting to enhance conditions.

Professional behavior must be guided by judgments about the quality or appropriateness of the society in which one works. When the existing social order does not serve people's needs, the more ethical behaviors may be those designed not to support it, but to change it or even overthrow it. These are high risk ethical behaviors. They are controversial. They put the practitioner in jeopardy of personal loss for overall gain.

Home economists have been criticized at times for supporting a social order that is unduly restrictive to a class of people (women) and at other times for supporting changes that were either too trivial to be worth the energy of talented professionals or that on the whole worsened conditions for those the home economists sought to serve. Home economists have also been criticized for failing to identify what the prevailing social order was--particularly in international work.

Home economists, working in the sphere of people's immediate daily needs, must not only identify the prevailing social order, they must also do their work within the context of the times for one cannot change a social system and only then feed, clothe, shelter and nurture the people in it.

Ethical professional behavior requires an understanding not just of the cultural, social and political setting, but of what the profession is about. To engage in ethical professional practice, home economists must study the various interpretations of the mission, philosophy, and definitions of the field.

Hunt wrote in 1903, "There is a narrow and also a wide view of home economics. The former makes it deal exclusively with the details of household management; the latter makes its chief concern the problem of the adjustment through home life of the individual to society" (East, 1982, p. 126).

The definition of home economics from the 1902 Lake Placid Conference says "Home economics ...is the study of the laws, conditions, principles and ideals which are concerned on the one hand with man's immediate physical environment (i.e., food/nutrition/food service; textiles/clothing; housing/design/equipment) and on the other hand with his nature as a social being (i.e., human development and relationships) and is the study especially of the relationship between these two factors (i.e., resource management, decision making, communications) (East & Thomson, 1984, p. 3).

Although many professional home economists describe their work as serving individuals and families, and indeed professionals do serve both, the Lake Placid Conference definition did not mention family. The centering concept of home economics throughout history has been the interrelationships of people with their social and physical near environments.

Viewed this way, we are freed from the dilemma of claiming to support both individual and family needs. The needs of an individual and the needs of the family are not necessarily mutually compatible. If they were, families would, without our intervention, experience greater satisfaction because issues of competing needs and conflicting desires would not exist. Furthermore, to tie the definition of our purpose to serving families disenfranchises some areas of practice in the profession such as textile science, food science, institution management, and apparel design.

An additional problem with using family as the centering concept of home economics is that the term "family" has implications and popular associations that are politically bound up with culture and status distinctions. Furthermore, family in a generic sense is an undefinable entity.

The interrelationships of people with their social and physical near environments constitutes their private sphere reality. It is this that brings life satisfaction or frustration, comfort or hardship, love and belonging or loneliness and despair. It is this that enables individuals to function in the public sphere.

Although differences in men's and women's roles in the private and in the public spheres kept the ideology of separate spheres alive since the time of the industrial revolution, the "spheres have never actually been separate; from the beginnings of American industrialization, businesses manufactured goods for household use, and households served business by consuming those products and reproducing the labor force" (Strasser, 1982, p. 309).

"The private and public spheres continually interact with each other as we live out our lives." Home economists need an appreciation for the interplay between the private and the public spheres and "the understanding that this interplay may be filled with contradiction, hidden assumptions, ambiguous agendas, abstract meanings and may create irreconcilable problems for individuals and groups" (Hamilton, 1986, p. 10).

Women's political agendas illustrate well the need to identify these ambiguities, contradictions, and interrelationships. In the political arena, women's liberation activists and "New Right" activists each oversimplified their agendas and each incorrectly identified the underlying issues for advancing the status of women in our society.

Women's liberation activists have ignored the private sphere in their efforts to promote "public issues like the Equal Rights Amendment, fair hiring, abortion laws, and equal pay for equal work in the paid labor market" (Strasser, 1982, p. 307). Although their agenda is considered by many to be important, it is incomplete because it ignores the private sphere realities of women's lives.

While the women's liberation activists focused on tangible economic and political issues, the women of the New Right focused on the field of personal issues and campaigned against the ERA and reproductive rights and public policy to provide access for women in the public sphere, supposedly in the interests of "saving the family" (Strasser, 1982, p. 308).

The public and private spheres are intrinsically interwoven in each individual's life experiences. This leads to a need to understand the opportunities and demands afforded by both spheres in the development of public policy that serves well the needs of people both in their private lives and in their public lives.

Referring to the dilemmas faced by American women today, Hewlett writes, "The problems of contemporary American women are not the result of some massive or inevitable conflict between work and family life. Rather, they result because the United States does less than any other advanced country to make life easier for working mothers. We have less maternity leave, less subsidized child care, less job flexibility. And partly due to this deficit in our public policies, women in America earn less, proportionately than their counterparts in other nations" (Hewlett, 1986, p. 402).

"In the 1970's it was thought that all you had to do was to break down the barriers so that women could fully participate in the mainstream of society"--the public sphere. "The spirit of the decade was to pretend that there were no differences between men and women. Well, the results are in. More women than ever before are working outside the home...and most women are in worse economic shape than their mothers were. They have lost their traditional protections and guarantees without improving their earning power in the marketplace" (Hewlett, 1986, p. 401-402).

Children, too, have been disadvantaged by these changes. Over 20% of American children under 18 live in poverty (Hodgkinson, 1985, p. 8). Half or more will spend part of their childhood in a single parent home (Hodgkinson, 1985, p. 3). Children are neglected, not just by overworked parents, but by policy makers as well.

These children are our future. They will govern and defend our country, run our businesses and support our retirement fund. Enlightened self interest says we would be wise to nurture these children. Not to do so is analogous to "eating the seed corn."

Yet public policy to support children's needs has little popular support because people say, "Mothers should be home with their children," and "Teenagers should not get pregnant." Let's face the facts--mothers are not home and are not going to be home for this generation of youngsters--and neither are their fathers. Children born to unwed adolescents do the same thing that children born to well educated, affluent, married couples do--they grow up and take their places in society. Someone must pay for the care of our children--the parents, the taxpayers, or the children whose futures are mortgaged by lack of adequate care.

Scarr and Weinberg's (1986) study of the history of American child care legislation shows that lack of public sphere support for children is not new. They state that "during the Great Depression, the federal government sponsored day care for small children--not because legislators believed that three- and four-year-olds needed early education or care away from home, but because it was a convenient way to employ out-of-work adults and to distribute food to hungry children. During World War II, the federal government sponsored day care for as many as 400,000 preschool children--not because legislators believed day care was good for children, but because the children's mothers were essential to the war industries. After the war, the federal government withdrew all support for day care and told women to go home and care for their children (Scarr & Weinberg, 1986, p. 141). This account indicates that public support for child care has historically been based on practical, not ethical issues and has been more supportive of the public than of the private sphere.

For a home economist to promote public support of child care undoubtedly appears to some to be self serving--more support of child care translates into more jobs for home economists. While it may be self serving, promoting public support for child care fits the ethical imperative for the profession of home economics; it enables individuals to enhance their private lives.

Child care is but one issue where the work of home economists in the public sphere--to provide direct services to the private sphere, to shape public policy, and to educate people--is of enormous consequence to the daily life experiences of people and to the future of both the public and private spheres.

As a field of study, home economics is concerned with the study of people's immediate physical environment, their nature as social beings and the relationships between the two. In professional practice, we claim an ethical position of enhancing the private spheres of endeavor--of improving conditions in people's everyday lives--and we experience the concurrent ethical imperative of supporting the goals and profitability of our employing institutions and businesses. We must balance conflicting ethical and practical concerns.

If we agree that our "reason for being" is to optimize the quality of people's private lives, then we support social change. To enable this change to occur, we must respond to practical issues as well as ethical issues. While desirable outcomes can be identified from an ethical basis, they cannot be reached without responding to practical considerations. To achieve ethical outcomes, one must respond to economic, political, and social realities. To create positive change for those one serves, one must have support not only of those served (that's the easy part), but also of those in control.

To implement effectively the ethical imperative for home economics--to enhance the private spheres of human endeavor and experience--we must exhibit some "high risk" ethical behaviors. Ethical behavior that supports the existing social order is low risk. That which promotes progress is high risk and it is controversial. Promoting any kind of change takes resources and energy; promoting progress takes courage as well. Without courage, professionals respond to practical considerations and ignore the concurrent, and often conflicting, ethical considerations.

Professional home economists seeking to better the private sphere of human endeavor must ask the question, "What is better?" Although that question cannot be answered with any finality (ethical ones never can be), this paper has proposed guidelines for professional practice.

The practical realities of public sector employment must be managed in ways that meet the concurrent ethical imperative for home economists to enhance the private sphere of human experience. To achieve success in this endeavor, home economists must work to enhance the legitimacy of the private sphere as a matter of concern to public decision makers. They must direct their work in the design, development and dissemination of products, spaces, services and information to issues of significance in the daily experience of people. And, they must work from a vision of a world in which both the public and private spheres of endeavor are valued.

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"DEEP" VS. "SHALLOW" ECOLOGY: THE SEARCH FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC

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Environmental ethics rests on the proposition that some kind of moral relationship does, or should, exist between people and nature, but it is not at all clear what the philosophical basis of that moral relationship is or should be. Stated in the terms of moral philosophy we can phrase the question thusly: "What are our duties and obligations over and against nonhuman nature, and the logic which underlies these duties?" For some time now, strong efforts have been made to ground such an ethic of nature so as to provide a philosophical underpinning to the environmental movement.

Looking to traditional ethics, one searches in vain through 3,000 years of philosophy. With the exception of a few scattered accounts to do so, no consistent theory has been developed for right conduct regarding the relationship of humans to animals, plants, and the rest of nature. In those instances where persons did speak out, the tone was decidedly utilitarian, i.e., the earth and all of its creatures are here for the use and benefit of humankind.

The idea that nature was created to serve humans has been a popular belief throughout western history. Socrates in a dialogue with Euthydemus is reported to have said, "Tell me Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to reflect on the care the gods have taken to furnish man with what he needs?" And he goes on to recite the bounty which the gods make available for the exclusive use and enjoyment of our species.

Aristotle expressed a similar view more plainly: "Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man. . . nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain; it is undeniably true that she made all (all the natural worlds) for the sake of man."

St. Paul, in his letter to the Corinthians, poses the rhetorical question "Does God care for the oxen?", and goes on to answer, no!

Immanuel Kant, who did so much to shape western philosophy and is one of its pillars, makes the claim that so far as nature is concerned, we have no direct duties to it; nature is not self-conscious and it is present only as a means to an end, the end being human utilization.

Charles Lyell, a leading geologist of the 19th century, believed that domestic animals (and one wonders if he didn't mean all of nature) had been designed expressly for human use.

All of these so-called Dominion theories affirmed directly or indirectly that humankind is to be valued more highly than all the other beings in nature; the valuing, of course, is done by us. And indeed, it makes good sense to view oneself and one's own kind as being at the center of things. This certainly accords with the biological side of things (spiders probably live in a world which to them is arachniocentric, and mice rodentiocentric). But the problem with this world view is that it gives an unrestricted license to do what one pleases to one's world. And again, this is OK if what you can do is limited; but when great powers for doing mischief are yours, then something else is at stake. This, of course, is precisely where we are today as human societies worldwide play out the survival game. Now there is the feeling that maybe things are not as they should be, even to the point of debating the morality of our uses of the nonhuman environment.

Western ethics, though, developed specifically to order humans interacting with other humans; little or no thought was given to the moral status of nonhuman nature. Traditional ethics revolves around implied or explicit contracts between persons; and so we find useful such moral maxims as justice, or promise-keeping, or truth-telling. All of these derive from the position that the agents involved, i.e., humans, have moral standing and that we have moral duties only to moral agents. The flip side of this is that we do not have duties to non-moral agents, however defined. The standard criteria for moral agency are all anthropocentric -- self-consciousness, some kind of sentience, the capacity to distinguish rightness from wrongness, and so forth; all are clearly human endowments. Non-human nature, by these standards, fails to qualify. Individual animals and plants, to say nothing of the rocks and rivers, cannot be educated to make moral claims, hence, they must remain outside the ethical domain.

So then, if we wish to justify an environmental ethic, that is, to set forth a valid principle for reacting to the question, "Why should I preserve and protect the environment as opposed to exploiting it to my exclusive advantage?" we must turn elsewhere for our guide.

The usual answers, invoke some kind of utilitarian calculus and a number of these have been around for some time. The most frightening is the extreme environmentalist position sometimes called the survivalist view. It warns that every exhaustion of natural resources, every irremedial pollution of the terrestrial environment, leads us closer to the evil day when we will find the earth no longer a pleasant abode, but a stinkhold of ever-diminishing fitness for life. On this global sphere, not only humankind but every living plant and animal, every microbe and virus, is bound together. Human survival, therefore, depends ultimately upon the ability of other species of life to replenish our atmosphere, purify our oceans and fresh water, and recycle our resources of minerals.

Ecologist Paul Ehrlich employs the metaphor of the Earthship to portray our planet and the life it sustains. Various species are the rivets which hold the ship together. Extinction of species is comparable to popping the rivets. Loss of these species rivets threatens the destruction of the entire ship. How many rivets are needed to keep the ship intact no one knows, so that every loss is not to be taken lightly.

The ethics needed to sustain this kind of universal symbiosis is thus based on our own need to survive. The argument is simple and direct. Since nature is absolutely necessary for our own future welfare, it is not only logical but extremely practical that we conserve it. Nature's richness must be preserved because all its components are significant. The removal of any part may lead to undesirable consequences somehow, somewhere, someday.

This familiar view is espoused by many environmentalists and ecologists today and is the reason for its other name - the ecological theory of conservation. It is also the message broadcast at us almost daily.

Another utilitarian view makes an appeal to another motive, that nature constitutes a huge warehouse of resources having an enormous potential for making our lives better. This is one of the arguments being made today to preserve biological diversity, the destruction of which is going on at a hectic pace in the earth's topical ecosystems. Many biological species, both animal and plant, contain an array of chemicals which can be put to good use; many of these are still undiscovered and undeveloped. Some examples of those already known are oil from the jojoba bean (a desert shrub) which has the same properties as sperm whale oil, the serendipity berry of West Africa which is 3000 times sweeter than sucrose, numerous medicinals and anticancer drugs gotten from plants and marine invertebrates which promise rich payoffs in medicine's never-ending fight against a host of wild gene pools, especially those of tropical plants, may some day be useful to rejuvenate or otherwise rescue our major food plants, all of which are of tropical or subtropical origin, from genetic debilitation.

Biologist Thomas Eisner testified before Congress that only 2% of the flowering plants have been tested for alkaloids, a natural compound having medicinal value. A National Science Foundation report advocated saving the Devil pupfish because it thrives in extreme environments and therefore may serve as a useful biological model for future research on the human kidney.

Some ecologists argue still another benefit, the so-called "free work" of nature. Nature's cycles purify and recycle the most basic requirements for life -- water, oxygen, nitrogen, and so forth. These crucial benefits will be lost if we continue to pollute and otherwise desecrate our planetary home.

The position for preservation claimed with these is labeled conservationist, with conservation being defined as "the care of natural resources and their protection from depletion, waste and damage, so that they will be readily at hand through perpetuity." This view advocates the wise use of resources, which in turn requires planning and management. One of its guiding paradigms is 'maximum sustainable yield" of biotic nature.

In both the ecological theory of conservation and preservation for the sake of payoff, the primary concern is not with threatened nature but threatened humans. Our species is still assigned primary value while Nature is accorded secondary value. (By secondary we mean that something is necessary to secure a primary value, in this case our survival or well-being.)

Several more versions of an environmental ethic which accord with the preeminence of our kind could be cited; none of these seriously challenges the assumptions of the prevailing worldview. This worldview described by sociologist William Catton contains four basic presumptions:

1) People are fundamentally different from all other creatures on earth, over which they have dominion.

2) People are masters of their own destiny; they can choose their goals and learn to do whatever is necessary to achieve them.

3) The world is vast, and thus provides unlimited opportunities for humans.

4) The history of humanity is one of progress; for every problem there is a solution, and thus progress never need cease.

We will have time to critique this worldview, though it has been critiqued, not only by ecologists and environmentalists, but by some poets and other literary writers, religious thinkers and philosophers, economists, sociologists, and ever a few politicians. The theme running through most of these is that technological society alienates human beings from each other and from the rest of nature because technology, by its very nature, must promote destructive values and goals.

With this rather extensive lead-in, we are now ready to get to our main point. The positions for grounding an environmental ethic we have been so far discussing have been lumped under the rather derisive label, "shallow ecology," for the reason that they fail to probe deeper questions. They are still anthropocentric in that their focus rests exclusively on humans and what we can get out of nature; they also tend to provide support, if not directly then indirectly, for the prevailing worldview.

This is not to say that these defenses of the environment have not been and continue to be extremely valuable. Many parks, nature reserves, and threatened species have been saved, at least temporarily. But the threats are still there. The national parks are once again threatened by plans for more intensive development, and many natural areas are under almost constant attack from economic interests who would use them for a profit. The various legislative acts passed by Congress in the '70s when environmental matters were useful for political gain - The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Acts, The Endangered Species Act, and so forth -- now have hard sledding as they come up for renewal. The widening gap between the world's "haves" and "have nots", as the "have nots" try desperately to provide for their growing populations, is pointed to as the reason for widescale ecological destruction.

All of these have led many to see the limitations and weaknesses of the "shallow ecology" approach. They sense that something is missing. They are becoming aware that the environmental movement, if it is to be truly effective, needs an articulate philosophy grounded upon assumptions which differ from those of the dominant worldview. They are asking the deeper questions. The perspective is away from narrow anthropocentrism and toward a much broader biocentrism.

In 1972, the Norwegian philosopher, Arne Naess began discussing such a philosophy which he named "deep ecology." He named it that because it probes the deeper issues of the metaphysics of nature. This metaphysics is genuinely non-anthropocentric. It proposes the development of an "ecological consciousness" which above all, operates on the principle that all parts of the biosphere are considered to be of equal and intrinsic worth. This goes for individual humans, whales, grizzly bears, whole forest ecosystems, mountains and rivers, or the tiniest microbe in the soil. Naess calls this biocentric equality. The main element of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of self-realization. Stated in philosophical terms, deep ecology assigns primary value to all of nature. This means that all of its parts have intrinsic worth. Nature and its preservation need not be defended on any other grounds than that it is there; in effect, nature has moral standing just as you and I have moral standing. Just as we can claim certain rights and entitlements, and have certain obligations and duties over other moral agents, so we stand in a similar relationship to nature. There is no bifurcation between humans and the non-human realm. There is a oneness and a wholeness. To the extent that boundaries are erected, we fall short of deep ecology consciousness.

Self-realization and biocentric equality are the two ultimate norms which come out of this unity. The deep ecology sense of self requires an identification which extends not only to other humans - family, friends and species overall - but to the non-human world as well. George Sessions, in his book Deep Ecology - Living As If Nature Mattered, summarizes this unfolding of the self with the assertion, "No one is saved until we all are saved," and the "all" in this context means every organism, every ecosystem, the whole world.

The most immediate and obvious challenge to the proposition of living one's life by the dictates of biocentric equality is the issue of resource utilization. To live is to use others for sustenance; all species feed on each other, modify parts of their environment for shelter, and so forth. The paradox, according to deep ecology, is that if we harm any part of nature we also harm ourselves as well. The duty not to harm, though, may be overridden for survival's sake, just as the prohibition against killing can be overridden if by doing so, we are protecting other life. The necessary moral stipulation is that there must be compelling reasons for doing so. So, too, here, the duty not to disrupt or harm non-human components can be overridden if the justification is valid. But utilization cannot be done wantonly and without careful reflection. In plain terms we should live so that our activities will have minimum impact on other species and on the earth. This is the basis of Naess's working principle -- "simple in means, rich in ends."

This notion of nature cannot be grasped intellectually, but it is ultimately experiential. With John Muir we may tie ourselves to a tree during a raging storm to experience what the tree experiences; we lie down on a rock to think like a rock.

The following brief summary contrasts the dominant worldview with that of deep ecology.

DOMINANT WORLDVIEW	DEEP ECOLOGY
Dominance over nature	Harmony with nature
Natural environment as resource for human	All nature has intrinsic worth, biospecies equality
Material/economic growth for growing human population	Elegantly simple material needs (material goals serving the larger goal of self-realization
High technological progress and solutions	Appropriate technology; non-dominating science
Consumerism	Doing with enough/recycling
National/centralized community	Minority tradition/bioregion

To many of you who are long-time environmentalists and are conversant with its literature, what is elucidated here does not sound new. And indeed, you are right. Deep ecology articulates the long-established view that has its expression in some very ancient cultures, notably native North Americans, and more recently, by a large number of contemporary writers and poets. In this sense, deep ecology is a return to a wisdom we once knew. In fact, Naess himself notes that the idea is far from original; he came upon it from trying to make sense out of the writings of biologists Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson. Its sources, therefore, are many and diverse, some very old.

A few thinkers since at least the time of Plato have tried to place humans in a wider scheme of things. Plato's "allegory of the cave" in the Republic is an example. The Dutch philosopher and theologian Baruch Spinoza advocated a nature-oriented system. St. Francis of Assisi, the patron saint of environmentalists, in the 12th century spoke the deep ecology view in his Canticle of Brother Sun, Sister Moon in which he makes a clear exposition of the quality of all of God's creation.

American Indians lived their lives with the reality of the Great Spirit which included all creatures as well as the land. To the primal mind, there was no sharp break between humans and the rest of nature. Their entire culture was built upon this perception -- their religion, cosmology, economy, and society. Careful hunting and agriculture in conformity with this spiritual view of nature preserved the earth and the life on it.

Countless writers over the years recounted a similar view. Herman Melville's Moby Dick can be seen as a modern-day allegory. The self-destructive attempt by Captain Ahab to conquer nature, the Great White Whale, is a quest which cannot be won. Henry David Theoeau, in Walden Pond, Aldous Huxley in Brave New World, the essays of D. H. Lawrence, Joseph Wood Krutch, and scores of others have called into serious question the pervasive worldview as the way we should live our lives.

John Muir, one of the pioneer movers in the preservation movement in our country, had as his vision the essential oneness of the earth which included a biocentric equality. Again and again environmentalists have gotten spiritual support from his numerous writings. Among these, I like this as one of the best: "...I have very precious little sympathy for the selfish propriety of civilized man, and if a war of races should occur between the wild beasts and Lord Man, I would be tempted to sympathize with the bears."

The name that stands at the top of most people's list is Aldo Leopold, who underwent a dramatic conversion from the management mentality of his early career to what he called an ecological conscience. His now famous Sand County Almanac contains the most quoted essay in the environmental literature, "The Land Ethic." In it he makes the claim that an ecological conscience "changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it." In another place he lays out the basic moral maxim to guide our uses of the environment: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."

If Leopold is the Prophet of the environmental movement, Rachel Carson is its High Priestess. Her vivid and numerous writings stressed humility and attentive listening to nature's rhythms, which are much broader than ours. Her Silent Spring (1962) dates the beginning of the "Age of Ecology."

More recently, the United Nations in October, 1982, adopted a World Charter for Nature which includes a biocentric orientation. One of its lines says ". . .every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action."

And saving the best for last, feminism and deep ecology are seen to be intimately intertwined. A number of feminist writers have extolled the parallels between the insights of feminists and deep ecology. The masculine behaviors of egoism, dominance, competition, and the like, contrast sharply with the feminine virtues of nonviolence, cooperation, personal relationships, celebration of life, and self-realization. Delores LaChapelle, Mary Austin, Elizabeth Gray, the poetry of Gwen Frostic, and many others emphasize this essential oneness of self with the world.

And still the list does not end. Numerous others from both sexes, poets, essayists, novelists, scientists (Loren Eisely), philosophers, religious thinkers, all continue to speak the common language of environmental citizenship. Among the religions, several such movements can be identified. One is the "Eleventh Commandment Fellowship." Its 11th commandment reads, "The Earth is the Lord's and the Fullness thereof' Thou Shalt Not Despoil the Earth, Nor Destroy the Life Thereon." Using this commandment as the guide, it encourages in its members the development of a personal ethic of the environment. A similar religious movement is the Eco-Justice Project headquartered at Cornell University. Its objective is to influence Christian thought away from the more traditional conqueror mentality to a stewardship one.

Much of this essay has been taken up with a defense rather than a discussion of the tenets of deep ecology, other than its briefest description. I did this advisedly to illustrate that deep ecology thinking is well-established in many people's mind and those who practiced it have not had to go back to the pre-hunting stage of our evolution. The ideal, at first glance, seems to be beyond the grasp of mere humans, but this should not deter our striving. Idealism whatever its form is meant to motivate and guide our contending. Religion, after all, continues to admonish its adherents to live as saints in the full recognition that none of us ever can do so, certainly not in this life. By setting our aim high, we can accomplish more. A simple paradigm I find especially useful in ordering my own life in these matters goes like this - "People who care will live lives that show they care."

Guidelines for incorporating the precepts of deep ecology into one's personal life might be these (as suggested by Sessions):

1) developing a sense of place

2) redefining the heroic person from conqueror of the land to the person fully experiencing the natural place

3) cultivating the virtues of modesty and humility

4) realizing how the mountains and rivers, fish and bears are continuing their own actualizing processes

And finally, "Simple in means, rich in ends," provides us with the over-arching operating principle as well as the anticipated payoff.

Admittedly, it is unrealistic to suggest that a deep ecology movement will sweep the country, but it is not unrealistic to think that it is possible that an ecological consciousness can be evoked in all sectors of it, a little at a time. And after all, haven't the great reform movements of the past achieved their goals in this way?

SCIENCE AND ETHICS

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Once viewed with optimism as the pathway to enlightenment, science has come to occupy a paradoxical place between hope for its ability to promote human autonomy and despair at its manipulative and destructive role. Earlier confidence in science as the means of 'knowing' is being eroded by recognition of its capacity and use for the exploitation of nature, social engineering and restriction of human freedom, and for its role in the development of crises in the human condition.

Confronted by this paradox, we are dismayed at the refusal of science to address vital questions as it hides behind its "value free" screen; we are dismayed at the so-called "ethical neutrality" of scientists involved in developing the lethal competencies of humankind, which, in Bookchin's terms is a "numbing symbol of 'science-run-wild'" (1982, p. 281), we recognize that there is a need to "transform the ends of science into normative questions for public debate" (Schroyer, 1983, p. 175)-- that we must establish the unity of science and ethics in the development and use of knowledge if science is to fulfill its earlier promise.

In focussing on the relation between science and ethics I will seek to develop the following points:

(a) The value-free claim of science is false; for, not only is the acceptance of what counts as knowledge based on value judgments, but also, the development of scientific theory is guided by external goals.

(b) In spite of claims that empirical science generates the only rational knowledge, that rational decisions cannot be made with respect to questions of value, claims to the rightness of norms can be rationally tested; practical-moral questions can also be rationally resolved.

(c) Although the technical or instrumental reason of science and technology has dominated life in modern industrial society, human emancipation is not advanced through technical problem solving; rather, technical problem solving applied to human affairs leads to a diminishment of reflective capacity and to certain crises. Emancipation demands political-moral reflection and public consensus on the progress of science in relation to rationally determined social goals.

In developing my argument I am defining ethics as "conscious standards of behavior" that invite "rational analyses ... and must be justified by intellectual operations" (Bookchin, p. 8). Whereas moral beliefs may be arrived at irrationally or rationally, ethics, which is the science of morals, denotes moral standards which have been rationally justified by a community. I am also drawing heavily upon the work of contemporary German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas.

Is Science Value-Free or Normative?

Positivistic science claims that facts must be separated from values; i.e., that on one hand, there are natural and social phenomena that can be examined in terms of empirical regularities which may be formulated into laws, while on the other hand, there are rules of human conduct known as "social norms." As a result, what counts as rational knowledge is restricted to empirical science while practical-moral questions lie beyond the realm of scientific inquiry and judgments about them are merely matters of decision.

Critical of positivism, Habermas (1972) argues that even a commitment to science is a matter of normative decision; moreover, the criteria for empirical testing of theories have been socially adopted by the community of scientists, and scientific judgments (cognitive judgments) as well as judgments of social norms (evaluative judgments) rest on socially adopted assumptions. Objective knowledge is not possible without intersubjective understanding and agreement among members of the scientific community regarding norms, methods, concepts, rules, and goals of science.

Arguing that objectivism is an illusion which hides the constitution of facts, or the relation of theoretical statements to underlying assumptions, Habermas reveals the connection between knowledge and human interests. He classifies the processes of inquiry generating different types of knowledge into three categories: empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and critical inquiry. The central thesis is that the "general cognitive strategies" guiding systematic inquiry originate in the natural history of humankind. From the earliest attempts to satisfy material needs through controlling the natural environment to the development of technologically-based industry, confrontation with nature has evolved as a learning process. The "anthropologically deep-seated interest" here, is a technical interest and the mode of inquiry produces nomological knowledge-- knowledge expressed as law-like generalizations. The human species also has a fundamental interest in intersubjective or mutual understanding through ordinary language communication. Habermas calls this interest in "securing and expanding possibilities of mutual and self understanding in the conduct of life" the practical interest (McCarthy, 1978, p. 56); the related mode of inquiry is therefore aimed at interpretive understanding and agreement. The third mode of inquiry is critical self-reflection; based on the interest in self-realization and rational action to gain or maintain human freedom, this mode of inquiry is employed in the emancipatory interest of humankind.

The processes of inquiry, therefore, have their bases in the natural history of the human species--in human interests. The subject conducting the inquiry is not a 'neutral' observer, but a "community of investigators, a subsystem of a larger social system that is itself a product of the social evolution of the human species" (McCarthy, 1978, p. 59). The world cannot be rationally conceived as a system of facts and theories independent of the knower, for the individuals involved in their development have certain intentions or interest in their use.

Students of the sociology of science point to what is called "finalization in science". Finalization is defined as "a process through which external goals for science become guidelines for the development of the scientific theory itself" (Bohme, Van Den Daele, & Krohn, 1976, p. 307). While science would divorce itself from normative considerations, values direct scientific research increasingly toward "economic, military, and infrastructural goals" (p. 307). An example provided is that of the direction of research in aerodynamics toward the reduction of noise levels at the request of airplane manufacturers; thus, the external goal which provides the guideline for theory development and research is linked to economic purpose.

Bohme et al. relate this example to another common tendency: to direct research toward establishing functional relationships. Pharmacology, for instance, is largely involved in determining the causes of specific effects (the development of drugs to eliminate headache is a case in point); mechanisms of the effects are not uncovered and are not theoretically explained. Inadequate development of theory in some instances leads to unforeseen changes occurring as a result of replication of the experiment; e.g., later manifestation of serious side effects of certain drugs in use; or, as in the case of the effects of DDT, the development of resistant insect strains. The more complex the subject matter of the discipline, the more marked is the functional orientation; e.g., psychologists develop learning theory, sociologists develop systems theory. The development of functional theory is strongly related to a technical interest in control and regulation, as in behavior modification, crisis management, and so on. The direction of research toward functional relationships and the resulting lack of explanatory power or inadequate theory development enhances the merging of science with technology and the orientation of scientific development toward external goals.

Finalization theorists show clearly that there are two alternatives in scientific development; one is repressive, the other emancipatory. Schafer (1979) points out that "the use of science and technology to oppress and destroy human beings and to exploit nature no longer belongs to the realm of science fiction" (p. 929). Finalization in science may persist, with its conformity to power structures and promotion of special interest groups, e.g., military or industry. This would be oppressive and totalitarian. On the other hand, the goals of science could be transformed into ethical questions for public discourse. This "alternative integration of science and society" would "bring the norms of nature and interests of human beings into accord instead of violating them" (p. 929). In Schroyer's terms, the latter alternative would provide for a "more dialectical notion of science and practical (moral-ethical) truth -- or the unity of cognitive and normative truth within the practice of human learning" (p. 175).

Can Practical-Moral Questions be Rationally Resolved?

Positivistic science assumes that while the validity of knowledge can be established with empirical, factual evidence through replication of the conditions of observation and experimentation, values are subjective preferences or mere matters of decision which cannot be rationally assessed. Moral statements cannot be properly judged true or false as there are no ethical characteristics such as rightness or wrongness which are directly or indirectly observable.

Habermas (1984) contends that as a result of the dominance of instrumental rationality, social issues are conceptualized as technical problems to be resolved through means-ends procedures; the interpretive procedures essential to ethical decisions are abandoned, hence, ethics is repressed. Referring to urgent ecological and social problems, Bookchin claims that "by reducing ethics to little more than matters of opinion and taste, instrumentalism has dissolved every moral and ethical constraint over the impending catastrophe that seems to await humanity" (p. 273). Recognizing that the approach of empirical-analytic science is an insufficient basis from which to understand social reality, Habermas shows how hermeneutic science provides an essential viewpoint and methods appropriate to the determination of ethical issues.

Organizing all speech actions into categories, Habermas shows how they are naturally oriented toward reaching agreement, how speech actions or discourse can be understood as the raising of claims with a view to reaching shared understanding and agreement. The claims which must be met are comprehensibility of speech, truth of propositions, rightness of norms, and sincerity of intention. These norms of ordinary communication are usually taken for granted; yet, when they are broken, a sense of shared experience and community is lost. While adhering to them, genuine consensus can be sought through a process of argumentation for reaching shared understanding. Rational consensus becomes possible when participants in dialogue are willing and able to participate as equals without employing force, deception, or manipulative strategies; when they are sincerely willing to seek agreement, and set aside all motives except the "co-operative search for truth." Habermas contends that all speech is oriented toward the achievement of this "ideal speech situation" for, without anticipating its possibility we would not enter into dialogue.

Ethical questions or issues are the focus of practical discourse in a community or society. Practical-moral discourse is the procedure for determining the rightness of norms and the soundness of moral judgments. Moral questions are questions about what we should do in concrete situations--questions about the rightness of certain norms and the rightness of certain acts; we need to know what is the case, and to determine what is morally right in the context of the situation. The concern must be for the welfare of all people involved. Nielsen (1967) states, "Quite independently of what we judge human welfare to be, these distinctively human values must, from a moral point of view, be distributed as equitably as possible to all the people involved" (p. 132). The dialectic method involved is an informal process characterized by movement of thought back and forth between levels of reflection. Participation in practical-moral discourse is a form of moral education. As conflicting views or contradictions are examined there must be freedom to participate, to examine meanings, to assess reasons put forth, and to redevelop conceptions of the problematic norm or moral question. Reasons must be assessed for their validity and their logical coherence in the line of argumentive reasoning. The force of the better argument will determine the outcome (Habermas, 1984).

Ethical questions can be resolved rationally in the public sphere. We need to understand how positivism blinds us to this truth and what the consequences are for the human condition.

Is the Progress of Science Synonymous with the Development of Moral Sensitivity and Human Autonomy?

While claiming to be value free, science has merged with technology. Pointing out that knowledge derived through empirical inquiry can only be utilized in social life as technology which expands our power of technical control, Habermas (1971) warns that "the capacity for control made possible by the empirical sciences is not to be confused with the capacity for enlightened action" (p. 56).

As the methods of science were successfully applied through technology in the development and control of production processes in the realm of work, these methods of control were then extended to the realm of work, these methods of control were then extended to the realm of social relations. Rather than solving social problems, however, this transference has created them; for the communicative action necessary for the resolution of conflicts, the realization of interests, and the interpretation of needs, has been pushed aside by the procedures of instrumental action.

Money and power have become mechanisms for steering interaction in the "lifeworld" or "taken for granted background of social action" (McCarthy, 1984, p. xxiv), thereby destroying communication. Moral-practical elements are driven out of the private and public spheres, and everyday life is increasingly "monetarized" and "bureaucratized." Habermas claims that "consumerism and possessive individualism, motives of performance and competition gain the force to shape conduct. ... As the private sphere is undermined and eroded by the economic system, so is the public sphere by the administrative system" (xxxii). Bureaucratic decision making disempowers the public and is also oriented toward ensuring mass loyalty for the system.

As the economy and the government are essentially connected, problems arising in either area can be dealt with in the other. In developed capitalist societies the decreasing possibility for political participation has been offset by "inflating the role" of the citizen; meanwhile, the worker has been enticed to accept his/her position through "normalisation" of occupational roles and the enhancement of consumer roles. Efforts are thus made to curtail political and economic alienation and to maintain system stability.

Habermas shows how the infiltration of instrumental action into the human lifeworld causes crises. Each of the structural components of the lifeworld, i.e., the culture, society, and human personality, is dependent upon undistorted communication for their reproduction. When disturbances occur in any of these components, crises are manifested in all three; e.g., there may be loss of meaning in the culture, withdrawal of legitimation in social processes, and loss of orientation in socialization; there may be lack of collective identity, normlessness, and alienation; or breakdown in cultural tradition, withdrawal of motivation, and psychopathologies. The price paid for the control of society through the "value-neutral" methods of science is not only the loss of human freedom, but also the development of crises in the human condition.

Habermas contends that the domination of human thought by instrumental reason has led to a diminished capacity for critical reflection necessary for self-understanding. Without reflectively appropriating life we are not aware of hidden forces which have bearing upon our patterns of thought and beliefs, deluding us about our society, our interests, and our needs. So dominated are we by means-ends rationality that when there should be concern for the practical-moral consequences of certain action, discussion focusses on technical means of achieving unexamined ends. While the direction to be taken by science and technology should be reflectively determined, technocratic consciousness blocks this type of reflection and in so doing it has the effect of dulling moral sensitivity. Moreover, it "fulfills the ideological function of concealing behind a facade of objective necessity the social interests that actually determine technological development" (McCarthy, 1978, p. 13), e.g., special economic or political interest groups.

Redeeming the Promise

The model of reason provided by Newtonian physics was accepted as the model for all knowledge and progress during the Enlightenment. As science made its impact on life, it was assumed that progress in science was accompanied by progress in morality. It was believed that as scientific knowledge diffused throughout social life with its emancipatory effect on traditional thought patterns, dissolving superstitions, prejudices, and "errors," political and economic structures would also be transformed. There would be a republican form of government guaranteeing civil liberties and "an institutionally secured public sphere, so that political power could be rationalized through the medium of public discussion to reflect the general will and common interest" (McCarthy, 1984, p. xvii). In the economic sphere, it meant that one would pursue one's self interest provided that it was compatible with similar pursuits of other individuals. The result was to be a continuous increase in general wealth shared by all. Weber challenged the assumptions of the Enlightenment regarding knowledge and progress, arguing that its orientation toward means-ends rationality aimed at control for realization of interests, meant that instrumental action could be harnessed from any value perspective. Moreover, cultural traditions dissolved, human freedom was denied, and the world was stripped of ethical meaning. The unity of the world had crumbled (McCarthy, 1984).

Habermas argues that the hope for humankind lies not in instrumental reason, but in the conditions of communicative interaction. His analyses show a reciprocal relationship between universal rational self-determination and self-realization or autonomy of the individual. Through being socialized as members of an ideal community, as participants in rational discourse, individuals would learn to act reflectively in a self-critical attitude, thus developing toward autonomy. Through the process of self-reflection they would reinterpret the legitimacy of structures of social control. As free or autonomous persons they would act on the basis of adequate concepts, and freedom from false beliefs or ideology.

Ideally, the direction of science and technological progress would be regulated through practical-moral discourse--through a public decision-making process free from domination or distorted communication. This would demand understanding of interests and needs of all who would be affected, thus the penetration of ideology promoting false conceptions of needs and supression of common interests. The goals of science would be directed in light of this new understanding and in relation to the techniques available for their realization (Habermas, 1970). Philosophical reflection and communicative interaction would thus be restored to their rightful place in social life.

In a world in which science and technology increasingly impinge upon ordinary life, in which the devastating effects of power and money become visible, in which there is inequality and social ferment, the distance between science and philosophy must be deplored. Merleau-Ponty states, "We have to show that science is possible, that the sciences of man are possible, and that all the same philosophy is possible. It is necessary in particular to end the rift between systematic philosophy and the advancing knowledge of science" (1964, p. 44). Science should no longer be allowed to exist in a moral vacuum.

Moreover, social science concerned with the whole of society, must be historical as well as philosophical; there must be continuity with the past and understanding of how we have come from the past to the present. Bellah and his colleagues remind us that "A free society needs constantly to consider and discuss its present reality in the light of its past traditions and where it wants to go" (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton, 1986, p. 307).

Many of our current crises have been brought about or aggravated by scientists working in isolation and ignoring the human and social ramifications of their work. By breaking down the boundaries between the sciences and between science and the public, i.e., by recognizing the need for cooperation between the philosopher, the social historian, the social scientist, the natural scientist, and the layman, by analysing the past as well as the present, by looking at values and social norms as much as facts and hypotheses, difficult issues would be more ethically resolved. It can only be through raising for reasoned argumentation the moral questions associated with the scientific enterprise--by restoring the link between science and ethics--that the promise of the Enlightenment can be redeemed.

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ETHICS, HOME ECONOMICS, AND DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION

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In 1985, the American Home Economics Association successfully competed for funds from the USAID Development Education program, its newest and only domestic initiative. A three-year grant totalling $207,000 provides support for a national secondary home economics program called "Global Connections: Development Education for American Teenagers." The purpose of the project is to utilize the expertise of home economists experienced in international development to educate secondary school youth to become involved with world development activities and worldwide reduction of hunger and poverty.[1]

The broad goals of the Project are to help ensure that teenagers will:

* Recognize the interdependence of elements of the global community;
* Become aware of and comprehend the problems of hunger and poverty in the world;
* Develop the ability to make decisions about perennial and universal problems facing families worldwide, particularly managing resources, nurturing human development, creating a home environment, and feeding and nourishing family members; and
* Appreciate and respect diversity in traditions, customs, skills, and beliefs of families and individuals of all cultures.

Eight objectives define the parameters of the Project:

1. To utilize a network of home economists with development experience to support and promote the project at the national, state, and local levels;
2. To involve home economists with development experience in preparing instructional kits and sharing experiences with American teenagers;
3. To establish links with organizations utilizing home economists in development activities;
4. To obtain input from home economists and other educators with mutual interests in development education;
5. To produce fifteen instructional kits based on development issues, which contain classroom-ready materials;
6. To increase knowledge, ability, and desire of home economists to incorporate development education into the secondary curriculum and youth organization programs;
7. To increase secondary home economics students' awareness of development issues, multicultural similarities and differences, and global interdependence; and
8. To increase the involvement of teenagers in discussion of solutions to the problems of development, particularly hunger, poverty, and overpopulation.

From these objectives come the four major program components: curriculum and materials development, preparation of teachers, materials and information dissemination, and member involvement.

Thus, through this framework, the project hopes to involve home economics teachers in a series of experiences that will ultimately result in more Americans being more knowledgeable about world affairs and the impact of U.S. foreign policy on families at home and abroad. A move toward incorporating this perspective into the secondary home economics, as defined by the American Home Economics Association; to wit, the 1974 document, Home Economics: New Directions II,[2] identifies five "new" priorities for home economics. While each of the five carry interpretations that could lead to the development of a global perspective, one of the priorities specifically addresses the matter at hand:

4. Redistribution of Resources

   Recognizes the interdependence of resource availability and the development of human potentials, and initiates actions that lead to a more equitable resource distribution. For example:

   . Developing programs on population education

   . Examining effects of resource limitations on human behavior

Other AHEA published material carries a similar theme.[3]

Having demonstrated that the incorporation of development education concepts into home economics curriculum and instruction is consistent with our professional philosophical base, perhaps it is appropriate now to raise questions about the nature of the messages likely to be imparted. Development education has as its primary goal the building of a committed constituency for development both at home and abroad, promoting the recognition of global interdependence and the continuing need for justice and equity in the world. That being the case, it becomes clear that domestic policy and interpretations of that policy will, in fact, affect foreign policy.

* Does the absence of "family policy" in the U.S. render inconsequential the development of a family policy for U.S. foreign assistance programs?
* Do inconsistencies in the philosophy undergirding U.S. family programs carry forth in foreign assistance programs designed to help families in other parts of the world?
* Does the inability to design U.S. programs that ADEQUATELY address the needs of the U.S. poor translate into inadequately designed programs for the foreign poor?

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[1] Simpson, Norma; Montgomery, Wanda; and Vaughn, Gladys Gary (1987, Spring). Global connections: Linking Third World concerns with American teens through home economics. Journal of Home Economics, 79, 43.

[2] Home economics: New directions II. (1974). Washington, DC: American Home Economics Association.

[3] For example, Concepts and generalizations: Their place in high school home economics curriculum development. (1967). Washington, DC: American Home Economics Association.

The U.S. "family" program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is a case in point. Rarely is this program thought of as a "family" program, i.e., one that strengthens the family. Rather, it is thought of as a "public assistance" program--a negative economic drain on the public. To what extent do perceptions of this kind of U.S. domestic program interfere with the development of meaningful and well-planned programs providing aid for families in need in other lands?

I suggest that these are the kinds of questions that can be raised by home economists in forums such as we are participating in here.

Development education should begin by sensitizing individuals to problems--and their possible solutions--that affect families and societies at the local level, and carefully move to national and then international concerns about these same problems.

If through development education, we can get an individual to understand the nature of a problem and its impact (real and potential) on families locally, it is a short step to extending that understanding to a similar situation faced by families in other lands.

ETHICS IN TODAY'S WORLD

Margaret Herrmann

Home Economics Teacher
Centralia (IL) High School

I feel especially honored to be asked to serve on this panel with these very distinguished colleagues who represent our national AHEA office, and our major universities. My role on this panel is to represent the classroom teacher, who has direct contact with today's teenagers, attempting to link them to their world.

During this past week, our newspapers have been filled with articles portraying alarming and tragic happenings. They imply that Americans' "lax attitudes" and general "complacency" toward foreign affairs may have contributed to the problems.

As Americans, we can make value choices about our involvement with various problems in the world. On a continuum, these value choices can range from total involvement on one end, to no involvement on the other. For example, the world hunger crisis is both easy and complex. Put simply, (1) we know that someone will starve to death tomorrow, and (2) we have the resources to do something about it. Nearly everyone would agree with these two factual statements.

But complexity and disagreement arise when considering whether we should act, and if so, what we should do.

A. Should we be proud of our own food reserves and wonder why underdeveloped countries are incapable of feeding themselves?
B. Should we blame ourselves or American foreign policy and call for an American disengagement from world-mindedness?
C. Should we rush emergency food?

Moreover, do we know how to overcome the obstacles that have caused our foreign aid programs to fail and lead to hunger in certain parts of the world?

What goals must be set and achieved to obtain security against famine and hunger for the first time in history?

Different views of the facts concerning the current hunger crisis help explain why some people favor a short-term emergency program, while others favor no program at all, and still others believe only a long-term reordering of the international economic order will suffice.

Unfortunately, the hunger crisis is just one of the many problems facing our world today. Others include managing resources, shelter, the state of children, the plight of the woman, unemployment; all of these relate to the quality of life for the family.

As Americans, we have a choice. With one of the world's highest standards of living, we have the resources, we have the knowledge, we have the "expertise." The question is, do we want to get involved? Yes, as Americans, we have the ethical choice to make. No involvement, or total involvement, or some involvement.

As home economists, I don't think that choice is as flexible. Our mission as home economists is to enrich the quality of life for families and individuals. Our mission does not limit our commitment to American families; it implies all families.

As Gwen Frazier pointed out in a recent article in The Illinois Teacher, "Our world is beyond the point of isolationism. We no longer have the luxury of answering only to ourselves for our actions or in-actions. We must be accountable to the rest of the world.[1]

As Home Economists, we are in a unique position. We deal in the "stuff" of world problems daily. We do it in a very practical way on a local level. Nutrition is the same concept, whether taught in Kansas or Kenya. Deficiencies and excesses are extremes of the same principle, whether we are teaching a Third World village mother to boil water for her infant or the advantages of breastfeeding, or whether we are teaching a teenage mother of an affluent New York suburb how to choose nutritious foods for her baby.

We deal in the matters of families, and that in itself makes our professional focus international. Everyone has grown up in a family group of some sort, and all face common problems.

"World problems are aggregates of local problems. Global solutions can begin as local solutions."

There are wonderful opportunities for the home economics teachers to involve students in global concerns in the classroom or in FHA-HERO activities. They can originate global lessons and projects to fit their own teaching situations, or they can encourage their students to contribute to some projects already established that have proven to be successful.

I would like to mention some projects that I feel are especially worthwhile: These include:

* Project Mercy, which is a relief organization that needs people to sew garments for African refugees. That organization will provide the fabric and a McCall's special pattern for as many garments as are requested by a person or group. This project is especially appealing to home economics teachers who may have students who experience "down time" when it is not always financially possible for them to obtain fabric for a class project. This project would help solve two problems (i.e., provide clothing for refugees, as well as give students a sense of pride in helping others).

* Textbook Project, in which mass mailings of new or used home economics or family-related texts, pamphlets and magazines are sent to developing countries. The cost of shipping is approximately 55¢ per pound but through the cooperation of the World Bank in Washington, D.C., books are sent overseas free of charge. Some educational groups like the American Association of University Women or Delta Kappa Gamma might be willing to help with shipping costs.

* Heifer International Project (Little Rock, Arkansas), in which cattle, chickens, rabbits and other animals are paid for

through contributions and transported to developing countries.

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[1] Frazier, Gwen (1983). The importance of the home economics teacher. The Illinois Teacher of Home Economics, 26(5).

- Habitat International (the project in which President Carter and his wife became involved, with the headquarters in Americus, Georgia), in which affordable quality housing is provided for the poor.

The time is now! We cannot continue to be apathetic to our World neighbors. Our commitment to home economics challenges us to become involved. As professionals we need to develop a global perspective in order to be most effective. Ethically, we do have a professional responsibility.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION: A PANEL

Sally K. Williams
Iowa State University

For several years I have been involved in international development work, and I am now exploring ways to apply what I have learned from my experiences to curriculum ideas for U.S. secondary schools and for the home economics program specifically. Working with a group of global educators at the national level has helped me to become aware that most people involved in global education have social studies backgrounds. My position is that global education applies across the curriculum and that all teachers have a responsibility to include concepts fostering a global perspective in their curriculum.

Our focus on this panel is to discuss development education, particularly AHEA's "Global Connections" project. My contact with the project has been as a development education consultant; thus, my remarks are of a general nature and do not necessarily reflect the philosophy of the project.

First, let me say that as home economists we must clarify what view or views of development we represent. I tend to speak more from a humanistic perspective than from an economic or political position. My view is that development is concerned with people--human beings, men and women, the elderly and children, and with the effects of decisions and events on the quality of their lives. The classification of countries as developed, developing or underdeveloped, therefore, does not work for me because that classification is based primarily on an economic perspective of development. In many ways, as I have worked with people in other countries, I have found them to be as developed or, in some ways, more developed than we are in the United States.

As home economists, we must ask the question: Should we be concerned about international development and the integration of content relative to international dimensions into our curricula? All indications are that the community in which our students will live and work is to be a world community. It has been already suggested at this conference that home or the domestic sphere will in the future include one's entire environment, that is, the entire planet earth. We in home economics must raise questions such as the following:

1. To what extent should we be preparing students to live in a world community?
2. To what extent must we help them to understand other people, other cultures, other ways of life?
3. To what extent do we help them think about the consequences of decisions made today on future generations?

Perhaps the time has come to consider Korzybski's time-binding concept which Betty Ray brought to the attention of home economists in 1970.[1] In essence, the concept of time-binding is the concept that people survive and social systems advance only as people in one generation (a) accept responsibility for those who will become the next generation; and (b) accept responsibility for the environment in which the next generation will live and the factors that will influence and affect the quality of their lives. In home economics this means that we must help learners to understand the interdependency of all people who live on this planet. Decisions made by us in the U.S. do affect the lives of people who live in the remotest village in Africa. We are affected by each other. Acid rain and the Chernobyl (USSR) tragedy are but two such examples.

Development education is a term used to describe educational programs which seek to inform, motivate, and/or involve people in understanding the development process, in gaining increased understanding of other cultures and the human condition and ways of life that exist throughout the world. Some people prefer to use the term global education. My specific charge as a panelist is to discuss resources. And it seems appropriate to raise ethical questions to begin this discussion. Thus, a few questions relevant to resource utilization:

1. Is it ethical to consume resources that are exported from a country where land has been converted from food production for local people to the production of cash crops for export? This question is a very difficult one to answer. There are many complexities.
2. Does the ability to purchase something carry the right to consume it? Take the issue of the ozone layer and such consumer products as aerosol spray containers. Ought we to discuss this question in consumer-related classes?
3. Is it okay for me to waste resources if I have the money to buy them?
4. Is it ethical to participate in overconsumption when it may deny resources to others?

Let me discuss a few examples related to these questions. Keep in mind, however, that development education should start by sensitizing learners to problems closely related to their own experiences concerning their immediate environments and should extend the process subsequently to consider more remote problems. In this way, the problems of other countries can be linked with those faced by learners in their own societies. For example, let us think about the resource, water. In the U.S. we have generally taken water for granted. But water has become an issue in our country, too. Most Iowans have always thought of our drinking water as clean. Suddenly, the environment has become a hot political issue: it recently became clear that the water in Iowa is not clean. The water is full of farm chemicals. And people, including farmers, who have to drink marginal groundwater from their wells are upset. Perhaps people in the U.S. can understand better the woman in a rural village in Sudan who has to walk long distances to get water from a well, carry it home, and use it for cooking and other tasks. And then her children may die of diarrhea because the water is not pure and contains microorganisms that may cause illnesses.

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[1] Ray, Elizabeth M. (1970). Professional involvement in education: Home economics and time-binding values. Journal of Home Economics, 62(10), 715-719.

At Iowa State University, we have a linkage project with The Sudan. One of the students from that country who received a degree from our university in December was very concerned about water in the villages of The Sudan. He decided to do something about the problem. An artist, he painted a series of watercolor posters related to water. He is using the posters at home to communicate with villagers who do not read about procedures to use in their daily lives to assure cleaner water for their families. We at ISU are using slides made from the posters to help our students learn about working with non-literate audiences at the village level. In the future we hope to develop curriculum related to the slides in helping secondary school students to learn about the effects of water, or the lack of it on the human condition in other parts of the world.

Food is another resource that we depend on daily. Often we think of hunger and malnutrition only in terms of affecting people in other parts of the world. This is not the case. Yesterday morning as I was waiting for transportation to this meeting, I picked up the Des Moines Register, our morning paper. A headline caught my attention. It read, "Doctor's group aghast at rural Iowa pain, hunger." Several statements reported in this article follow:

> "A group of physicians said Friday they found increased hunger and 'enormous pain and suffering' during an inspection of rural Iowa.... 'For an Easterner, it's sort of strange to come to heartland America, the breadbasket, and have farmers come in and break down,' said Dr. J. Larry Brown, a member of the faculty of the Harvard University School of Public Health. 'We were faced with the spectacle of farm families not being able to feed themselves ....' Among the most serious problems the group found was evidence that some children are developing slowly, a sign of long-term hunger, the physicians said.... 'We saw hungry people, and saw malnourished children,' Brown said. 'For the first time, we are seeing children experience growth failure. The families just simply do not have adequate food to feed the children.'"[2]

We all can cite examples of hunger, especially in our urban areas; however, it is almost unbelievable when the examples are of people who live on some of the richest soil in the world. Ought we to discuss with our students why people in various parts of the world are hungry? What are the causes? Are the causes of hunger in a developing country similar to the cause of hunger in the U.S.? How does hunger relate to our poverty?

Sometimes knowledge of our own history helps us to understand the human condition better in other parts of the world. One of my international students recently reported on energy consumption related to preparing family meals in her country. Firewood has become very scarce in many regions of the world, limiting some families to one meal a day. Adults can exist very well on one meal but young growing children cannot. Different forms of fuel were discussed by the student. One of the U.S. students was quite surprised when the use of cow dung was mentioned until she was helped to recall our own history and the use of dried buffalo chips on the prairies in the early days. One can show relationships between development in our own country and that occurring in other countries. We are not so different after all.

As we help students consider the use of resources and the management of resources, should we raise their ecological consciousness as was earlier suggested? Should we try to expand their thinking to questioning relative to the world perspective and the human condition, and to the interdependency that exists in the world? I am hoping that the materials resulting from this global connections project will be useful in so doing, and will help fill the void that currently exists in much of the home economics curriculum.

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[2] Des Moines Register, 11 April 1987, 3A.

ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS: ANALYZING ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN SERVICE PROFESSIONS

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Most of us are familiar with The Prophet, a book of insightful poems by the Lebanese poet, Kahlil Gibran. Gibran has other books of poetry with equally compelling insights. Let us share one of these with you. It comes from the book, The Wanderer, and is titled "The Two Guardian Angels."

On an evening two angels met at the city gate, and they greeted one another, and they conversed.

The one angel said, "What are you doing these days, and what work is given you?"

And the other answered, "It has been assigned me to be the guardian of a fallen man who lives down in the valley, a great sinner, most degraded. Let me assure you it is an important task, and I work hard."

The first angel said, "That is an easy commission. I have often known sinners, and have been their guardian many a time. But it has now been assigned me to be the guardian of the good saint who lives in a bower out yonder. And I assure you that is an exceedingly difficult work, and most subtle."

Said the [other] angel, "This is but assumption. How can guarding a saint be harder than guarding a sinner?"

And the [first] answered, "What impertinence, to call me assumptious! I have stated but the truth. Methinks it is you who are assumptious!"

Then the angels wrangled and fought, first with words and then with fists and wings.

While they were fighting an archangel came by. And he stopped them, and said, "Why do you fight? And what is it all about? Know you not that it is most unbecoming for guardian angels to fight at the city gate? Tell me, what is your disagreement?"

Then both angels spoke at once, each claiming that the work given him was the harder, and that he deserved the greater recognition.

The archangel shook his head and bethought him.

Then he said, "My friends, I cannot say now which one of you has the greater claim upon honor and reward. But since the power is bestowed in me, therefore for peace' sake and for good guardianship, I give to each of you the other's occupation, since each of you insists that the other's task is the easier one. Now go home and be happy at your work."

The angels thus ordered went their ways. But each one looked backward with greater anger at the archangel. And in his heart each was saying, "Oh, these archangels! Every day they make life harder and still harder for us angels!"

But the archangel stood there, and once more he bethought him. And he said in his heart, "We have indeed, to be watchful and to keep guard over our guardian angels."[1]

Analyzing ethical issues in the human service professions is something akin to the challenge of keeping guard over our guardian angels. Ethics provides a code of behavior, but we sometimes neglect to examine that code and the assumptions upon which decisions are made. To keep alive the spirit of a profession, we must "keep guard over our guardian angels." In other words, we need an occasional check-up of the ethical principles upon which professional performance is built, and we need to assess how we are doing in putting those ethical principles into practice. Thus, our presentation covers three topics: an examination of ethics in human service professions, key questions which help us to analyze ethical issues, and competencies needed to undertake this analysis.

Defining Human Service Professions and Professional Ethics

When discussing ethical issues in the human service professions, we need to understand what we mean by the words "profession" and "professional." These words are so loosely used nowadays that they are applied to almost any kind of occupation from "professional" grave digger to "professional" athlete, to professional lawyer. The one common tie in such usage is the implication that the professional receives wages for activities in contrast to the amateur who does something similar without pay.

A more precise and historically accurate understanding of the term profession limits its usage to those professions which are characterized by three necessary features.[2] First, extensive education is required, usually at least a college baccalaureate degree. Second, the education and practice requires a significant intellectual element, often described as a liberal education. Routine skills may be a part of one's profession but these skills are combined with decision making which calls upon the reasoning power of the mind. The third feature of a profession is that it provides an important service to society. Three other features which are common but may not be required are: certification or licensing, an organization or body to which individual professionals belong, and a certain degree of autonomy in one's work.[3] Professional means one who engages in or conforms to a profession.

It may be redundant to speak of "human service professions" because one element which distinguishes the professions is that they provide an important service to society. The descriptor, human service, implies that these professions are outwardly directed. Professionals espouse the ideal of service to others. They believe the world will be a better place in which to live because of their contributions.

Ethics is the study and philosophy of human conduct, with emphasis on the determination of right and wrong. Ethics is also defined as the basic principles of right action. Bayles (1981)[4] suggests that professional ethics may be viewed as a system of norms. In contrast to its general usage in the social sciences to refer to accepted behavior of a group, in the context of professional ethics, norms refer to the behavior that should be, i.e., the ideal, and to criteria that should be used to evaluate professional practice.

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[1] Gibran, Kahlil. The Wanderer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932), pp. 34-36.

[2] Bayles, Michael D. Professional Ethics (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1981), p. 7.

[3] Ibid., p. 8.

[4] Ibid., p. 16.

The Purpose of Professional Ethics

What is the purpose of professional ethics?

A major purpose of professional ethics is the guidance of conduct. However, the spirit of this guidance is not merely to lay out rules of behavior nor to focus on the legality of a particular action, but rather to identify ideals. What is legal in society is usually the lowest common denominator, a restriction or a right that fosters an orderly society. What is ethical points toward the highest ideals--that which we set before ourselves and the public, and which we hope to attain and maintain. When professionals adhere to the code of ethics they earn credibility, trust, and respect in the eyes of the public and their peers.

The education of human service professionals equips them with a body of specialized knowledge. An understanding of professional ethics in the human services provides the context for practicing the profession and goes beyond the content, i.e., knowledge of one's specialization. Individuals may be technically competent to practice a profession, but unless they work within the range of the accepted ethical code, they forfeit the privilege of being identified with their profession.

We mentioned earlier that being a professional implies having an orientation toward service. This is another purpose of professional ethics. Self-interest should not be the focus in the ethics of a human service professional. Hugh Prather (1977),[5] our favorite contemporary poet, puts it this way:

> "Is your first responsibility to yourself? The question is misleading: that is, it misleads the person who takes it to heart. It's like asking, must you shift your weight in order to walk. Of course you must, but anyone who concentrates first on shifting his weight will not walk well."

Likewise, professionals can legitimately look after their own self-interest as a part of their practice, but if they focus on that and not on performing their services, they will do poorly in their professional work.

Most ethical codes recognize the unique relationship between professional and client. In the case of attorneys, the role of advocate for a client is usually paramount. In the case of counselors and social workers, confidentiality is the focus. Human service professionals also have a responsibility for the public good, a responsibility which belongs to individual professionals and to the profession as a whole. This responsibility is even built into the Internal Revenue Code in the form of a special status, 501.C.3, for professional organizations having as a primary purpose the promotion of the public good.

Maintaining the public or common good has re-emerged in recent years. The erosion of concern for the common good is thoroughly discussed by Robert Bellah (1985) and his colleagues in their recent book, Habits of the Heart. Their analysis of contemporary America leads them to conclude that the extreme emphasis on individualism is eroding the sense of community necessary to undergird the institutions of a free society. They say that we have put our own good ahead of the common good (Bellah et al. 1985. p. 285).[6]

Bellah et al are not the only ones to raise this issue. Nearly ten years ago, Vincent Harding (1978) wrote,[7]

> ... a truly pluralistic and humane society must be undergirded by a common vision of the public good ... For without that capacity to see ourselves ultimately as a community, without that common basis on which community must be built, we are in danger of disintegrating into hundreds of private, warring, special interests (who will not, for instance, pay taxes to support the well being of the whole; who will, for instance--at astonishingly young ages--physically attack helpless elderly citizens to grab the pittances of their Social Security and welfare money; who will, for instance, pour life-destroying industrial wastes into rivers, or produce essentially poisonous products for profit alone). 'Where there is no vision, the people perish.' (pp. 350-351).

Human service professionals have the opportunity, perhaps even the obligation, to cultivate a vision of the public good and of leading society toward it. Parker Palmer (1981)[8] sets forth this challenge in his book, The Company of Strangers. He says: "We need to do more than berate and bemoan our privatism. We need to help each other discover and create occasions for public experience" (p. 30). More than ever, we need to renew our sense of belonging to one another and to reinvest in the processes of public life. Furthermore, he says that we need to increase our sense of relatedness to those strangers with whom we must share the earth and our sense of comfort and at-homeness in the world.

As a professional organization concerned with promoting the public good, the American Home Economics Association engages in a variety of education and service programs. In the Development Education project, high school

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[4] Ibid., p. 16.

[5] Prather, Hugh. Notes on Love and Courage (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977), Prather's books of poems are published without page numbers.

[6] Bellah, Robert N. et al, Habits of the Heart (New York: N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 285.

[7] Harding, Vincent. "Out of the cauldron of struggle: Black religion and the search for a new America." Soundings, 61:3 (Fall 1978), 350-351.

[8] Palmer, Parker. The Company of Strangers (New York, N.Y.: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1981), p. 30.

teachers are receiving guidance in the design of curriculum and teaching materials to foster an understanding of the benefits of international development. The Head Start Volunteer Training project helps home economists to provide nutrition education to workers and parents in Head Start programs. The AHEA staff currently is working on a proposal to improve the safety and self-confidence of children caring for themselves, the so-called "latch key children." These programs put into practice the ethical principle of promoting the public good.

Professional ethics helps to determine the conduct of professionals and what the role of the profession should be. How is this understanding acquired? Historically, the study of moral philosophy introduced the emerging professional to the ethical quandaries of the profession. After a lapse of many years, professional ethics recently has reclaimed a place in the higher education curriculum. And professional organizations now recognize the importance of examining professional ethics in programs of in-service education.

This renewed interest in professional ethics derived in part from evidence that sizable numbers of practitioners had compromised the ethics of various professions and from a broader societal concern about public morality. Frank Rhodes, president of Cornell University, speaking recently about moral development, said, "Yet, without acknowledgement of the moral dimensions of our world, we risk creating informed cynics and critics who know the price of everything and the value of nothing."[9] (How to nurture moral activity, 1987, p. 89). So, too, in the human service professions we run the risk of educating highly competent practitioners who can set a price on their services but who have only the vaguest notion of how to examine the ethical issues they will face. Indeed, in the absence of any attention to professional ethics, we may produce professionals whose behavior is immoral or amoral. Will Rogers, in his folk wisdom, put it this way: a simple man may steal from a freight car: but give him a college degree and he'll steal the whole railroad.

The study of ethics will not necessarily guarantee ethical practitioners, but it can inform and help to identify ethical principles. The poet, Hugh Prather (1977),[10] says, "The window is not the view; the window allows the view." Similarly, the study of ethics will not make us ethical but it will point us in that direction.

Analyzing Ethical Issues: Guidelines for Asking Questions

Educators and practitioners need effective methods for analyzing ethical issues in the human service professions. One of our most effective approaches can be to ask questions: asking the right questions and asking the questions right. In essence, this is using the Socratic method, an ancient, yet timely style of analyzing ethical issues. This method can be used in higher education where people are preparing for professions, in secondary schools to help students explore ethical issues, and by practitioners in examining their own confrontation with ethical issues.

Simply asking questions does not guarantee that ethical issues will be examined. We are all aware of how questions can be framed to avoid the real issue or to lead toward a predetermined answer. A recent opinion survey contained only one question which was to be answered "yes" or "no." It was a question in the vein of "Do you favor motherhood and apple pie?" The organization sending the survey was bound to get the answer it wanted. Indeed, when the report was circulated, it declared that over 80 percent of those who answered said "yes." The organization concluded that their program should receive top priority in the years ahead.

We have all experienced the loaded question. In teaching logic, the textbook example of loaded questions is usually, "Have you stopped beating your wife?" Answer "yes" or "no". The response that I never did beat my wife is not an alternative.

Leading and loaded questions do not seek the truth: they are instruments of manipulation. To avoid this and other pitfalls, we suggest that there are three questions which provide a helpful structure for analyzing ethical issues. These questions help to clarify the issues and lead to decisions or actions.

The first question is: "What is the ethical issue?"

When we have discussed conflict resolution in preparation for marriage and marriage enrichment seminars, we always stress that the first step a couple must take is to clarify the issue. Satisfactory resolution is difficult to accomplish if the partners are not clear that they are dealing with the same issue. The same is true of ethical issues.

Life is complex and issues impinge upon one another. They do not stand in isolation. Ethical concerns are generally embedded in issues which appear to be of a social, political, or economic nature. Despite their interrelatedness, the many parts need to be separated in order for dialogue to occur on each aspect of an issue.

For example, take the case of a small rural hospital with diminishing profitability. If questions are asked from strictly a business perspective, the approach may be to ask: How can this hospital become profitable? The answer may be to eliminate some of the personnel to cut costs or the answer may be that the hospital should be closed because it is not making a profit. But if questions are asked from the broader perspective of the community, different questions will be posed, such as: What is the need for health care in this community? Is accessible health care a right of all citizens? Whose responsibility is it to provide health care?

Related to the question, "What is the issue?", is the ability to identify that there is an ethical dimension to a topic. Few aspects of the human service professions are without ethical issues but in our rush to "cover the material" in the syllabus, we may overlook the opportunity to explore the ethical aspects of a topic. For example, an article on "Expressing Our Philosophy" in the Journal of Home Economics in 1948 raised these questions: "Does the absence or presence of 'tunnels' in muffins make much difference if half the world has no bread? Does what we teach really make for better homes the world around or do we emphasize trivia in a world of crises?" (Baldwin, 1949. p. 88).[11]

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[9] Rhodes, Frank. "How to nurture moral activity." Christian Science Monitor. (Jan. 30, 1987), B9.

[10] Prather, Hugh. op. cit.

The second question to be asked is: What else?

When faced with a particular ethical dilemma we often look for a rule or standard which can be applied immediately to resolve the dilemma. We frequently move too quickly from the absolute of the rule to the particulars of the dilemma without asking about other alternatives. In the ethical storm, we want to close the barn door before all the animals are inside. We should follow the management principle that many alternatives should be explored before making a decision to select one.

Asking "what else?" is beneficial to those looking at ethical issues because it reveals that there are a variety of alternative views about ethics and there are a variety of alternatives for resolving an ethical issue. The rapid pace of life, high levels of stress, competition for results, and lack of patience push people toward quick-fix decisions. Continued probing and skepticism of easy answers contribute to the ability to live harmoniously in our pluralistic society.

Individuals often have vested interests in ethical issues or already have made up their minds about an issue and therefore want to limit the exploration of options. Limiting the discussion means more control over the outcome. Conversely, promoting exploration frees the participants from needing to control and fosters tolerance of the ambiguities often inherent in ethical issues.

Searching out the ethical issues in complex situations requires that we are willing to persist in asking questions. As teachers we may focus exclusively on eliciting answers. If we intend thoroughly to explore ethical issues, we should encourage our students and ourselves to question the answer rather than to answer the question. When it appears that the ethical issue has been identified, we should ask: Is that the issue for another individual or group? Is that the full extent of the issue?

Much of our training is designed to enable us to give answers and information; we come to view ourselves as reservoirs of information. But in dealing with ethical issues giving information or answers is not enough. By questioning the answers a more systematic analysis of the issues eventually occurs and awareness that there may be more than one correct solution is reached.

An assumption that is generally made in dealing with ethical issues is that ultimately there is an answer or decision. But, what if the ultimate is process rather than arrival? What if flux is the reality, as the ancient philosopher Thales believed, rather than an end or static state being reality? If being in flux is reality, it is even more critical to encourage the process of questioning because the answers of the past are not sufficient for the present, and the answers of the present are not going to be sufficient for the future.

The third question to be asked in the process of analyzing ethical issues is: So what?

Susan Parr (1980) makes the observation that it is a

> "...widely held student attitude that individual responsibility is an anachronism in today's world and that a concern with ethical issues is a meaningless academic exercise .... (T)heir sense of place in the world has been that the world is so corrupt and social forces so powerful that they can make no impact on it" (p. 193).[12]

Overcoming these attitudes of fatalism and apathy is necessary if the third question, "So what?", is going to be relevant.

As educators we may need to convince our students that ethical concerns are inescapable in both personal and professional life. Any thoughtful and conscientious professional must be prepared to deal with them and to act. The question "So what?" is asked so that human service professionals will examine their potential response to an ethical issue. Asking "So what?" helps elicit a sense of moral obligation. Now that I understand the ethical dilemma, what am I going to do? Asking "So what?" provides guidance for not only how one ought to direct one's behavior toward others, but also what one ought to be able to claim from others in their behavior (Callahan, 1980).[13]

David Callahan (1980) provides the following rationale for including professional ethics in the university curriculum:

> "...courses on ethics should set the stage for behavioral change. If they are any good at all, they should make a change in the ways in which students think about ethical issues, and possibly also in the way they feel about those issues. They should, at a minimum provide students with the skills necessary to change their verbal behavior, i.e., by providing them with the tools for a more articulate and consistent means of justifying their moral judgments, and of describing the process of their ethical thinking. (p. 70)[14]

Exploring the various responses to the question "So what?" assists students and practitioners to internalize the moral ideals of their profession and it helps to cement the relationship between professional ethics and the broader needs of society.

Issues, options, actions--these are the three core elements of ethics. Asking the questions

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[11] Alderman, Katharine. "Expressing our philosophy." In Keturah E. Baldwin The AHEA Saga (Washington, D.C.: American Home Economics Association. 1949). p. 88.

[12] Parr, Susan. "Ethics in undergraduate nonethics courses." In Daniel Callahan and Sissela Bok (Eds.) Ethics Teaching in Higher Educaiton (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), p. 193.

[13] Callahan, David. "Goals in the teaching of ethics." In Daniel Callahan and Sissela Bok (Eds.) Ethics Teaching in Higher Education (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), p. 66.

[14] Ibid., p. 70.

we have just discussed is a method for focusing on these core elements of ethics.
What is the issue? What else? So what?

Competencies Needed to Analyze Ethical Issues

The discussion of ethical issues at the high school level, and even at the university, is frequently hampered by the lack of basic skills for good communication and critical analysis. Whether our challenge is to foster family members' capacity for resolving complex moral issues, or to prepare professionals to assist families in resolving issues with conflicting moral alternatives, or to promote the ability of human service professionals to analyze and act in response to ethical issues that they themselves face, there is much that we can do to promote the competencies that contribute to empathy, understanding, and conflict resolution.

The fundamental skills needed are those of basic interpersonal communication: "active" listening skills, self-disclosure skills, and the ability to disagree without being disagreeable. The majority of our society does not have these communication skills. Even common courtesies, such as not interrupting a person who is talking or allowing all those concerned with an issue to express their views, are frequently absent from ordinary interpersonal communication. Training in basic interpersonal communication skills will contribute not only to better communication in general but also to more effective examination of ethical issues.

Active listening means developing the ability to internalize the meaning of the communication received from another. It is a skill which helps the receiver of a message to "get in tune" with the intent of the message. Few people fully communicate the extent of their feelings and ideas. Active listening helps the sender of the message to clarify what he or she is trying to communicate and it helps the receiver of the message to understand the message and the sender. Self-disclosure skills in communication help the sender of messages to reveal more about her or his feelings, the ideas she or he is trying to convey, and her or his preferences regarding an outcome.

In our marriage preparation workshops we use a variety of activities to promote active listening and self-disclosure skills. In one of these activities, we type simple statements on slips of paper and distribute them randomly to the couples. Each person looks at his or her statement and decides what circumstances might have been behind that statement. Then he or she says the statement to the partner who uses active listening skills of asking for clarification of the statement to try to understand the full meaning of the message.

A better understanding of the complexity of interpersonal communications and the time needed to develop good interpersonal communication skills is achieved by such activities. There are a number of good resources for developing these interpersonal communication skills (see for example, Clinebell and Clinebell, 1970[15]; Gordon, 1970[16]; and Miller, Wackman, Nunnally, and Saline, 1981[17]).

Understanding of basic logic helps to develop the skills of separating fact from opinion. A recent study of high school social science teachers found that almost half could not perform the basic critical thinking skills of distinguishing between statements of fact and statements of opinion (Unks, 1985)[18]. Most ethical issues contain an element of both fact and opinion. Skills in logical thinking help to clarify factual information from assumptions, prejudices, and opinions. A part of the teaching of logic is the teaching of critical thinking. When this skill is developed, the student or professional is better prepared to resolve issues. One of the primary aspects of critical thinking is asking questions. There are many books and articles focusing on techniques for developing critical thinking skills.

Debating skills teach students to organize ideas and to move from one point to another in a consistent way. Participation in debate requires one to understand an issue fully from different points of view. Preparation to defend more than one position on an issue helps the person to understand that there are various perspectives on ethical issues and it helps him or her to develop an attitude of tolerance which is vital to a pluralistic society.

Another competency for analyzing ethical issues is empathy. Activities that simulate the experience of another group or person help to develop empathy. Role playing activities in the classroom have been used to accomplish this. Internships and field work assignments give the human services student an opportunity to experience first-hand struggles of resolving ethical issues, thus developing empathy.

Earlier we talked about the importance of being concerned with the common or public good. Competencies needed to work toward the common good are cooperation and participation. The competitive model does little to foster cooperation. Projects in which students work together rather than individually to accomplish a goal teach this skill.

When our family goes camping we take along one of our favorite games called "Our Town" (available from Family Pastimes, R.R. 4, Perth, Ontario, Canada K7H 3C6). The board game is designed somewhat like "Monopoly" except that the objective is to win as a group instead of every person playing for his or her own advantage. If the game is successful, everyone wins and the community is enhanced. The objective of this game was reinforced by the experience of camping which our family has always undertaken as a cooperative activity. Creative experiential learning such as that game, provides opportunities for students to experience and internalize attitudes which foster seeking the public good.

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[15] Clinebell, H.J., Jr., and Clinebell, C.H. The Intimate Marriage (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

[16] Gordon, T. Parent Effectiveness Training (New York: Peter H. Wyden, Inc., 1970).

[17] Miller, S., Wackman, D., Nunnally, E., and Saline, C. Straight Talk (New York: Rawson, Wade, Publishers, Inc., 1981).

[18] Unks, G. "Critical thinking in the social studies classroom. Do we teach it? Social Education: v. 49, n. 3 (March 1985), pp. 240, 244-246.

In the discussion groups which follow you have the opportunity to share the ways in which you have promoted competencies contributing to the ability to analyze ethical issues.

Conclusion

Analyzing ethical issues in the human service professions is a tremendously challenging endeavor. The view through the kaliedoscope is constantly changing. The old kaliedoscope was made of glass pieces which fell neatly into place when it was turned. Modern Kaliedoscopes are made with fluid and the color patterns sort of slide into place. The open-minded examination of ethical issues leaves a great deal of fuzziness around the edges and it is comprised of never-ending change. Is there an end to this process? We may be tempted to stop asking questions and settle for the easy solution. Again, we quote from Hugh Prather (1977)[19]:

> "No one ever gets it right. As long as there are human beings, there will never be one who will get it right. The tendency of the mind is always to huddle over its little pile of bromides, to state things easily, and to make simple nodding movements of the head."

We interpret these lines not from a sense of futility, but as a precaution against glibness and impatience.

As professionals in the human services, we must continue to ask the right questions and we need to pass this heritage on to the next generation of professionals. In this way we will be keeping guard over professional ethics, our guardian angels.

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[19] Prather, Hugh. op. cit.

TEACHING VALUES IN EDUCATION

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I am pleased to be here with you this morning. I am honored to be included in this conference, in part because it may seem unusual to have an academic administrator invited to talk on the topic of "ethics." What might an administrator have to say on such a topic? But I am pleased to be here because it is an important topic. This winter, an article in the New York TIMES discussed the prominent issues confronting education in 1986 and cited the question of values in education as the single most important topic that had arisen and been discussed seriously in the course of the year. Just a week ago, USA TODAY, a less valuable source of news, devoted its entire editorial page to the issue of values in education; the opinions expressed range from those who didn't want educators involved in teaching values at all to those who thought that we should be teaching from the Bible. The editorial cartoon showed George Washington next to the cherry tree he had just chopped down saying to his father, "Dad my teacher says, I cannot tell a lie, I cannot tell the truth, and I cannot tell the difference."

In secondary education, the teaching of values has been, for some time, emphasized by people like Lawrence Kohlberg arguing that the teaching of moral development was an important objective of the teaching profession and secondary education. At the post-secondary level, there has been a tremendous change in the whole posture of the colleges and universities on the issue of the role of institutions in shaping values and the policing of morals on the campus. In the last 25 years, in the time since most of us here have left college, the role of the University has changed 180 degrees, having moved from the principle of in loco parentis to the notion that college students were young adults and therefore free to make all their moral decisions without interference from campus authorities. There is probably much that has been lost in that transformation; yet, I don't think we can turn back the clock.

The issue of ethical development in education is vital because it confronts our students with some of the most pressing concerns they face. "Who am I?" "How do I survive as an individual person, true to myself, yet responsive to the needs and legitimate demands of those around me?" "What compromises do I make with the person I think I am or want to be in order to remain a part of the community of my peers?" These are the questions we face acutely as adolescents and young adults, but we also recognize that we must answer them anew in each new context we encounter. At base, they are issues of values, of ethical life.

Still, it is clear, even from the pages of USA TODAY, that the question of values in education is a controversial topic. My sense is that we will always get into trouble whenever we are talking about values or morals in the classroom, that we will always be criticized by one side or the other--the fundamentalists with a religious objective, or those who would have education be completely neutral on all issues that have ethical dimensions.

How, then, should we approach the problem? I would argue that we should be concerned for the context in which values are formed. It is in addressing the context for the formation of values that students begin the process of questioning values and how they are derived. We need to recognize that the context in which most of us live and in which values are shaped today is very different from what it was in the past, so the simple solutions of the past are more difficult to apply to the present. We are living in a period of dramatic and rapid change, a period in which the definitions of the self are changing rapidly. It is fair to suggest, as the psychologist Jay Robert Lifton does, that the image of personal identity, the self that is defined in the context of other symbols, becomes unstable when the traditional institutions that symbolize social existence begin to dissolve. If those boundaries provided by traditional institutions become blurred or erased, the self, with the values that define it, is cast adrift. I was reminded of this again the other night when I watched one of my favorite movies on the late show, the film version of Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath. There is a touching scene toward the end of the book in which Tom Joad, having killed a man, is about to light out, and he tells his mother he is leaving Oklahoma. He says:

> "They was a time when we was on the lan'. They was a boundary to us then. Ol' folks died off an' little fellas come, an' we was always one thing--we was the fambly--kinda whole and clear. An' now we ain't clear no more. I can't get straight. They ain't nothin' keeps us clear. Al--he's a-hankerin' an' a-jibbitin' to go off on his own. An' Uncle John is jus' a-draggin' along. Pa's lost his place. He ain't the head no more. We're crackin' up, Tom. There ain't no fambly now. An' Rosasharn...she gonna have her baby an' they won't be no fambly. I don't know. I ben a-tryin' to keep her goin'. Winfiel'--what's he gonna be, this-a-way? Gettin' wild, an' Ruthie too--like animals. Got nothin' to trus'."

There is more here than just a story of the trials of Oklahoma migrants in the dustbowl years of depression, seeking a new future in California. There is the story of a whole society becoming mobile, moving from the land, losing the traditional boundaries with familiar cornerposts of place, family, community, and the coherent flow from past, through the present, into a predictable future--"Ol' folks died off an' little fellas come, an' we was always one thing-we was a fambly--kinda whole and clear."

Years ago, my daughter Daphne, who was eight or nine at the time, asked what Memorial Day was all about. And I explained how it had originally meant the commemoration of those who had died in war, but that it had gradually broadened to be an occasion to remember all of those close to us who had died, and I explained what it was like when I was a boy. It was the occasion for the annual family reunion, with over a hundred people, few of whom I knew, but all of whom I was related to in some close or distant way. And we put flowers on the graves, and had a picnic, and the women worked and cooked, while the men talked about the weather, the crops, and played horseshoes. And the cousins, dozens of them, played games, and the boys teased the girls, and the girls wore their spring Sunday dresses and tried to act lady-like. As I said, I didn't know many of them, for I came from town, not from the farm community where the family was concentrated; but I knew they were family, and I knew my grandparents, and my uncles and aunts and cousins. When Daphne asked her question, I realized that my kids were growing up without any of that, that they barely knew their cousins, and they saw their grandparents once every couple of years at most. Those familiar boundaries didn't exist for my children at all; their identity was to be shaped by other images and symbols than mine had been.

The second thing that seems to me to be important in the shaping of values, in addition to a sense of place, is the sense of a continuity with the past, a sense of the relationship of past, present, and future. I think that it is essential that any kind of values are derived from a community and that people have an understanding of the relationship between the past and the present. I don't think I say this merely because I am an historian. Young people have very little historical perspective. Recent studies show that many 17 year olds cannot name the century in which Columbus sailed to the new world, miss the dates of World War I by a century or more, cannot say who we were fighting in World War II, and even have little awareness of the issues in the Vietnam War. I felt that my youngest daughter, then 16, did not really understand much about the Vietnam War, so I took her to see the movie, "Platoon," which is not a pleasant movie, but one that is important for young people to see lest we lose sight and knowledge of our recent past.

A sense of the continuity with the past, present, and future is important to values because the values we live by are linked closely to our notions of immortality. Values are the linkage we have to the wider community of which we are a part--including those who came before us and those who will come after us. And this raises the question of the imagery and symbols associated with death as they pertain to our search for meaning and identity among the living. This is a question that has much occupied Robert Jay Lifton, particularly as he has tried to understand the psychic dislocations that have occurred since the advent of the nuclear age. Lifton argues that the sense of immortality is "man's way of experiencing his connection with all of human history." This, immortality is our link to the wider community of those who have gone before us and those who will come after us, the community provided by historical consciousness.

There are five ways in which we can speak of immortality, Lifton maintains. First, there is the biological mode of immortality, the sense of living on through one's children and grandchildren. This has a psychological dimension, the vicarious satisfaction of living again in the experiences of one's children, of course, but there is, even beyond that, the biological sense of immortality of being connected to family through an endless chain of biological attachment. Second, there is the theological mode of thinking about immortality, the concept of spiritual life after death. A third mode is the immortality that is achieved through creative works--through our writings, creative art, or simply the impact that our lives have had on other human beings. Artists, scientists, revolutionaries, social benefactors, and our humble endeavors as teachers all share in this form of immortality. A fourth mode of immortality is that achieved by being survived by nature itself, being at one with the natural elements, a part of an endless chain of being that transcends time and space. This finds its expression in Japanese religious philosophy, in some of the attitudes of European Romanticism, and in the worship of nature manifested by people who wish to have their ashes scattered on a lonely beach or in the wilderness. The fifth way of thinking about immortality, Lifton asserts, is different from the other four; it is a kind of psychic state in which time and death disappear through some experiential transcendence, through ecstasy or what Freud referred to as the "oceanic feeling."

What is important to note is that all forms of immortality, with the possible exception of the fifth, presume the existence of some form of community--the biological continuation of the family, the community of believers, the continuation of one's impact on others beyond one's personal death, and the continuation of the natural order that is the basis for all community. What is also important, from Lifton's perspective, is that the presence of nuclear weapons threatens all these images of immortality. He writes, "If we anticipate the possibility of nuclear weapons being used, and I believe everyone from about the age of six or seven in some measure does, we are faced with the prospect of being severed from virtually all of our symbolic paths to immortality."

Obviously biological immortality disappears with the extinction of the species. But Lifton also argues that belief in spiritual immortality is also threatened, for he doubts that belief in a spiritual existence beyond death can be maintained without association with a world in which there are still human beings who are living. That is, he says, that "one may require an assurance of the continuation of ordinary natural life in order to believe in a supernatural kind." Immortality offered by human creativity would obviously no longer exist in a world devoid of humans; more importantly, for the idea of community, however, it may be that the very threat of such extinction vitiates the impulse to create works that will renew the common world for the next generation. Nature may survive in some form, although the images of nuclear winter recently drawn by leading scientists even cast that into doubt; it is difficult to conceive of an immortality that is part of a natural order different from any nature we can now imagine. It may be that the fifth mode of immortality, the quest for the experience that will transcend time and space is the only response left in the face of nuclear destruction; hence, the search for transcendent experiences through drugs or religious communities of ecstasy. Another form of such experience, according to Lifton, is the embracing of nuclearism itself, epitomized for a moment in Oppenheimer's reaction to the Alamogordo test in 1945: "I am become death, the destroyer of worlds," or in its chilling satirical form, in the movie *Dr. Strangelove, or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* with its ultimate image of perverted ecstasy, the cowboy riding an atomic bomb as it soars from the plane toward a glorious explosion.

I think these arguments of Lifton are compelling. Human meaning, human action, human endeavor have always been found in the context of some transcendent meaning or purpose, some form of immortality, if you will. Human values have also been dependent on the conviction of some more noble objective to the human experience; wipe out the basis for any belief in transcendent meaning or immortality, and the effort at values has been dealt a nearly mortal blow. The fate of the individual self is inextricably linked with the fate of the community; public spaces and private spaces are bound together and cannot be sundered without both the self and the community withering. "All that is left," as Pasternak writes in *Doctor Zhivago*, "is the naked soul stripped to its last shred."

I would argue, therefore, that the traditional signposts for the formation of values have been battered beyond easy recognition. The natural community of place--small-town or neighborhood in large cities--has been replaced by a mobile, rootless society of urban and suburban dwellers. At the same time, the community of time--the sense of historical meaning and the forms of imagining human immortality--has been deeply wounded in the age of potential nuclear annihilation.

Well, what has happened to the individual self in this process? Here, I think the historian Christopher Lasch has much to tell us in his book, *The Culture of Narcissism*. Though I have approached the subject from a different perspective, trying to look at what has happened to the concept of community in an era in which the traditional boundaries have disappeared, I think I reach the same place as Lasch does: America has developed into a culture of incomplete selves who have difficulty forming communities. Lasch examines contemporary American culture from two vantage points: one is the emergence of a new psychopathology, the narcissistic personality, a conclusion he reaches from a close reading of the reports of psychologists. The other is the emergence of the consumer society. The result is a society characterized by individuals with weak egos, too weak to support an independent self. Terrified by his separateness from the surrounding world, the narcissist continually seeks to deny that separation by adapting himself to the expectations of those around him. Bombarded by the hedonist ethic of consumerism, the driving force of contemporary capitalism, the narcissist seeks to find meaning, to feed a weak ego, through consumption of commodities. The ethic is self-gratification--"It costs more, but you're worth it," as the ad says. Living for the moment, hungry for newness, the narcissist has an all-consuming preoccupation with self. Human relationships are also seen as instrumental commodities to be set aside if they no longer offer the same satisfaction; long-term commitments are voided. The narcissist prefers to keep things mellow at all times. The narcissist becomes a deft manipulator of appearances and feelings; outwardly cool, he is yet in nervous flight from all commitments and deeply dependent upon others' praise to make up for the emptiness he feels within him. This is much more than self-interest or even self-love. Narcissism in this sense is the total preoccupation with the self and what makes it acceptable to others.

Who can really doubt that Lasch has put his finger on something important, even though he may have overstated the case. There is no more evident confirmation of Lasch's thesis, it seems to me, than that offered by the article in last month's *Newsweek* devoted to the "year of the Yuppie." Listen to some of the comments of Yuppies and compare them with the narcissistic personality identified by Lasch.

> Laurie Gilbert, a twenty-eight year-old, Los Angeles attorney. "Without children I would be comfortable with $200,000 a year. Money means a lot to my happiness." She replenishes her wardrobe at the rate of two outfits a week. "The way you look is very important," she says. "Sometimes I think it is more important than what you can do." Gilbert, *Newsweek* tells us, met her second husband in a job interview in Los Angeles while she was on a honeymoon with her first husband, whom she went back home to divorce. "I know it sounds shocking," she explains, "but there are times in your life when you just have to go after what you want."
>
> Another Yuppie explained that, though a Democrat, she liked Reagan because she thought she would gain financially from his tax policies. Certain that he would be re-elected, she voted for Mondale. "If I thought it was a close election, I might not have voted for Mondale. I had the best of both worlds. I could vote my conscience and still come out ahead financially."
>
> Another described making $30,000 in real estate appreciation in the year. "I'm totally infatuated with real estate. It makes me feel smart and it gives me more control over my life."
>
> Another described personal relationships of Yuppies. "Our professions have become very important to us and we're willing to sacrifice other things for them--marriage, families, free time, relaxation. Our marriages seem like mergers, our divorces like divestitures."

Need I say more about the culture of narcissism?

The fact of the matter is, however, that a narcissistic society is one that renders values for the community virtually impossible. Attachments are fleeting, loyalties calculated, commitments short-term. The deeper bases of community do not exist.

What does all this mean to us as educators, teachers who work with young people? If, as I believe, it is the task of education to call attention to the bounds that link us together, to the problems we share as a people, then it seems to me that this is how we must address our education if we are to teach values in any way at all. If we are to understand the world that we share, we must help to renew it, we must help young people to understand those kinds of bonds of community that bind us together. How do we do that in an era in which the bonds of community are tenuous, in which the broad forces of the culture seem so destructive of community? I haven't any clear answers, but let me offer a few suggestions.

First, we must be realistic and not hopelessly romantic about the nature of community and values in a complex, urban society. Whatever were the virtues of community that existed in small-town America, they are now gone and they cannot be called back. We will all be members of a multitude of communities that form around common political interests and actions, religious affiliations, educational involvements, leisure activities, and many others. Seldom will neighborhood or place form the basis for our primary community affiliations. What our education can do in this connection is to cultivate an atmosphere of the understanding, tolerance, and civility that can enable each of us to recognize the legitimacy of the other communities of which we are not a part. The neighborhoods of immigrants and small town communities that transcended class distinctions once created the ideal of a melting pot that fused us all into Americans. Now, it is important that the culture of civility and tolerance for differences enable us to allow other forms of community to flourish. The teaching of a culture of civility is crucially important; it is a task that falls primarily on the humanities.

Second, it seems to me that we must take seriously the importance of the humanities in achieving the objective of community, for I know of no other form of discourse that will provide it. To the humanities falls the responsibility of reminding us of our commonalities as human beings, for they alone force us to contemplate what it means to be human--what it means to confront death, and aging, and loneliness, and joy, and loving, and caring, and hating, and coping with disappointment and tragedy--all the things that we face as humans. Understanding those fundamental commonalities gives us access to other persons and thus provides the basis for community. The humanities enable me to see myself in the context of a culture of millions who have lived before me and will live after me. They enable me to see what Martin Buber called the "I in the Thou."

In addition, because all true community is the voluntary choice of free people, we must recognize and celebrate the humanities as the fundamental source of human freedom. We are never more unfree than when we do not know our limitations; we are never more unfree than when we think that the problems we face as individuals and as a people are ours alone and that they have never been addressed before. We become free when we understand the world from another person's point of view and therefore share that world with that person, thus forming a communal bond. That freedom--seeing the world of others--is the basis for respect. Thus, I hope that my three daughters will read King Lear and understand that I will grow old and act foolishly. I want them to read William Wharton's novel, Dad, because I want them to know what I am experiencing in middle age, as I lose the generations on both sides of me--my parents to death, my children to adulthood. And I believe my children will be freed by that perspective and be more capable of kindness and community.

Third, our education is and must be involved in teaching a public language. A couple of years ago, I attended a meeting sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities at which one of the major speakers was Richard Rodriguez, the author of a marvelous autobiography entitled Hunger for Memory. An Hispanic-American who came from a Spanish-speaking family in Sacramento, Rodriguez tells what it meant to him to attend an English-speaking school, to be fascinated by the language, and to master it. It brought him into a new culture while it simultaneously estranged him from part of his native culture. Rodriguez argues against bilingual education, but he develops his argument in an interesting way, and it is the nature of his argument that is pertinent for us. Rodriguez argues from his experience that we are born into a private language. In the case of a non-English speaker, of course, that private language is obvious; but it is true of all of us. We first develop within the language of our home--an intimate language, a language of personal relationships, a language of understanding, of nurture, of obedience, of love. As we enter the schools, we are entering into a public arena where a different language is spoken--it is the language of society, of public relationships, of power, of culture, of social class, of law, and of rights. It is a language that is informed by the broad cultural and historical dimensions of our society. Rodriguez says it directly: "Public schools have one function: to teach me that I am a part of a common society. It is not to teach me that I am separate from you. Public knowledge is conveyed through a sense of being a part of a common culture. It is the purpose of the school to teach a public language, not a private language."

In a fundamental way, it is also the responsibility of our education to teach a common language, a public language--not so as to obliterate differences between us, but to celebrate the differences while at the same time transcending them. Public language enables us to reclaim our common heritage and to begin to build, from that common history with all its warts, a sense of belonging to a tradition. In this sense, it is our task to become public persons and help others to share in that public trust.

I do not know whether we can turn aside the current of despair that flows out of the consciousness of possible nuclear annihilation;

I do not know whether we can set aside the sense of alienation and loneliness that comes with the knowledge, as the Students for a Democratic Society put it, "that we may be the last generation in the experiment with living." And I do not know whether we can alter the cynicism and narcissism that pervades our society, advising people to "get theirs while they can." But I do feel strongly that we have a special mission to teach what community has been, how it relates to the values we hold, and how we are less than complete human beings without community and the common values it represents. Perhaps, most important, is to teach kindness. Let me close on that note, with a benediction that is appropriate for teachers of youth. In God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, by Kurt Vonnegut, the protagonist, an eccentric millionaire whose way of dealing with the world is to withdraw to a small town in Indiana and give help to the down-and-out, is called upon to baptize a set of twins. According to Vonnegut, here's what he said he would say:

> "Hello, babies. Welcome to earth. It's hot in the summer and cold in the winter. It's round and wet and crowded. At the outside, babies, you've got about a hundreds years here. There's only one rule that I know of, babies. 'God damn it, you've got to be kind.'"

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND ETHICS

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Our culture's recent trend of value neutrality and now of authoritatively-imposed values gives sufficient reason for consideration of the moral implications of our endeavors and further development of our understandings of the ethical dimension of our practice. A recent U.S. News and World Report (Feb. 23, 1987) feature on lying in America highlights a need for a high degree of ethical conduct. Bok (1979) in her book, "Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life," believes it is within our power to find ways to increase the incentives for honesty. I hold that kind of positive assumption as well. It is within our power to become more ethical in our own behaviors and to create practices and a climate for facilitating it. Will we? That's another question.

I took on this task, because I am convinced that those of us engaged with facilitating human development should have a clear understanding of the ethical implications of our actions and inactions. This paper is my attempt to identify the ethical imperatives related to human development. When I speak of persons who facilitate human development I refer to friends, parents, spouses, siblings, teachers, professionals, supervisors, politicians, anyone who relates with another human and takes action on behalf of development--that's all of us.

First, I shall outline the philosophic basis and definitions that form the foundation of my approach, and elaborate on the core ethical behaviors of facilitators and ethical practice. Finally, I shall explore the blocks to ethical behavior.

Philosophic Base

My approach to ethical behavior derives from a loose collection of philosophies of freedom, of faith in the human person. It is my position that no single philosophy speaks adequately to the problem of human development.

Spinoza may have been the first modern thinker to relate mental health to right living and mental sickness to wrong living. Mental health in his theory was living according to the requirements of human nature: achieving the optimal realization of the nature of the species. The goal of human life is the affirmation of life, the unfolding of man's powers. So the duty of the individual is to become oneself, to develop into the individual one potentially is. Facilitators should support that process or in the very least refrain from blocking it. The assumption that all organisms have an inherent tendency to actualize their potential does not imply an abstract drive to fulfill that potential. One's power to act creates a need to use that power, but failure to use it results in dysfunction (Miller, 1981).

Schweitzer, who was probably best known for his concept of "reverence for life" as the basis of ethics, advocated that the only meaningful way of life is the activity of giving and caring for fellow creatures. Thus, our social, political, and economic activity must consider first the well-being of people. Consideration of consumption, use of our natural resources, change in political and social structures, etc., require a fundamental concern for human welfare as well as for other parts of the biosphere.

Certain tenets of existentialism are fundamental concepts for me. Buber (1965) described the two basic realms of man's world as the I-It and I-Thou. Knowledge within I-It is essential to human life, but being human requires knowledge through relation (I-Thou). Jaspers (1959) described communication as the most essential of existential tasks--being oneself is not real without communication. The slogan, existence precedes essence, is a central focus of existentialism. Meaning (essence) arises out of one's own being and acting.

Fromm's (1976) concepts of "to have" and "to be" hold that a society which focuses on "to have" centers on things, on possessing and owning. In contrast, the being mode means aliveness and authentic relatedness. The concept of process (activity and movement) is an element of being, therefore becoming and changing are inherent qualities of being. While proposing the means of achieving a synthesis between a spiritual core and the development of rational thought and science and noting a few hopeful factors, he held out only slim chance for the development of the necessary human and social changes to assure the continued vitality and health of our social system. He felt that moral passions would be rendered ineffectual by the technological outlook.

Marjorie Brown (1985a, 1985b) as translator has aided our understanding of the difference between a technical and practical reasoning (Habermas, 1973) philosophic approach. From a technical perspective, a cost effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis approach has appeal because it bases decisions on the criterion of the greatest good for the greatest number. A technical perspective is devoid of ethical considerations, because it subscribes to value neutrality. The technical approach was popular for its reliance on the scientific model, but that position has been challenged by scientists who recognize that values are embedded in scientific inquiry, certainly in the behavioral science realm.

Practical reasoning accepts technical reasoning as a subordinate process, but requires rational discourse regarding moral issues. I think we need not be tied to any specific rational reasoning approach to adopt a general philosophic position that integrates technical reasoning and reasoning about ultimate values and ends, as well as means to the ends. But we need a clearer understanding of processes for interweaving technical data and value analysis. Even though we can't agree on the universal elements that define the dimensions of our field, Home Economics has unique strength in its integrative perspective and in the variety of decision and value analysis models that can be creatively combined to expand the forms of practical reasoning.

This eclectic collection of ideas has a common attitude of mind that gives man and his nature a central role in the fundamental belief system. Man's interests, needs, goals, and well-being assume great importance. Actions and inactions on behalf of human development should have a humanizing effect. In summary, it would be fair to say that good mental health and good spiritual health are one and the same to me. Elsewhere I have argued that creativity expresses the unfolding of life, and creativity is one of the major signs of enduring health (Mitstifer, 1985, p. 3). Creativity in this sense is full development of the self.

Values Defined

Specific values that are desirable, important, or worthy from such an eclectically derived philosophy form the implicit foundation of ethics. The values discussed in this paper have to do with consciousness of values, excellence, holistic/systemic view, client orientation, competence, human potential, quality of life, authenticity, process as well as task, a relationship of autonomy/freedom/responsibility, independence and interdependence, collaboration, trust, risk-taking, development/growth/transformation (Gellerman, 1985).

Ethics Defined

The definition of ethics that flows from this philosophic basis and value orientation states that ethics is a set of norms for achieving excellence in living (Fromm, 1960). Ethical concern

> ... originates in the give and take of human relationships and provides regulation of individual character and conduct and of the varied groups that make up human societies. Its values and rules become regulative principles for the evaluation of the institutions and policies of a society as well as for its constituent members and associations (Conover, 1967, p. 35).

"It is interesting ... to ask why our time has lost the concept of life as an art. Modern man seems to believe that reading and writing are arts to be learned, ... but that living is something so simple that no particular effort is required to learn how to do it" (Fromm, 1960, p. 165).

Certain types of ethical judgments to promote well-being are made by deliberating about probable consequences, comparative worth, and experiential knowledge. These "differ from moral rules or conventions which prescribe what must be done under certain conditions to win group approval or to avoid group censure" (Koch, 1959, p. 354).

The practical reasoning philosophical approach supports ethical inquiry that

> ... begins with specific problems of choice and decision-making and provides determinate clues as to values or ends capable of terminating these problems. These values are warranted by the character of methods employed in reaching them, and they typically involve a process of constant intersubjective comparison, free criticism, theoretically the ideal of unlimited, open-ended inquiry. The result of such inquiry in practice is not a body of final knowledge or the discovery of absolute goods, but values which are assured of better warrant than those resulting from unreflective immediate experience, or from the high reaches of authority. Thus values are relative to human experience of a particular sort--continuous, sustained, directed, intersubjective inquiry regarding the conditions of well-being" (Koch, 1959, p. 355).

Given this perspective of ethics as a foundation, what are the human qualities that an ethical approach should preserve? and what are the practices that protect them?

Ethical Practice

Ethical practice can emphasize either means or ends. A means approach establishes behaviors and standards or codes, but the ends approach focuses on the notion of ultimate goods. As you will remember, Kohlberg's (1969) work hypothesizes that the moral stages of development shift from means to ends as one moves from stage 1 to stage 6. If the point of our action is clear, the ethical sense of day-to-day practice will become more evident (Green, 1987).

While discussion of ethical practice from a professional point of view is redundant because professional practice is a moral enterprise, criticism of conduct in the performance of tasks is essential (Green, 1987).

> ... if we seek to induct persons into a profession by giving them command of the relevant expertise, and if at the same time we neglect to teach them the point of the practice, then surely we will need to offer instruction in professional ethics. But that need will arise from our failure to teach the point of the profession, not from our failure to teach ethics (p. 108).

Let me assure you that I am not arguing against courses in ethics, but to encourage the appropriate role of ethics courses in the development of professionalism. The moral character of the practice of human development does not derive from its body of theory, but from the fact that it is a social practice that should be moral.

Ethicality of action should be judged in terms of creating or destroying ultimate goods. Walter (1984) proposes three mutually related goods: individual freedom, self-esteem, and privacy.

Freedom refers to individuals with autonomy. The means of change (learning, growing) should never interfere with freedom, at least on the long term basis. A short-term loss of freedom may be justified if the gain realized from a specific loss is sufficient (Walter, 1984). For example, participation in decision making could be a fundamental objective in a family. But if the individual lacks the maturity to participate in a particular activity, restriction of the freedom to participate is in the long-term best interests of the individual and group.

Self-esteem seems to derive from seeing a purpose in life, not being used by others solely to promote others' ends, having some control over one's life, and having some level of competence that aids in this control (Walter, 1984).

Privacy from a legal sense should be limited only when the individual right conflicts with other more fundamental rights or with the requirements for order. Another aspect of privacy has to do with one's ability to protect one's inner self from censure or ridicule. Infringement on the right of individuals to determine what they will reveal and withhold from others is also a concern. Respect for privacy often requires strict maintenance of confidence, except in life threatening situations.

Ethical human development would assure these ultimate goods, and something similar to the Hippocratic oath for physicians would require all persons who have responsibility for affecting human development to show respect, communicate empathy, provide altruistic service to others, communicate genuineness, and build trust.

Showing respect, regardless of age, social class, physical attributes is the ability to operationalize a belief and trust in the capacity of an individual. Each person is of worth in his own right. Respect helps the person feel important and capable of doing things on his own; it breeds self-respect. "Respect is a basic attitude and habit--a bias toward the positive" (Mitstifer, 1976, p. 61). For example, the mother who respects herself and her child from the very first day onward will never need to teach respect. But a mother who was not taken seriously or respected by her mother will crave this respect from her child as a substitute. And she will try to get it by training. The result of this training is not respect.

Communicating empathy means experiencing "the moment to moment world of another person, and ... verbally [and non-verbally] communicating this experience" (Mitstifer, 1976, p. 62). Empathy requires listening to the speaker's internal frame of reference. "Sensitive and clearly communicated empathic understanding has a releasing effect and can help the [person] to know and to understand self ..." (Mitstifer, 1976, p. 62). This skill is defined as mirroring by Miller (1981) and Mahler (1968) who have studied its relationship to narcissistic disturbance and healthy narcissism. Mirroring accurately reflects the full range of emotions, gives serious attention and respect, shows understanding. It suspends critical judgment and reflects what is being offered. The essence of the person gets caught in the mirroring process and is reflected back. The content of the personality is reflected: its uniqueness, power vulnerability, and need for attention. A healthy determination that me is special contributes to positive self-esteem. The need for mirroring is lifelong, but it is especially crucial in early childhood. This process is essential to the development of the boundaries between self and other, to a separate but related state. While cognitive capacities can develop without empathy or mirroring, the emotional dimension of the self cannot.

Providing altruistic service to others, showing unselfish regard for the welfare of others, places strict limitations on behavior regarding the possible use of the client to meet one's own needs. A person taught in accordance with the facilitator's needs may never experience the pleasure of giving and sharing. Teaching altruism often negates the real thing. Does the parent teach the child to be "good" so that other parents view him/her as a good parent? Does the teacher teach the child to be good (quiet) because the principal likes quiet? Many teachings help the facilitator more than the learner. Persons need attention, respect, echoing, understanding, sympathy, and mirroring. Young girls who enjoy early parenthood because they have something of their own to love--an object available to them--cannot give respect, or echoing, or mirroring, because they are needing it themselves. These mothers feel the need to be the center of attention.

Communicating genuineness, relating in an open, honest, and direct way establishes an authentic relationship, and actual rather than masked feelings are communicated. "There is harmony between what is done and what is said, between what is said and what is felt, between what is felt and how one looks. This harmony exists because all states of being are consistent, congruent, whole ... A person is most free to [grow] in a climate of realness where the energy flow is not directed toward defensiveness and maintenance of self-esteem but toward self-enhancement" (Mitstifer, 1976, p. 59, 61).

Building trust means having the capacity to build a relationship which places confidence in the other. There seems to be a relationship between being open and disclosing to others and being able to establish a warm, communicative relationship. And when the relationship is one of openness, trust builds. The processes of growing and developing are "inhibited to the degree that the self is concealed or an idea is held back" (Mitstifer, 1976, p. 67). Trust implies that the individual "takes all of the available information and directs a course of action which fits the needs of the moment. This behavior is found to be competent and trustworthy. Thus the individual is inner-directed and able to take risks" (Mitstifer, 1976, pp. 58-59). Building trust leads to risk-taking which is changing, growing, developing.

These behaviors would demonstrate that the person wants to be accountable to a client-centered standard of ethics. On the other hand, functional ethics (the unreflected practice by which choices are made) could mean that emotional factors surrounding decisions impeded individuals from actualizing their implicit and often unorganized values. If this be the case, we need to help people develop skills in the affective aspect of decision making so that enhanced self-awareness clarifies the ethical core of one's response.

Green (1987) discussed the ways we limit our conscience in criticizing our own and others' conduct. He identified five voices of conscience: craft, membership, duty, memory, and imagination.

While moral action is not derived from technical skill, it cannot be exercised without it. In the modern world we tend to discount the need to be excellent in our craft. We excuse the person who is inept by inferring that being unskillful is not a moral matter. This view does not serve us well. Lack of skill is a fault, and it should be construed as failure by the conscience. It is also important to demand that skill is required even when there is no moral quandary. Doing things well and exercising foresight are matters of ethics.

Ethical practice is always conducted within a community or in an environment of attachments. Membership carries with it some limits of behavior (norms) which impose constraints. These norms are rules of conscience for individuals as members. And since there are often several memberships to consider, the individual needs to find a balance among the conflicting demands these norms impose.

"The clearest, most self-evident moral voice is the voice of sacrifice. We hear this voice when self-interest and duty conflict" (Green, 1987, p. 112). Of the two, self-interest seems the strongest, but the voice of duty is stern. We begin to understand the limits of conscience when we examine our actions in response to the clash between self-interest and duty.

"Social memory, moral imagination, and their interdependence are essential voices of conscience ... because we cannot do without rootedness and criticism, without tradition and dissatisfaction with tradition. No one can stand apart to criticize the existing order of things without standing somewhere" (Green, 1987, p. 114). Memory gives history to the conscience, affirming that it cannot function as a clean slate. A critical imagination serves to identify the disparity between hopes and fair expectations and the failures in our practice.

In addition to developing new attitudes, understandings, and behaviors to improve ethical practice, it is useful to destroy the roadblocks or rigidities. The blocks to ethical behavior involve attitudes and beliefs and conceptual and behavioral inadequacies.

Blocks to Ethical Behavior

One of the ethical cop-outs encouraged by modern political systems is to devise laws and regulations so perfect that no one will need to be good. In other words, people cannot be trusted to be good; we have to do it for them.

The current culture promotes shallow and indiscriminate interpersonal contacts and hinders deep personal relationships. This creates oversocialization which develops the ability to get along with everybody by showing the right face to each. This practice reinforces acceptance of changing fashions and expectations in relationships and social practices. Conformity rather than independence is sanctioned and "what is generally acceptable" becomes the basis for moral decisions. Unquestioned conformity to standards of a changing society is a clear and present danger.

Another contributor to the changing moral standards is the increasingly technical human attitude to living--responding to life through chemicals, machines that replace muscles and minds, packaged products to meet our every need and want, real or imagined. As marvelous as the health giving and saving contributions of advances in scientific technology are, they have the effect of creating a technical mind-set. Impersonal techniques often contribute efficiency but endanger the unique interest of the individual.

Individualism in personal morality reinforces the doctrine of freedom and responsibility of the individual but accepts little commitment to anything and breeds distrust of institutions in society. The thrust toward development of a life style and self-fullfillment without concern for others implies a narcissistic disturbance, an inability to function effectively in an adult role. Often this is demonstrated in unconscious manipulation of others in the interest of the self. For example, this unhealthy state prevents the parent from providing the necessary emotional climate and understanding for the child's needs. Even if the parent is inactive in providing support for the child's development, the child can develop from the interaction with significant others if the parent does not prevent development by specific actions (Miller, 1981).

Another block is the lack of understanding of processes for developing valuing skills and of theories of moral development. The thrust toward determining "what to do about values" as part of the mission of Home Economics was generated by the work of Brown and Brown and Paolucci (Arcus, 1986) and implemented by recent curriculum models: issue analysis process, practical action teaching model, problem reasoning, value reasoning, and problem posing model.

Conceptual inadequacy in theories of moral development has also restricted our practice. Quinn's (1987) model of the humanistic conscience proposes that moral character is a "function of the developmental integration of the conative, affective, and rational dimensions of the person" (p. 71). Since self-actualization theory, at best, gives explanation for a morally neutral drive toward development, his work recognizes that inner needs (motivations) and feelings interact with cognitive structures to influence the way we respond to moral problems. We have made more progress at the theoretical level in understanding moral development than we have put into practice, and this discrepancy poses a grave moral dilemma for society.

The discrepancy between practice and theory in its impact on behavior is illustrated in an example within Home Economics. Modern consumers could be described by the formula: I am = what I have + what I consume. Thus the modern consumer would reflect the "to have" mode of existence. The concept of being as a preferable mode of existence has implications for how we communicate our practice related to consumer economics. In fact, some of our practice is probably perceived to block ethical practice in this area of human behavior, and some of it does. I do not mean to imply that this is the only area where the public perception is inaccurate or the practice is wrong.

Another discrepancy has to do with intentions and actions. In the real world, why people act to solve a particular problem is inseparable from how they act. It is not enough to "have one's heart in the right place." Good intentions can, and often do, have harmful consequences. Thus we must have principled reasons not only for acting, but for acting correctly. And ethical action is action that correctly addresses the problem. The difficulties of implementing ethical principles in human development are not to be diminished or taken lightly, but such an orientation is essential if we are to face up to the ethical consequences of failed human development and its consequences for the dignity of people.

A major impediment to functioning in an ethical way involves two related areas--first, lack of communication and lack of awareness of the dynamics of interpersonal relationships. If you don't understand defense mechanisms, the relationship between anger, displays of hostility, and fear and threat; if you don't understand how impasses in communication develop; and if you don't understand how to negotiate, how to limit your own objectives in light of another person's agenda; then you will be ill-equipped to relate effectively with individuals. I am continually amazed at the shallow understanding of communication in Home Economics, even though one can find complete agreement on its value. Helpful communication includes the ability to articulate clear messages, listen sensitively, show empathy, make assertive and not aggressive statements, and respond with gentle confrontation. The latter is especially important to assure our ethical responsibility for feedback.

One of the reasons that morality is imperfectly exemplified in human societies is that individuals, groups, and nations declare their independence of morality, or subordinate its claims to personal, group, or national interest. We home economists should be critical of our own practice to determine if we are exempt from this criticism.

A major block to doing human development is the source of our learning about growing and developing. "We tend to believe what others around us believe, and we tend to accept as truth what these people tell us of the nature of the world as we listen to them during our formative years" (Peck, 1978, p. 189). I'm not stating new insights in Home Economics that the basic culture in which we develop is the culture of our family, that our parents are its "culture leaders," and that the nature of the world we learn is determined by the actual nature of our experience in the microcosm of the family. What may receive less attention is that if this family world view is transferred to the macrocosm of the adult world, it may well be inappropriate. If the parenting was not "good enough" and if the adult world view is mostly a product of transference, the individual is likely to be caught between developmental stages of child and adult. In this state the individual is unlikely to facilitate positive human development.

Summary

I have proposed that the practice of human development can be improved by examining one's belief system, by determining the point of one's practice, by employing core ethical behaviors, by enhancing self-awareness, and by neutralizing the attitudes and actions that block ethical practice. Real change in human development practices relies on the action of individuals, but moral action will not just happen. Individuals must make it happen.

Opportunities for non-professionals to gain skill in doing human development are available from a variety of organizations and perspectives: parenting training, support groups, communication training, human development training, individual and group counseling and therapy, marriage enrichment, family enrichment, child and family development courses, conferences, self-help books. Elsewhere I have hypothesized that the core skills of developmental processes should focus on communication and decision making. With these basic skills the individual can use the processes of analyzing, facilitating, and evaluating and the action patterns of value analysis, goal setting, planning, implementing, and using feedback to increase the effectiveness of one's craft (Mitstifer, 1982).

Persons need to accept that the development of moral life is a lifelong endeavor--not as a burden, but as an opportunity for openness to new experience and relationships. In this way the person can ask, "What aspect of my values is being challenged or confirmed in what I am now doing?"

"Mature moral conduct is to a high degree self-regulated; it is reflective, conscientious, and responsible" (Conover, 1967, p. 34). *Reflective* conduct is careful appraisal, especially self-appraisal, which places value on one's own opinion of values, ethics, and effectiveness. *Conscientious* conduct is sensitive regard for fairness and justice as well as careful and meticulous actions. *Responsible* conduct is "the ability to respond creatively and positively to any situation (response-able) and the 'owning' of one's own actions and inactions. This definition contrasts with the common meaning that implies that 'I am responsible because I owe it to you or it'" (Mitstifer, 1976, p. 41). Our concern about ethics in human development must be directed toward these qualities of moral conduct.

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ETHICS AND THE MEDIA

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For many, media ethics is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms, like airline food or military intelligence or the Long Island Expressway. Journalists have had the same thought. There is a lovely quatrain they are fond of reciting that goes:

"You do not have to bribe or twist,
Thank God, the noble journalist.
But seeing what the man will do, unbribed,
There's no occasion to."

Despite that skeptical beginning, let me quickly assert that I have learned more about ethics hanging about with journalists after hours than I have in the halls of the academy. Journalists, as a class, are among the most thoughtful and reflective of people concerning the ethics of their enterprise--at least when you talk to them in private. The source of such ethics is not journalism, however. Such ethics as they possess comes from their private lives, from the communities--ethnic, religious, neighborly--in which they have grown up, and the real conflict is between these primordial sources and the conditions under which they must work. I agree with William Buckley that I would rather be governed by the first 100 names in the Boston phone directory than by the Harvard faculty, though I would prefer the staff of the Boston Globe to either. If the subject of journalism ethics is a primitive one, it is rather more developed than the subject of academic ethics. If journalism ethics hasn't been thought by the professors of philosophy, academic ethics hasn't been thought of or practiced by anyone. Indeed, when the American Association of University Professors was founded more than a half century ago, two committees were created: Committee A to deal with academic freedom and Committee B to deal with academic responsibility. Committee A has met continuously since then. It took 35 years to call the first meeting of Committee B. Journalists are often much more serious and systematic and orderly on questions of ethics and responsibility than are academics.

However, the ethics they possess, as I have said, is drawn mainly from their private lives rather than from the profession. And, they constitute an unprotected professional class--one without a tenure or seniority system. Journalists are not backed by powerful professional groups such as the American Bar Association or the legislative support evident in state licensing boards. Not long ago CBS retired, that is, laid off, its distinguished Supreme Court reporter, Fred Graham--a testimony to the vulnerability of journalists as a class.

Despite that, journalists are genuinely suspicious of ethics, and ethical discourse does not particularly flourish among them. To most journalists ethics smacks of a certain high-mindedness and, therefore, a state of mind of which journalists are rather suspicious. Journalism is part of the low life of the country/ it begins in the jail house and the courts. Early on, journalists develop, as a necessary protective covering, a certain cynicism about human motives and little in their experience dissuades them from such a view. When journalists go looking for human motives, they normally find self-interested ones and rather quickly come to the view that social life is pretty much a matter of whose ox gets gored. Tell a journalist that someone is acting out of a love of justice or honor, or beauty, or truth and his eyes are likely to glaze over. This is not the noblest of views but it is not so easy to shed. As a result, journalists are not likely to take seriously discussions of the truth, even in relation to their own craft, though they may have to feign such an interest on ceremonial occasions. Journalists are simply too exposed to the unethical.

Journalists look at talk about ethics as an invasive tyranny, as the first step down the path toward control of the press by the state. Ethics, in this view, is a Trojan Horse out of which will march the petty bureaucrats and enslavers to overwhelm the unarmed editorialists. The tradition of freedom of the press in America is almost exclusively negative: "Congress shall make no law..." The language of ethics by contrast is almost inevitably a language of duty, of obligation, of responsibility and reciprocity. Ethics constitutes a moral vocabulary of human relations and such a vocabulary sounds suspiciously opposed to freedom of expression, as journalists have understood such freedom. The language of objectivity and value neutrality leads journalists to think of ethics as a subjective and dangerous matter and even a little "wimpy" and unmanly; tender-minded rather than tough-minded. Ethics also seems to be the benign and well-intentioned opening to a horror story: censorship, regulation and governmental interference and consequently inimical not only to the interests of the press but to a free society generally.

I can gloss this matter in a slightly different way. Louis Hartz, the late professor of history at Harvard, had a wonderful crack to the effect that in America, "law feeds on the corpse of philosophy." Ethics is a philosophical discourse; freedom is a legal one. Freedom feeds, in a way, on the corpse of ethics. As a result, all philosophical and ethical questions are converted into legal questions. Questions of the interpretation of the First Amendment. The First Amendment, in other words, sets the outer limit, the boundary, for the discussion of ethics. It is the First Amendment, not ethics, that is the source of the norms of professional practice but the First Amendment is solely concerned with removing restrictions from the press, not imposing duties or obligations. To raise any ethical question with journalists is to invite the response that the First Amendment is being violated in even considering the issue.

There is another reason why journalists are wary of the subject of ethics. There is an old saw that doctors bury their mistakes and lawyers hang them, to which I might add that academics sequester them in private classrooms and social workers in client booths. Journalists, unfortunately, publish their mistakes. They make a public record which can be easily reconsulted.

As a result, they are an unusually vulnerable social group, and consequently cautious in public discussions of their work. I am always astounded that at public gatherings I am somehow responsible for all the problems of journalism, and everything that has been published and televised that day, beginning with the student newspaper and ending with CBS. The law school dean is not responsible for "All the President's Men," the business dean for Robert Vesco, or the engineering dean for the fact that nothing works anymore. But, because journalism is a public activity--shared in common, easily accessible, not so hard to criticize, not so difficult to understand, very hard to mystify--journalists are unusually vulnerable to criticism and that makes them unusually wary about public discussions of their craft. More than that, journalists are not very good at taking criticism. Nothing in the conditions of their work prepares them for it. Despite being public figures, on some accounts the archetype of the public man or woman, they are not very comfortable in the public arena. As Edward R. Murrow said in an oft-quoted line, "journalists not only have thin skins, they have no skins." Journalists react defensively and with hostility to the mildest rebuke, as if all criticism of the press must be suppressed in the name of the First Amendment, even if the criticism is conventional wisdom among journalists themselves.

A final sense in which journalism is ethically irregular is that our models of professional ethics have been derived from the examples of doctors, lawyers, and ministers: independent practitioners who serve an individual client. The models in professional ethics are the lawyer in private practice serving a known client facing a problem of justice, the doctor in the office with a sick patient, the priest in the confessional with a moral problem on the other side of the curtain. Journalists, on the contrary, have always worked for organizations; originally family businesses, then corporations, increasingly conglomerates. They always have been hired hands rather than independent practitioners. And who is the client of the journalist? The public? Well, it is easy to say, but what is the public? The public is not as vividly particular as a person in trouble; e.g., a defendant in the dock, a patient on the operating table, a sinner in moral confusion. Well, perhaps the community is the client. This may be true in Boone, Iowa, but unlikely in New York City or Chicago; unlikely perhaps in a town as big as Champaign-Urbana. It is the fact that journalists are employees and that there is no clarity in the relationship of the journalist and the client that makes the ethical obligations of journalists so difficult to puzzle through. The public is there, but the public is not part of the working culture of a journalist. Someone is out there, undefined, someone who shows up in a letter to the editor, who may even call once or twice, but is not a vivid, continuous understandable presence that the client is to the other professions.

Journalists, to come back to the first part of this dilemma, have always been employees of organizations, and they have little control over the terms of their employment or the conditions of their work. They have never been protected by essentially medieval traditions such as academic freedom or the privileged communication of the doctor, lawyer or priest. Freedom of the press is a legal right grounded in the modern idea of property. As the old saying goes, freedom of the press extends only to those who own the presses. As a result, journalism ethics ignores, when it does not deliberately mask, the deeper problems of the ethics of property, ethics governing the acquisition, use and disposal of property that under the constitution partakes of a public trust.

The fundamental practices of journalism are justified on the basis of private property and capitalist imperatives: the need to compete for and build audiences, to protect stock-holders, to take advantage of opportunity costs, to beat back competitors within the industry and to ward off others from without. While no one denies these facts, or wishes necessarily a different arrangement, the press nonetheless insists upon a special position in the corporate community because it is a private business imbued with a public trust. The real responsibility for this public interest, however, is saddled on the lowest level of its employees; those who have the least control over the conditions of work and the greatest insecurity. Arguments about journalistic ethics are almost exclusively concerned with the conduct of reporters and editors and not with the ethics of ownership and property. The fundamental ethical problems of journalism originate at the deepest level of ownership but are "solved" at the level of the reporter and editor. For all practical purposes, reporters are professionals subject to professional ethics but owners are not. There was an interesting example of this in the midst of the Pentagon Papers affair. When the *Washington Post* came upon the Pentagon Papers, Kathryn Graham, the owner of the *Washington Post* was trying to decide whether to trade stock of the company on the market; that is, to make a public issuance of stock. The internal debate at the *Washington Post* as to whether or not to print the Pentagon Papers turned on how it would affect the price of the stock which was then about to be issued. The editorial judgment for which to some degree reporters and editors are held responsible is made by ownership which has the basic forms of control.

I need to take this argument just two steps further. I have been arguing a defense of journalism, and now I want to raise some more difficult questions about journalists. Journalists are, in some sense, people who help us carry on the conversation of our culture. They are story tellers. That is how they talk to one another. "Did you get the story? Did you miss the story? Was it a good story? Was it a bad story?" They are professional story tellers. They are often very good at it. They are not, in this sense, truth tellers. They are story tellers. And, yet we do not know how to deal with the ethics of stories very well. The ethical problems are easy when it is simply a matter of telling the truth, in the sense of being accurate. It is very, very difficult to be accurate, in fact, but there is not ethical ambiguity about the task. It means getting the right facts in the right order. Ethics, however, pertains to how stories are selected, the point of view from which they are told, the kind of imaginative and narrative devices which animate them. One of the troubles that I have with young reporters is they are so intensely ethical that their stories are uninteresting. I do not want to read them. They insert every

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qualification, every phrase is accurate and they use every source possible. By the time they finish, there is no story left. It's a recitation of bare-bone facts with almost no intrinsic interest to the reader.

The origins of journalism are in the deepest most democratic impulses we have in our language. Journalists tell stories about the most ordinary, vulgar, commonplace aspects of life. There is a wonderful section of a book by the first great journalist of the English language, Samuel Johnson's Journey to the Western Islands. Johnson, travelling with his companion Boswell, writes a series of travel articles about Scotland, a country Johnson did not particularly like. They come to a town called Bamff. In the first part of his report he tells the story of Bamff and all the reasons he does not like the Scots. Bad architects. They don't know how to design houses. Have you ever been in a Scot's room, he asks? They don't know how to make windows. The ventilation is awful. After telling us all this he comments as follows:

> The true state of every nation is the state of its common life. The manners of the people are not to be found in the schools of learning or the palaces of greatness where national character is obscured or obliterated by travel or instruction, by philosophy or vanity nor is public happiness to be estimated by the assemblies of the gay or the banquets of the rich. The great mass of nations is neither rich nor gay; they whose aggregate constitute the people are found in the streets and the villages and the shops and the farms and from them, the people collectively considered, must the measure of general prosperity be taken. As they approach delicacy, a nation is refined. As their conveniences are multiplied, a nation, at least a commercial nation, must be denominated wealthy.

This was the first great plea in our language for a democratic journalism of the common life. Freely translated it means, as Peter Finley Dunne put it, that the ethical imperative of journalism is to comfort the afflicted and to afflict the comfortable. The major ethical problem of modern journalism is that it does nowhere near enough of that. It is, indeed, in most of its impulses very, very tame.

I've tried to make two arguments. First, there are a series of limitations and dilemmas that confront journalists in the ordinary conditions of their work. The commitments they have to freedom of expression, as opposed to the ethics of journalism, for example. Second, I think the social purpose of journalism, its major function, is to afflict the comfortable and comfort the afflicted and that leaves journalists always at the edge of difficult ethical practices.

I want to close, however, on a different note. I want to end on the question of memory and do so in a personal way. I grew up very much under the influence of my grandmother who was illiterate. She went to school only through the first grade. She was taken out of school, in the practice common for New England young girls of her time, and sent to work in a textile mill when she was six years old. She died 59 years later, tending the same weaving loom she started tending when she was six. She died seventeen days before her resignation became effective, a resignation caused by a political conflict with the owner of the mill. She never read newspapers. She rarely listened to the radio. She came to love the movies late in her life, particularly Charlie Chaplin. Yet, she was an endlessly wise, politically sophisticated, astute observer of all social life, including the life of politics. Why Part of it had to do with the fact she did not attend to the mass media. Her illiteracy insulated her to some degree. She tended not to believe what she heard, what others read to her, and relied instead on enormously well-developed, highly internalized instincts, and, above all, the instinct of an absolutely infallible memory.

Prior to the emergence of literacy, the single most valuable skill people had was memory. The utilization of language in poetic, mnemonic, rhythmic forms, was the attempt of illiterate peoples to internalize deeply and to cultivate deeply the art of memory as such. It is from these skills, this single great human talent, that all others are built. There is a wonderful story about Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Russian writer now living in splendid exile in Vermont, who was arrested on the Prussian front in 1945. he was put into a 20 year exile called the gulag, from which he emerged and wrote a remarkable series of books. He explains in his autobiography, The Oak and the Calf, how he wrote in prison. In prison he was denied pencil and paper. To compensate he converted his daily experience into verse, memorized the verse, and when he came out copied the verse out of memory. A highly literate man, he reverted to the oldest, continuous human talent. The point I'm trying to develop is this. The major form of human learning is that of story telling, of learning narrative in verse, a learning which instills into people the deepest most ennobling traditions of their culture. What Solzhenitsyn teaches us is that once such talents and stories are internalized in memory, possessed actively, they cannot be taken away. You cannot get rid of them because you cannot forget them, even if you want to. I wish I could forget the prayers of my youth, but once having learned and listened to them chanted orally day after day, they become an absolutely indestructible part of one's own personality. Listen to the great Czech writer, Milan Jundera, now living in exile in Paris, in his novel, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting. "The bloody massacre in Bangladesh quickly covered the memory of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. The assassination of Allende drowned out the groans of Bangladesh. The war in the Sinai made people forget Allende. The Cambodian massacre made people forget Sinai and so on and so forth until ultimately everyone lets everything be forgotten." In Kundera's view, the destruction of memory is both the aim of modern politics and the fundamental phenomenon of contemporary life. Such things can happen in democracies as well. That of course was the primordial fear of Orwell's 1984.

The habits, the understandings and the ethical basis of human communication are always acquired in our earliest experiences. To grow up and to come to the media of communication

(Continued on page 68.)

THE DISCUSSION GROUPS

The following questions and comments were heard during the discussion group sessions:

QUESTIONS:

1. What problems do home economics teachers run into when incorporating ethics into their classes?
2. What are some of the questions teachers can ask to lead students to think about ethics?
3. Are some issues just not "discussable" in some communities?
4. Is it ethical to emphasize working for extrinsic rewards (e.g., grades)?
5. Is it unethical to damage a student's self-esteem?
6. Is it ethical to neglect critical content and spend time on trivia in home economics classes?
7. Who should make the rules?
8. Do we teach values in the "hidden curriculum"?
9. What is the focus of home economics?
10. Does the changing family change the responsibility of home economics?
11. Should we teach the history of why women have been suppressed?
12. What is the role of the teacher in helping students to raise questions and to question answers?
13. How do we help people develop a sense of community?
14. When consumer is used in our name, does it emphasize produce and take the focus away from what we say we are?
15. What should be the relationship between ethical and economic in decision making?
16. Have we been focusing on the wrong perspective to express the uniqueness of home economics?
17. Does environmental protection hinder progress?
18. If we used the term personal priorities instead of values, would we eliminate some of the criticisms?
19. Do we need to develop a nonlaboratory curriculum?
20. Could journal editors initiate and promote dialogue on ethics?
21. How can we explain philosophical abstractions in language that lay persons, students, parents, and others can understand?
22. What areas can we drop from our curriculum in order to make room for more essential elements?
23. What ethical considerations underlie our decisions about curriculum, about home economics, about society?
24. Has home economics just accepted, without analysis and prediction of consequences, the profit-oriented and technologically-oriented society we live in?
25. What are the hard questions we need to be asking?
26. What are the core values that a home economist must have?
27. Are we providing enough depth in our teaching and are we clear on our goals and expected outcomes?
28. Do we need more than 4 years to prepare teachers. Is more always better?
29. Do we need to weave ethics into every course or teach it as a separate course? Why not both?
30. As home economists, have we promoted materialism?
31. What should we do when other departments infringe upon our territory?
32. Are there differences in ethical perception between males and females?
33. Is tolerance for differences causing some indifference to social problems?
34. Can we (Home Economics) make a difference in the high school climate?
35. What kind of assignments can help students to react to moral/ethical issues?
36. Does our classroom atmosphere, structure, and behavior (all designed by the teacher) reflect our attitude regarding others?
37. How do we respond to the assertion that something is "all right if you don't get caught"?
38. Is there a conflict between the concept of learning to be independent and autonomous and the need for connecting and networking?
39. Should we help others to aspire for things that are in conflict with their cultural values?

Comments:

1. This conference has been stretching our minds.

2. We need to help students deal with the affective aspects of decision making.

3. The way we ask questions affects our teaching of values.

4. Taking high-risk ethical stands can have consequences such as job termination.

5. Family stability is not the opposite of family violence.

6. Laws which protect individuals may not support families.

7. Homes are better than "institutions" for caring for individuals.

8. Maybe the strength of home economics lies in the phrase domestic tranquillity (from the U.S. Constitution).

9. Many home economists see themselves as dispensers of technical knowledge and skills free of moral judgements.

10. We need more awareness of what we stand for.

11. We need to use value analysis rather than value clarification.

12. We need to produce journals that help us deal with more complex issues and give a respectable academic image.

13. Teachers and other home economics need support groups to help them present their cases to their various publics and to reassure them when they are attacked.

14. We need to continue and expand our dialogue, identify readings and share them, create local opportunities for idea exchange, make time for heady discussions.

15. Let's reward cooperation rather than competition among both students and faculty.

16. Self-assessment is essential--personal values, the kind of society we want, the kind of knowledge we want to teach.

17. Having someone say we are espousing secular humanism doesn't make it true.

18. We have borrowed heavily from business without looking at the effects or implications in a home economics context.

19. Let's not forget Maslow's hierarchy of human needs.

20. Enough is sufficient! (in regard to use of earth's resources)

21. We need to teach fewer concepts and emphasize depth, helping students to learn how to ask the hard questions.

22. Maybe we're too specialized.

23. Use the telephone if you don't have someone local to dialogue with.

24. We need to examine what values we are teaching and what values we are not teaching.

25. We need to take a strong stand on what we believe, e.g., about the appropriateness of curriculum.

26. Mentors are needed.

27. We need to examine controversial issues through reasoned dialogical argumentation.

28. Let's focus on integrators.

29. Let's teach and live by principles rather than rules.

30. Values are motivational.

31. We need to reflect on both our ends and our means as a profession.

32. Mothers who operated on a high level of moral-ethical behavior had children who operated on a higher level, according to one study. The same was not true for fathers.

33. We need to include an ethics component in college classes and teacher education.

34. We need to "hold hands and link together."

35. We need to be gentle but assertive.

36. We need to know more about the theory and principles of ethics.

37. Since Home Economics is the only profession and field of study concerned with the family and all its interrelationships, ours is a unique and complex role.

38. Teachers and teacher educators should be models in the use of reasoning to make moral/ethical decisions.

39. The word problem does not have only a negative connotation; it can be viewed as a challenge or an issue.

40. The purposes of the family are more important than its structure.

41. All education is a process of becoming, never finished.

42. The mobility of society and lack of extended family can make one's connections and sense of place very difficult at times.

43. Listening helps build connections and fosters cooperation.

44. In considering "time on task" in the classroom, we need to be very clear of what our task really is.

45. Small group techniques in the classroom promote connectedness as students listen to others' views, help one another to learn, assist each other in developing skills, and share ideas.

46. Ethical behavior is related to caring and concern.

47. We need to think about the consequences to ourselves and to others as we make decisions and determine our behavior.

48. We need to continue to ask probing questions.

49. Let's continue to network with these conference participants and work on our own personal growth in the area of ethics.

(Continued from page 65--Ethics and the Media. James W. Carey, Dean, College of Communications, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.)

without a well-founded body of narrative and knowledge, story and verse, and a well-trained memory against which to test it and correct it, is to be in certain ways disarmed and helpless. Eudora Welty, the greatest American writer working today, says, "I live in gratitude to my parents for initiating me as early as I begged for it, without keeping me waiting, into the knowledge of words, of reading and spelling, by way of the alphabet. They taught it to me at home in time for me to begin to read even before starting to school. I believe the alphabet is no longer considered an essential piece of equipment for travelling through life. In my day it was the keystone of knowledge. You learned the alphabet as you learned to count to ten, as you learned "Now I Lay Me" and "The Lord's Prayer" and your father's and mother's name and address, telephone number, all in case you got lost." A trained, vivid, active, powerful human memory is the basis of all our ethical relations and you cannot get one by watching television or reading news stories. Without memory, no ethics; not much journalism either.

THE LISTENING PANEL

The following Resolutions (or suggestions to the profession) were proposed by the Listening Panel and adopted by the Conference at the final brunch.

1. Continue the dialogue about ethics.
    a. Illinois Teacher have session on ethics at AHEA 1988.
    b. Have ethics as a theme or program topic at state or regional meetings.
    c. Infuse ethics into State President's Unit meeting 1988.
    d. Encourage State Supervisors of Home Economics (in AVA) to include ethical reasoning in curricula.
2. Make Proceedings of Illinois Teacher Conference of 1987 widely available.
    a. Seek publicity for Proceedings via AHEA.
    b. Place in Illinois Teacher booth at AHEA.
    c. Display at IFHE.
3. Encourage researchers to do research on ethics in Home Economics via AHEA and AVA.
    a. Include interpretative and critical science modes.
    b. Identify assumptions we make for our profession to clarify our ethical approach.
4. Incorporate an ethics component into common core required for accreditation.
    a. Consider ethical issue of accrediting programs not called Home Economics.
    b. Consider the ethics component of certification.
5. Encourage AHEA to take a position on the "censorship of textbooks" now going on.
6. Encourage AHEA to take a position on intrusions into the practice of home economics.
7. Consider the ethical issues that face the profession including the responsibility of the individual home economist to the profession.

HESTIAN ETHICS: AN ETHICS OF CARE AND CONNECTION

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Feminist theory and the new scholarship on women have informed my understanding of and appreciation for Home Economics. This conference gives me an opportunity to expand on ideas presented in a seminar at the University of Illinois in October 1985 and later published in an article titled "Home Economics and the Hestian Mode."[1] To recapitulate: I propose that the unique nature and meaning of Home Economics can be communicated in a metaphor drawn from the name of Hestia, goddess of hearth and home in classical Greek thought. By contrast, we also deal with a world typified by Hermes, the Greek god of communication and public spaces. Hestia and Hermes represent the private and public spheres.[2] In addition, archetypal psychological theory identifies persistent aspects of the "collective unconscious" that can properly be called "Hestian" for both women and men.[3] To support my view further, French Annales historians (notably Fernand Braudel) recognized the private (Hestian) and the public (Hermean) as two distinct yet related spheres of human action.[4]

Systems thinking, implicit throughout the history of Home Economics, is essential for understanding the relation of the two interdependent spheres. Systems thinking, as contrasted with linear or "logical" thinking, is necessary to see "wholes" and the relationship of parts to wholes. Holistic thinking is essential for the comprehensive vision required in an integrative discipline such as Home Economics.[5]

My research and theoretical work deal with Home Economics as a discipline and a profession with a unique grounding in the private (Hestian) sphere which has also been called the "life-world" of women. Bernard noted the importance of studying the female world.[6] Home Economics, the first "woman's discipline," has traditionally integrated knowledge from the male-defined disciplines from a perspective that cannot be characterized as "female" or "feminine." Rather, it is Hestian. From this Hestian center, the interest of home economists extends outward to the Hermean "public" world and the activities that take place there. These in turn impact on the Hestian "private" world. As the State has become the chief Hermean institution, the family has become the major Hestian institution. The two can be viewed as interdependent and interactive systems. This perspective creates for Home Economics a Hestian ethical horizon, wherein actions (both private and public) must be measured against a "home"-centered standard which, I hope to show, values care and connection.

The Private and the Public

The political philosopher Hannah Arendt says that the private and public spheres of life (which correspond to the household and political realms) have existed as distinct entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state. In her view, the emergence of the social realm which (strictly speaking) is neither private nor public, is a relatively new phenomenon. Its origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and found its political form in the nation-state. This development makes it hard to understand the decisive division between activities related to the maintenance of life in the private sphere and activities related to the "common good" in the public sphere. Arendt states that the line between the private and the public, regarded as "self-evident" and "axiomatic" in ancient times, has become blurred. She points out that in ancient thought the very term "political economy" would be a contradiction in terms because what was then termed "economic" related to individual life and species survival and was, by definition, a nonpolitical "household" affair.[7]

The classical scholar Jean-Pierre Vernant delineates two kinds of social space from which the Annalistes derived their ideas.[8] On the one hand is the private, socially invisible space associated with Hestia--the "Great Goddess" of antiquity. Hestia embodied the invisible natural order which met the survival needs of human beings--for food, body covering, shelter, and intimate connection. The beneficent aspect of Hestia was signified in the continuity and stability of the private world of the oikos, or household, which gave a family its social location and identity--the "house of Atreus," for example. Hestia's presence was symbolized by the family hearth and the hearth fire. In ordinary language, this private space has been called the "domestic sphere" or

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[1] Patricia J. Thompson (1986). "Home Economics and the Hestian Mode." Illinois Teacher of Home Economics 29:3 (January-February), pp. 87-91.

[2] Patricia J. Thompson (1986). "Myth for Home Economics Empowerment--Making Visible Our Hestian World." What's New in Home Economics 19:7/8 (March/April), pp. 10-11.

[3] Jean Shinoda Bolen (1984). Goddesses in Everywoman: A New Psychology of Women. New York: Harper-Colophon.

[4] Traian Stoianovich (1976). French Historical Method: The Annales Paradigm. Foreword by Fernand Braudel. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. See Also Fernand Braudel (1979; 1981). The Structures of Everyday Life. Tr. from the French. Rev. by Sian Reynolds. New York: Harper & Row.

[5] Patricia J. Thompson (1986). "Systems Thinking and Information Processing: Key Concepts for Home Economics Education." In Proceedings of an International Conference on Thinking and Problem Solving in Home Economics. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University, May 31-June 3, 1986, pp. 79-87.

[6] Jessie Bernard (1981). The Female World. New York: The Free Press-Macmillan.

[7] Hannah Arendt (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

[8] Jean-Pierre Vernant (1982). Myth and Thought Among the Greeks. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

"domestic realm." In the Annales canon, the socially visible, public space was associated with Hermes, god of communication and change. This was the sphere of the polis, or city-state.

In both Greece and Rome, women's spirituality (with its tie to the natural order) was manifest in rituals associated with Hestia and (later) Vesta. It was woman's duty to keep the sacred fire burning. The hearth was a spiritual symbol. In early times, the great public hearth of Hestia (later Vesta) was symbolic of the private household "writ large" in the public space of the city-state. Thus separated, the private (domestic) realm and the public (political) realm coexisted. They continue to coexist. However, greater attention is paid to the public sphere and greater value is placed on activities that occur there.

Costantakos details the etymological roots of Home Economics in the oikos, or household, and in oikonomeia, i.e., "economics" or household resource management.[9] Indeed, since its inception in the late 19th century, the domestic science/home economics movement has maintained its focus on the integrated household system, resource management, and the family--in short, the Hestian domain. Employing systems thinking, Hook and Paolucci conceptualized the family as a life support system for its members. They viewed the household/family unit as an ecosystem.[10] According to Arendt:

> it is very likely that the rise of the city-state and the public realm occurred at the expense of the private realm of family and household. Yet the old sanctity of the hearth...was never entirely lost. What prevented the polis from violating the private lives of its citizens and made it hold sacred the boundaries surrounding each property was not respect for private property as we understand it, but the fact that without owning a house a man could not participate in the affairs of the world because he had no location in it which was properly his own.[11]

Our social location is still fixed by our "home address." The person without an "address"--the homeless person--becomes socially "invisible." More than any other factor, I believe that Home Economics is rendered "invisible" because of its concern for the private sphere, a sphere historically identified with women. As a matter of fact--if not a matter of choice--Home Economics is a women's field. It is, in fact, the first "women's studies."

Paradigm Lost: Reclaiming Hestia

The new scholarship on women is replete with references to "woman's place," the "private sphere," and "woman's invisibility." Such language connotes a lingering awareness of something significant in human life that, having no name, has not been conceptually incorporated in our accepted ways of being, seeing, and thinking. In effect, it is "paradigm lost." In my view, the Hestian/Hermean distinction gives voice and coherence to women's collective concern for home, family, and children and is especially apt for Home Economics. The metaphor goes beyond gender, however, because female and male human beings live in both a private, Hestian world and a public, Hermean one. They must learn to function ethically in both spheres.

Before addressing the notion of a Hestian ethic, we must grasp the psychological meaning of the Hestian domain. As described by the French- Canadian psychologist Ginette Paris:

> Hestia is the center of the Earth, the center of the home, and our own personal center. She does not leave her place; we must go to her...
>
> The home of the average Greek of antiquity was in the first place a hearth, around which was built a house. The domestic space was organized around a hearth, and Hestia was this hearth. There was only one word to designate both the hearth and the Goddess who inhabited it. Just as "orgasm" is designated in ancient Greek by the word "Aphrodite," so the hearth fire is designated as "Hestia."
>
> This was the hearth of the home, the place of intimacy for the group or family, a shelter from tumult, for Hestia protects, receives, and reassures. When a stranger was invited in the area of the hearth, he was protected, for this place was sacred... Quarrels and fights could not develop in Hestia's presence, because the hearth was a place of peace and security.[12]

In the course of human evolution, the need for a secure "place" of one's own and a group with whom to share it may have become imprinted--indeed "hardwired"--into the human psyche, thus creating the Hestian archetype. In other words, all human beings (female and male) are programmed to be Hestian.

I find the Hestian paradigm implicit in Home Economics. It is concerned with such private sphere, "everyday" matters as food and fiber, textiles and clothing, shelter and household furnishings and equipment, and the knowledge and technologies associated with their acquisition and use in families. The connecting thread in the process of resource management is practical reasoning or prudent deliberation (which Aristotle called phronesis). Prudential choice in the solution of everyday problems is related (either directly or indirectly) to the wellbeing of the home and family. Human wellbeing is the core of a Hestian ethic. It makes the wise use of resources an ethical priority and dictates the need to make ethical choices in everyday circumstances.

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[9] Chrysie M. Costantakos (1984). "The Home Economics Idea: An Etymological Odyssey." In Patricia J. Thompson, ed. Knowledge, Technology, and Family Change. Fourth Yearbook of the Teacher Education Section of the American Home Economics Association. Bloomington, IL: McKnight Publishing Company, pp. 176-194.

[10] Nancy C. Hook and Beatrice Paolucci, "The Family as an Ecosystem." The Journal of Home Economics 62:2 (May), pp. 315-317.

[11] Arendt, op. cit. pp. 29-30.

[12] Ginette Paris (1986). Pagan Meditations: Aphrodite, Hestia, Artemis. Dallas, TX: Spring Publications.

A Hestian Heuristic for Ethical Analysis

The term "heuristic" is used in philosophy, the sciences, and engineering to refer to a "real world" model that serves to organize ideas, information, or research data. It is also a framework for ethical analysis. In the past, most heuristics were developed in and for the Hermean domain--for the Patriarchal public world.

According to Sissela Bok, epistemology and ethics nourish each other, and we must get beyond the notion that epistemology is somehow prior to ethics. She writes:

> Applied ethics...has seemed uncongenial and lacking in theoretical challenge to many moral philosophers even apart from any belief in epistemological priority and from muddles about the meaning of "truth." As a result, practical moral choice comes to be given short shrift...[13]

Hermean ethics hinges on abstract definitions of truth and lying. Hestian ethics hinges on concrete applications of understanding and empathy in the process of establishing a truth and a lie. It also involves forgiveness as well as punishment in restoring social harmony. Hestia was, after all, the peacemaker among the gods.

A Hestian lens of analysis provides a "corrective" heuristic for the one-sided view of reality perpetuated under patriarchy as "the one-and- only" correct view.[14] What I propose is not an either/or choice of vision. It is, rather, a binocular vision, a holographic model that brings both Hestian and Hermean, "male" and "female," experience into view. Its goal is a holistic image of humanity.

Consider the following list:

knowledge
values
truth
philosophy
information
courage
education
profession
science
right
freedom
power
technology

We can look at this list in two ways. On its face, the list consists of words with well-accepted meanings. Their definitions mask their patriarchal origins. They are commonly defined only by their Hermean meanings. Preface each word with "Hermean," and the objective, impersonal, "masculine" consciousness of the public domain is evoked. However, if we preface each word with "Hestian," a subjective, personal, "feminine" consciousness of the private domain is communicated. Gender issues can be separated from human issues, and we can speak of "Hestian knowledge," "Hestian science," "Hestian technology," a "Hestian ethic," even a "Hestian language" to expand our understanding of once-closed Hermean categories of thought. Each time I place a particular word in "quotes," in order to shift its meaning somewhat, I find it is often because I am listening to a "different" voice--a voice denied a language of its own--the Hestian voice. Without a voice, the Hestian ethic is also silenced. To the extent that Home Economics reflects a Hestian heuristic, it has been denied a voice in promoting a Hestian ethic--an ethic of care and connection. Thus epistemology and ethics must proceed together.

In Home Economics, we are handicapped in our discussion of ethics by the limitations of Hermean language. The two adjectives "Hestian" and "Hermean" evoke competing systems of belief and commitment--one system private and invisible and "the other" system public and visible. Recognizing the existence of a "Hestian" heuristic in addition to a "Hermean" heuristic calls into question the "received wisdom" of Western civilization. It helps us to identify two distinct categories of human thought that contribute different perspectives on the human condition. Both must be recognized in order to deepen our understanding of the private and the public in human life.

The Hestian perspective suffuses Home Economics, and the Hestian heuristic--unnamed until now--explains the "double bind" of our thinking in Home Economics. We are being pulled in two directions. To be sure, both Hestian and Hermean views represent valid ways of seeing, being, and thinking--but only the Hermean has been publicly legitimated. Only Hermean ethics has been given public recognition and incorporated in Law. As defined by patriarchy, "Right" and "Justice" are Hermean concepts. Hermean ethics is based on rules designed to control and dominate. Woman's "authentic" way of looking at the world is accomplished through consciousness-raising (the feminist answer to masculist discourse and debate). It is legitimated through public speaking and publication of the new scholarship on women. Hestian thinking has not been codified into laws by males (and some women) who "see" the world in terms restricted by Hermean definitions and categories of thought. The Hestian heuristic has been denied "public" acceptance and "public" recognition in the legitimation process that remains in the control of powerful Hermean gatekeepers.

Feminist Ethics

Philosopher Mary Midgley defines the traditional business of moral philosophy as "attempting to understand, clarify, relate, and harmonize so far as possible the claims arising from the different sides of our nature."[15]

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[13] Sissela Bok (1979). Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Random House-Vintage, p. 11.

[14] Patricia J. Thompson (1986). "Hestian Hermeneutics: A Lens of Analysis for Home Economics." In Linda Peterat, ed. The Conversation and Company of Educated Women: A Colloquy on Home Economics Education. Special Publication. Illinois Teacher of Home Economics. Urbana-Champaign, IL: Univ. of Illinois, pp. 11-17.

[15] Mary Midgley (1978). Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Perhaps the different sides of our nature might also be characterized as Hestian/Hermean. Both are influenced by socially constructed gender, yet the moral issues that most concern women are not at rock bottom "gender issues." Anderson notes that women are effectively excluded from the social construction of knowledge.[16] The early home economists confronted this exclusion. They "invented" a discipline that gleaned the fields of knowledge and worked the neglected pieces into a comprehensive whole with unique significance for the Hestian domain and consequently for women, children, and families.

The contemporary French feminist Julia Kristeva asks:

> Are women subject to ethics? If not to that ethics defined by classical philosophy--in relationship to which the ups and downs of feminist generations seem dangerously precarious--are women not already participating in the rapid dismantling that our age is experiencing at various levels (from wars to drugs to artificial insemination) and which poses the demand for a new ethics?[17]

The ethics defined by classical philosophy has been derived from the particularistic viewpoints of males and legitimated by Hermean institutions as universal "ideals" and universal "standards." A basic feminist claim is that women's experience, experience authenticated by other women through consciousness-raising, is denied legitimacy by gatekeepers of knowledge in the Hermean world. The new scholarship on women is asking new questions, formulating new theories, and testing new hypotheses. A pattern has begun to emerge that reveals the Hestian paradigm. What was once invisible can now be seen!

In 1984, I argued that Home Economics should be viewed as a knowledge system--not a system for the perpetuation of gender role stereotypes.[18] Today, I would call Home Economics a Hestian knowledge system essential for the support of the oikos, for the maintenance of the family ecosystem. A Hestian knowledge system contrasts dramatically with a Hermean knowledge system which is required for "success" in the public world of government, business, law, science, technology, education, and politics. Hierarchy and status are Hermean categories imposed to maintain dominance, control, and "superiority," and they support a male-defined heuristic. Utilizing a Hestian hermeneutic, that is, listening to the "Hestian voice" in texts, is a first step toward reconceptualizing a "masculist," male-grounded perspective on experience with a "feminist," female-grounded perspective on the same phenomena. It is also the first step toward the articulation of a Hestian ethic, an ethic that promotes authentic moral behavior on the part of individuals rather than "proper behavior" through fear of punishment.

Recently, feminist theorists and women scholars have begun to deconstruct and reconstruct the assumptional world of patriarchy. They endeavor to "reconceptualize" the disciplines through this form of critical thinking. In a telling summary of three major Western philosophers, Hilde Hein writes:

> Jean Jacques Rousseau...explicitly prescribes that women's education be relative to their role as subordinate to men, and he violently repudiates any suggestions that women be educated for equality with men. Similar sentiments are expressed by other admirers of the "egalitarian" revolution. And such urbane philosophical skeptics as David Hume and Immanuel Kant, whose philosophical scrutiny ranged over the principle of causality, the substantive identity of the self, the foundations of morality and the truths of religion, blithely echoed the conventionalities of society with respect to women. "Bless their pretty little heads, they were not made for serious thought, the principled action or noble endeavor."[19]

As shown above, a Hermean definition of "serious thought," "principled action," or "noble endeavor" will necessarily differ from a comparable Hestian definition. The new scholarship on women forces on us a revisionist view of the history of human thought, including ethical thought. To the extent that a Hestian perspective brings into focus thoughts, actions, and projects that would be neglected in the Hermean view, we can expect that we must one day develop a Hestian ethical theory from a feminist perspective, not a quasi-Hermean one. "Domestic (Hestian) Ethics" which is concrete and has force in everyday life may then be valued more highly than "Propositional (Hermean) Ethics" which is abstract and of force mainly in theory.

Equality, Equity, and Ethics

Confusion exists in the women's movement about the difference between "equality" and "equity." The words are not interchangeable. Each has a different bearing on issues of ethics and morality. Equality consists in the belief that things can be alike and, when alike, should receive like treatment.[20] The concept of equality involves both ontological and ethical judgment. It supports an ethic of Right. It is embodied in the Rule of Law, a Hermean concept. In Western culture, the idea of equality among men has been a dominant theme, and one that has also been adopted by many leaders in the modern feminist movement. Women who use male experience as the standard of comparison assume that "equality" with men is desirable. Theirs is a Hermean goal.

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[16] Margaret L. Anderson (1983). Thinking About Women: Sociological and Feminist Perspectives. New York: Macmillan.

[17] Julia Kristeva (1981). "Women's Time." In Toril Moi, ed. The Kristeva Reader (1986). New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 187-213.

[18] Patricia J. Thompson (1984). "Home Economics: A Knowledge System--Not a Gender System." In Patricia J. Thompson, ed. Knowledge, Technology, and Family Change. Fourth Yearbook of the Teacher Education Section of the American Home Economics Association. Bloomington, IL: McKnight Publishing Company, pp. 317-341.

[19] Hilde Hein (1983). "Woman--A Philosophical Analysis." Citations omitted. In Mary Briody Mahowald, ed. Philosophy of Woman. 2nd ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, p. 344.

[20] Dictionary of the History of Ideas (1973). New York: Scribner's, Vol. II, p. 38.

There are acknowledged differences among human beings in intelligence, talent, strength, power, stamina, comfort levels, and the endurance of pain. And they are not gender specific. Yet all males in the category "man" are "equal" irrespective of difference. Females do not share in the category "man" or "mankind." This suggests the need for equity rather than insistence on an abstract and arbitrarily defined equality using male-defined norms of behavior as a standard.

A genuine respect for difference will emphasize the goal of equity. Equity suggests a less Hermean perspective on ethics, law, and jurisprudence. The ideal of equity recognizes that the law itself may not always be perfect, that the enforcement of legal rights and duties may fall short of justice.[21] Restated, we might say there may be conflicts between the demands of conventional or legal justice (which we might call "Hermean" justice) and natural justice which is justice according to individual conscience or practical reason (which we might call "Hestian" justice). Public (Hermean) law is general and seeks rules that address classes of cases, cases grouped in accordance with male-defined Hermean categories. Equity operates to correct the law where the law is found to be inadequate by virtue of its generality. We might argue that inadequacy of law is also the result of a "blind spot" concerning the Hestian domain.

The accepted view of philosophical inquiry is that its domain is public, and consensus is achieved through discourse and debate. A revised philosophy, as Carol C. Gould proposes,[22] would extend to practical social questions. In sum, philosophical method related to propositional knowledge is "Hermean." By contrast, ethical issues in the Hestian domain may require other methods of analysis. They may be less "rational" (i.e., arguable along the lines of a Hermean heuristic) but still "reasonable" (if argued for in terms of a Hestian heuristic). Hestian concern with love and human connection operates on an ethical plane informed by empathy and love whereas a Hermean ethic appears preoccupied with control and the maintenance of dominance informed by a will to power. The basic Hermean habit of perception is fragmented, linear, and impersonal. The alternative Hestian habit of mind is integrative, holistic, and personal.

New Ethical Dilemmas

The rapid proliferation and acceptance of the new reproductive technologies present two instances where Hermean legal systems must deal with redefined Hestian family systems. We can ask how a Hermean valuation of women as childbearers has forced on women a self-valuation leading to "motherhood at any cost." We may also ask how the notion of a privatized "male line" can come to have such overwhelming priority in patriarchal social systems.

Human beings become human in family groups that are organized to meet their everyday physical, emotional, social, and spiritual needs. Reproductive options are redefining expectations concerning human relations embedded in "the family." A Hermean dispute over parental "rights" seems inadequate to sort out the ethical issues involved. A judicial decision leaves a host of Hestian concerns unexamined.

Two cases challenge conventional concepts of family relationships. They present thorny ethical issues which are not readily reducible to conventional analysis. In the "Baby M" case we have long-held concepts of fatherhood and motherhood redefined by a concept of "surrogate motherhood." One has to ask at which point in the human chain of conscience and decision-making the ethical issue was first apparent. Explosive issues of "right" and "ownership" of a child's life cannot be answered by an objective application of Hermean rules. Nor can they be reduced to Hestian sentimentality. More far-reaching principles must be examined. Parenting involves commitment over a lifetime. The new technology raises the new question: "Whose child is it, anyway?" The locus of children in a family ecosystem involves the day-in, day-out mediation of both human relationships and resource management. For a well-balanced physical, emotional, social, and spiritual life, a web of relationships and a resource base must be established from the beginning. The monogamous family unit is but one institutionalized solution to this human need. Impersonal, abstract rules of law are hardly applicable to personal agreements that violate age-old social arrangements. Contract law seems hardly adequate to deal with changes in such matters. In South Africa, the issue has been further complicated by a mother who is carrying three fetuses conceived with her daughter's ova and her son-in-law's sperm. In both cases, the marital contract seems to be suspended, but with neither party physically guilty of "adultery." New definitions of "consanguinity" and "incest" boggle the mind. These, and cases like them, will place Hermean and Hestian views of morality and ethics in an ethical Erewhon, a moral vacuum, where the potential for human anguish may outweigh the potential for human happiness. A new paradigm is desperately needed.

Epistemology and Ethics: The Hestian Connection

Since Home Economics began as a reaction against fragmented knowledge, we may look at the form of practical reasoning inherent in the discipline as a form of connected knowing. Belenky et al. describe the epistemological orientation toward relationship in knowing as connected knowing. Gilligan and Lyons used the terms separate and connected to describe two different experiences of the self as (a) essentially autonomous (separate from others) or as (b) essentially in relationship (connected to others).[23] The separate-self experiences relationships in terms of reciprocity, considering others as it wishes to be considered. The connected-self experiences relationships as a response to others in their terms. We might designate "separate" knowing as Hermean and "connected" knowing as Hestian. Each provides a different perspective on ethical questions. Significant for a balanced human life and a humane society is the ability to integrate both the Hestian and the Hermean modes when examining ethical issues.

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[21] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 148.

[22] Carol C. Gould and Max Wartofsky, eds. (1980). Women and Philosophy. Toward a Theory of Liberation. New York: Perigree-Putnam, p. 3.

As laid out by Belenky et al.:

> Connected knowers begin with an interest in the facts of other people's lives, but they gradually shift the focus to other people's ways of thinking. As in all procedural knowing, it is the form rather than the content of knowing that is central. Separate knowers learn through explicit formal instruction how to adopt a different lens--how, for example, to think like a sociologist. Connected knowers learn through empathy. Both learn to get out from behind their own eyes and use a different lens, in one case the lens of a discipline, in the other the lens of another person.[24]

Women assume connection. There is a premise of connectedness in their search for truth and their ethical decision-making. The "white lies" of the Hestian domain violate absolute definitions of truth toward the end of maintaining connection. A different set of moral questions is opened to Hestian analysis. What is the purpose of maintaining "connection" if it is a mask for "control" of another person? Can it be considered ethical or moral? Feminist modes of apprehending the truth that connect the knower and the known and what is known in one area to what is known in another have begun to emerge. This integrative mode of knowing is Hestian, and it is long-standing in Home Economics. In the Hermean mode, if you master the rules, you do not need to know individuals. Members of the public sphere know the rules and are expected to follow them. They need not know one another at all. Dissociated modes are basic to rule-governed knowing, i.e., procedurally "correct" knowing. Collaborative modes are basic to connected knowing.

> Separate knowers try to subtract the personality of the perceiver from the perception, because they see personality as slanting the perception or adding 'noise' that must be filtered out. Connected knowers see personality as adding to the perception, and so the personality of each member of the group enriches the group's understanding. Each individual must stretch her own vision in order to share another's vision. Through mutual stretching and sharing the group achieves a vision richer than any individual could achieve alone.[25]

Separate and connected knowing have ethical implications.

The "Different" Voice is a Hestian Voice

Gilligan has proposed that female structuring of moral problems is articulated in a "different voice." Perhaps we could name it the "Hestian voice." Belenky et al. note that "when the woman's voice is included in the study of human development, women's lives and qualities are revealed and we can observe the unfolding of these qualities in the lives of men as well." They note:

> By listening to girls and women resolve serious moral dilemmas in their lives, Gilligan has traced the development of a morality organized around notions of responsibility and care. The conception of morality contrasts sharply with the morality of rights described by Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1981, 1984), which is based on the study of the evolution of moral reasoning in boys and men. People operating within a rights morality--more commonly men--evoke the metaphor of 'blind justice' and rely on abstract laws and universal principles to adjudicate disputes and conflicts between conflicting claims impersonally, impartially, and fairly. Those operating within a morality of responsibility and care-- primarily women--reject the strategy of blindness and impartiality. Instead, they argue for an understanding of the context for moral choice, claiming that the needs of individuals cannot always be deduced from general rules and principles and that moral choice must also be determined inductively from the particular experiences each participant brings to the situation.[26]

This concern for context is not the same as a self-serving "situational" ethic. It elevates Hestian principles above personal interest. I submit that the social context that lends ethical coherence to the particular experiences that women address is Hestian-grounded in concern for maintaining the family ecosystem. A Hestian ethic would protect women, men, and children and seek to preserve a hospitable human environment that supports species wellbeing. Defining oneself relationally through connection and responsibility rather than hierarchically through rights and status is basic to the Hestian ethical mode.

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[23] Carol Gilligan (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nona Plessner Lyons (1983). "Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Morality." Harvard Educational Review 53:2 (May), pp. 125-145.

[24] Mary Field Belenky et al. (1986). Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind. New York: Basic Books, p. 7.

[25] Ibid., p. 8

[26] Ibid., p. 115.

Hestian Ethics: An Ethics of Care and Connection

For Nel Noddings, psychic relatedness lies at the heart of an ethics of care. She distinguishes between "pure" or logical reason and "practical" or moral reason. I would distinguish these as Hermean and Hestian ways of thinking and valuing. Noddings says:

> ethics has been discussed largely in the language of the father: in principles and propositions, in terms such as justification, fairness, justice. The mother's voice has been silent. Human caring and the memory of caring and being cared for, which I shall argue from the foundation of ethical response, have not received attention except as outcomes of ethical behavior. One is tempted to say that ethics has so far been guided by Logos, the masculine spirit, whereas the more natural and, perhaps, stronger approach would be through Eros, the feminine spirit.[27]

Noddings believes that an ethic of care arises out of women's experience just as the traditional logical approach to ethical problems arises from masculine experience.[28] She alludes to the fact that the kind of caring that lends meaning to the act or process of caretaking is too often dismissed as "sentiment."[29]

Hermean feminists often misjudge Home Economics and home economists--mistaking the visible product for the invisible process. They see only the end result, not the process of either creating or valuing the resources that brought it into being or utilizing them in the context of caring relationships. Theirs is a Hermean evaluation of a Hestian process. Hermean means do not comport with Hestian ends. When the focus is on the object itself and not the object-in-use with its invisible affective context, we become "materialist." Our ethical concerns become thing- rather than human-oriented. Hestian needs are met in the spatial and social context of the family ecosystem. In meeting them, care and connection are both invested in the process and are inherent in the product. Indeed, the two cannot be separated.

Hestian ethics is not "rule bound," not by male-constructed rules in any case. Rather, it is bounded by the "natural rules" that dictate the physical, emotional, social, and spiritual needs of all human beings. Hestian ethics is invested in processes such as being, caring, nurturing, clothing, sheltering, and futuring--all intimately connected with long-term well-being at every level of human need.

A Hestian ethic is at one with the human condition--with the "nature" of our being while it respects the refinements of human action in meeting needs over eons of human evolution and cultural development. We dislocate Hestian care and connection to the Hermean domain with disastrous consequences. Abstract problem-solving is not linked to human concern for the well-being of individuals and families in their privately constituted Hestian space--the household and home. Formally constituted public agencies fail to meet the needs of the hungry and homeless when people--still hungry and still homeless--become enmeshed in the "red tape" of bureaucracies. Bureaucracies and bureaucrats are "uncaring" by definition. Switching off our basic human-ness to adopt a Hermean ethical mode is dangerous. We create the Frankenstein monster that will destroy us even as it "loves" us. To become too "rational" or too "objective" is to become indifferent to human suffering and to displace ethical responsibility from our private conscience to the impersonal public conscience of "the State." The dialectic and tension between the abstract rule and the concrete instance, between the objective, rational thought and the subjective empathic thought, dramatizes the difference between the Hermean mode and the Hestian mode. The ethics of care that Noddings identifies is also, I submit, an irreducible component of Hestian ethics.

Writes Noddings:

> If moral education, in a double sense, is guided only by the study of moral principles and judgments, not only are women made to feel inferior to men in the moral realm but also education itself may suffer from impoverished and one-sided moral guidance.[30]

The "double sense" to which Noddings refers is the Hestian/Hermean dualism. The "one-sided sense" is over-reliance on the Hermean part of the duality. The Hestian paradigm accommodates the ethics of care that Gilligan, Lyons, and Noddings identify. The Hestian heuristic allows us to organize around this alternative perspective rather than to attempt to adapt the varied experiences of women and men to a Procrustean bed of rule-bound Hermean principles. As Noddings says, situations of relatedness are unique.

> As an ethical theory develops out of this analysis of caring, we shall consider a process of concretization that is the inverse of abstraction, and we shall explore the possibility that this process is one preferred by women faced with moral dilemmas. Instead of proceeding deductively from principles superimposed in situations, most women seek to 'fill out' hypothetical situations in a defensible move toward concretization.[31]

Noddings suggests a commitment to care rather than a will to power as an ethical mandate. In her view, women often define themselves as both persons and as moral agents in terms of their capacity to care. It is Hestian (not feminine) to experience, enhance, and maintain caring-in-relation as contrasted with caring-in-the-abstract, which is Hermean (not masculine).

Caring is the wellspring of Hestian morality. One gives and cares at the same time.

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[27] Nel Noddings (1984). Caring: A Feminine Approach to Caring & Moral Education. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 1.

[28] Ibid., p. 8.

[29] Ibid., p. 22.

[30] Ibid., p. 28.

[31] Ibid., p. 36.

It is in this sense that it is better to give than to receive. As Noddings develops her thesis, she notes that the ethics of care is open to both women and men. As women have been accused of a lack of the capacity to reason in the abstract, men have been accused of the inability to feel in the concrete situation. Gender does not seem to be the definer of an ethics of caring as opposed to an ethics of principle. Noddings speaks of "concentric circles of caring." Just as Hestia was the center of the intimate space and the "relation" of kinship was warmed by the central flame, we may consider that Noddings' examination supports the notion of a Hestian ethic that goes beyond gender.

The Goal of a Hestian Ethic

We must distinguish between "principles" derived from arbitrary logical arguments built on assumptions conveniently narrowed to serve patriarchal objectives and principled behavior that serves the ends of a free and just "family" of human beings, each of whom has a finely tuned moral sense. We cannot allow a "moral attitude" to be displaced in favor of a "moral language" that takes precedence over the "good life," that is, a life lived within the bounds of moral awareness.

Women must reclaim for humankind the language of the Hestian domain and make it accessible to men and women alike. The so-called "feminine" attributes of receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness are essential for masculine well-being, too. No human being can designate another to be her/his moral agent. As Noddings notes, moral decisions are made in real situations, and she locates the very wellspring of ethical behavior in human affective response.

Each domain--the Hestian and the Hermean--responds to its own demands. A Hestian ethic deals with individual responsibility for personal actions. It deals with the private conscience as well as the connected consciousness linking human beings to the collective well-being of others as individuals and as members of the human family. It deals with issues of relation rather than rule. A Hermean ethic, by contrast, deals with collective responsibility, with the "public" conscience. This allows pious public statements to cloud ethical irresponsibility and amoral behavior in the public realm. When public policy deals with private morality, it often violates the private conscience of individuals. The Hermean ethic is a "consensus ethic" of the dominant group, i.e., a patriarchal group, imposed by powerful public institutions--the Party, the State, the Church, the Government, the Establishment, for example.

Distinguishing the ethical boundaries of the Hestian oikos and the Hermean polis is a precondition for understanding the complexity of ethical issues in everyday life. Western (read "Hermean") civilization has adopted the Hermean ethical mode as a universal mode, supported by patriarchal power. Gilligan has demonstrated dual aspects of ethical experience and moral "reasoning." In an "ethic of care," a "Hestian ethic," actions are predicated on maintaining connection. In an "ethic of justice," a "Hermean ethic," actions are predicated on maintaining power and control. Caring is more likely to occur in the connected (Hestian) mode of knowing and is an expression of the responsible vs. the authoritarian mode of moral reasoning. Let us begin to examine ethical concerns from the integrated, Hestian perspective of Home Economics. Then we shall have found our voice!

Conclusion

Alone among the disciplines (like the solitary Hestia), Home Economics advocates a holistic, integrated view of the Hestian domain as a "center" for human well-being. It should be fairly evident that women's muted voices have consistently called for greater attention to the Hestian domain which is both neglected and distorted by single-minded emphasis on the Hermean domain. In my view, both the fragmentation of the male-defined academic disciplines and the trend among Home Economics units toward "splitting off" the specialized areas illustrate how centripetal (Hermean) and centrifugal (Hestian) forces operate to obscure the need for a unified, holistic view of human well-being that would recognize both spheres as complementary.[32] This push-pull struggle between the Hestian/Hermean domains is an ongoing one. While those in the Hermean domain struggle for power and dominance, those in the Hestian domain struggle for voice and connection. Lacking an adjectival form for "Home Economics," I employ the adjective "Hestian" to describe the interlocking, interdependent everyday activities that are commonly associated with the invisible sphere of the household, home, and family. They are activities essential for day-by-day survival and the survival of the human species. Hestian activities provide the unifying focus of the field of Home Economics and the focus for a Hestian ethic.

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ILLINOIS TEACHER OF HOME ECONOMICS
XXXth Conference - ETHICS IN TODAY'S WORLD
April 11-14 1987

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